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Wolf and Lustig Ten Years
Later: Illegal State Evidence
in State and Federal Courts
In this Article Professor Kamisar analyzes the decisions in
Wolf v. Colorado and Lustig v. United States. He considers
and rejects various bases for treating evidence obtained in:
(a) state search and seizure cases differently from state confession cases; (b) "silver platter" search and seizure cases
(federal prosecutions based on illegal state-seized evidence)
differently from "all-federar search and seizure cases. In
light of Wolf, McNabb v. United States and recent Supreme
Court cases, he concludes that the "silver platter" exception
to the exclusionary rule should be eliminated on both conceptual and practical grounds.
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A large number of the Mafia

were driven out of Italy at one time; were they not?
MR. SIFAGuSA [A federal narcotic agent who has worked with
Italian authorities]. Yes; they were driven out by Mussolini.
SENATOR WILEY. Well, you have got to hand it to Mussolini
then. He didn't fear them. He went at it and cleaned them out.
Certainly, we are not going to admit that what Mussolini could
do, we couldn't do in this country ...
MR. SHAGUSA. In Italy's Fascist days they used many polico
methods which under our laws could not be used.
SENATOR WILEY. Do you want to specify?
MR. SRAGUSA. Well, I mean that there is no such thing as an

arrest requiring a . . . warrant. If they want a man, they get

him and put him in jail for several weeks without any legal
proceedings. They use hostages. If they want a man, for instance, who committed an armed robbery, I have referenco to
the name of a man that cropped up in this investigation we are
working on now, they would just take his mother and the word
would pass out that if so-and-so didn't surrender, his mother
would be kept in jail indefinitely.
Those are the methods they used in those days. The police
methods are now more democratic.
SENATOR WILEY. I wouldn't suggest anything of that character, but I would not admit that we are unable to cope with this
problem. ....

I

WHAT "character" of police methods may be employed to

cope with the problem" is the stuff of many important Supreme
Court cases. One day ten years ago (June 27, 1949) six such cases
were decided. Three murder convictions were reversed, resting, as they did, on

confessions procured by methods violating due process. 2 All three
were state prosecutions for state crimes based on evidence obtained

by state police. That the confessions were independently corroborated did not save them. That the police had resorted to illegal
tactics was crucial.
The other three were search and seizure cases. They ran the

gamut of federal-state relations. At one end was Brinegar v. United
States,' a straight fourth amendment case: a federal prosecution for

a federal crime based on evidence seized by federal police. In the
middle was Lustig v. United States,4 a federal prosecution for a federal crime based on evidence seized by state police. At the other end
was Wolf v. Colorado,' a straight fourteenth amendment due proc1. Hearings Before the Special Senate
Crime in Interstate Commerce, 82d Cong.,
2. Harris v. South Carolina, 838 U.S. 68
62 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49

3. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
4. 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
5. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).

Subcommittee To Investigate Organized
1st Sess., pt. 14, at 353, 357-58 (1951).
(1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S.
(1949).
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ess case: a state prosecution for a state crime based on evidence
seized by state police.
Wolf and Lustig stand in marked contrast to the other four criminal procedure cases decided the same day. The "all-federal" search
and seizure case and the three "all-state" confession cases regard the
character of the police activity involved as the ultimate question.
If such conduct is-unconstitutional, exclusion of the evidence thereby obtained will automatically follow.
Wolf and Lustig, on the other hand, view the character of the
police activity as something of a preliminary question. The five Wolf
opinions seem to be in unmity on one point: the search and
seizure in question violated dueprocess. The great debate centered
on what to do about it A (6-3) majority held that the evidence
need not be excluded. Similarly, the Government conceded in Lustig
that the search by state police was ".uite plainly . . . an illegal
one if tested by the Fourth Amendment "- which, in light of Wolf,
would seem to have made it a violation of due process as well 7 But
the main debate turned on the extent of "federal participation" in the
search: "a search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in
it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured by state
authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter." 8 A (5-4) majority found the requisite federal participation and
thus excluded the evidence without considering whether it would
have been admissible if seized by state agents alone.
Lustig furnished a golden opportunity to expand upon the meaning of Wolf. While it too involved state police, Lustig, unlike Wolf,
dealt with a federal prosecution. How significant was this distinetion? Was it decisive? Whereas the origins of the "silver platter"
doctrine may be found in the notion that an unreasonable search
conducted entirely by state officers does not violate the federal constitution, the interme6diate holding in Wolf is to the contrary: fourth
amendment rights are enforceable against the states through the
due process clause. Did Wolf, then, spell the end of the "silver platter" doctrine?
The Court left these questions unanswered in Lustig inasmuch
as "where there is participation on the part of federal officers it is
not necessary to consider what would be the result if the search
had been conducted entirely-by State officers." 9 Ten years later,
these questions remain unanswered.' 0
A major purpose of this Article is to consider the bases for treating
6. Brief for Respondent, p. 19 n4. See also Brief for Respondent on Reargument,
pp. 2-3.
7. See the discussion in section I-B infra.
8. 838 U.S. at 78-79.
9. Id. at 79.
10. "It has remained an open question in this Court whether evidence ob-
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"state police-state prosecution" and "silver platter" search and
seizure cases differently from "all-federal" search and seizure and
"all-state" confession cases. Another major purpose is to formulate
some answers to the questions left open in Lustig.
I. TiE Wolf CASE
A. Searches, Confessions and the Demands of Federalism
Wolf, as does any search and seizure case, marked a clash between the values of individual privacy and public security. But at
least for Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the author of the Wolf opinion,
the case posed still another set of competing values:
No member of the Court has more vigorously defended the protections of
the Fourth Amendment against encroachment by [federal] police officials
or has with more eloquence urged the value of those provisions in the
maintenance of the free society. On the other hand, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
has frequently insisted upon the relevance of prevailing practices of the
states in giving content to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and [at the time] some two-thirds of the states have refused to require
the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of constitutional rights from
state criminal prosecutions." 1 '

The author of the Wolf opinion proceeded to perform "the unusual, if not unprecedented, feat of simultaneously creating a con-

denying the most effective remedy for violastitutional right and
12
tion of that right":
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment - is basic to a free society.
It is therefore implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty" and as such
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause....

tained solely by state agents in an illegal search may be admissible In federal court
despite the Fourth Amendment." Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 98, 102 n.10
(1957). However, it may not remain an open question for much longer. After
declining to do so on numerous occasions in the past ten years, on April 20 of this
year, the Supreme Court agreed to reconsider the "silver platter" doctrine If it
resolves a preliminary question (whether or not the evidence used in a federal
prosecution was obtained by state police in violation of petitioner's federal constitutitional rights) in petitioner's favor. Rios v. United States, 256 F.2d 173 (9th
Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 359 U.S. 965 (1959) (Misc. No. 40).
The "silver platter" doctrine is also being challenged by the petitioners in Elkins
v. United States, 266 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1959), petition for cert. filed, 28 U.S.L.
WEx 3008 (U.S. July 7, 1959) (No. 126). While the government's position is that
Elkins should ultimately be affirmed, it is not opposing certiorari on the "silver
platter" issue in the light of the Rios grant. Memorandum for the United States,
p. 8, Elkins v. United States.
11. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Libarties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1950).
One who had heard Professor Paul Freund's Rosenthal Foundation Lectures, delivered two short months before the Wolf decision, would have braced himself for
discord. FRxtmm, ON UNDERANDING THE SUPREME COuRT, 22, 24, 28-29 (1949).
See also the penetrating pre-Wolf article: Jaffe, The Judicial Universe of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, 62 HARv. L. REv. 357 (1949), particularly at 358, 378-79, 396-407,
409.
12. Perlman, Due Process and the Admissibility of Evidence, 64 HAnv. L. Rv.
1304 (1951).
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But the ways of enforcing such a right raise questions of a different order.
How such arbitrary conduct should be checked, what remedies against it
should be afforded, the means by which the right should be made effective, are all questions that are not to be so dogmatically answered as to
preclude the varying solutions which spring from an allowable range of
judgment on issues not susceptible of quantitative solution ...
When we find that in fact most of the English-speaking world does
not regard as vital to such protection the exclusion of evidence thus obtained, we must hesitate to treat this remedy as an essenial ingredient
of the right. The contrariety of views of the States is particularly impressive in view of the careful reconsideration which they have given the
problem in the light of the Weeks decision ...
We cannot, therefore, regard it as a departure from basic standards to
remand such persons [those convicted on illegal evidence], together with
those who emerge scatheless from a search, to the remedies of private
action and such protection as the internal discipline of the police, under
the eyes of an alert public opinion, may afford.. . .There are, moreover, reasons for excluding evidence unreasonably obtained by the federal
police which are less compelling in the case of police under State or local
authority. The public opinion of a community can far more effectively be
exerted against oppressive conduct on the part of police directly responsible to the community itself than can local opinion, sporadically aroused,
be brought to bear upon remote authority pervasively exerted throughout
the country.' 3

Was the fact that at the time of Wolf almost two-thirds of the
states admitted such evidence so significant? Why then, three years
later in Rochin v. California1 4 when the Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, excluded the forcibly extracted contents of
defendant's stomach, did the majority fail to so much as address itself to the point made in a concurring opinion that such evidence
would be admissible in more than two-thirds of the states which had
passed on the question? 15
13. 338 U.S. at 27-83.
14. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
15. Douglas, J., concurrin 842 U.S. at 177-78.
Professor Roy Moreland points out that "the strongly affrmative position taken
by the Justice as to the issue was weakened by the lack of evidence of state practice
-almost
all the cases cited by him dealt not with stomach pumping but with
less drastic devices, such as blood tests and urinalyses," MoNzW.LN, MODMN CuMiNAL. IocEurE 81 (1959), but he agrees that "probably, a good majority of the
states would have allowed such [stomach pumping] evidence to be admissible in
1951," ibid. Moreland distinguishes Rochin from Wolf on the ground that in the
former case since "there was no well-established, over-whelming state tide of authority... the Supreme Court decided to nip the further growth of such a practice in the bud, id. at 82-83. It may also be that there comes a point in police
misconduct, a point reached in Rochin, when the Court is no longer concerned
about state practice, well-established or not. If so, why wasn't this point reached in

Wolf
Consider BEtsF,

CoNmoL OVER ILxEGAL ErFonc£mmNr o THE CImNAL

Ror.x OF THE Suspsm

CouRT

'Aw:

59 (1955):

How could the Court in one breath employ the Palko analysis which defines only fundamental rights of liberty and in the next breath say, as it did in
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Were the demands of federalism really so pressing in the Wolf

case? Was the problem really so perplexing that it could not be
resolved otherwise than by "simultaneous acceptance of contradictory alternatives"? 16 Perhaps -if it were a dilemma of first im-

L

Wolf, "'Wecannot brush aside the experience of States which deem the incidence
of such conduct [illegal search and seizure] by the police too slight to call for
a deterrent remedy not by way of disciplinary measures but by overriding the
relevant rules of evidence." [338 U.S. at 31] With a right that won Its way
into the Fourteenth Amendment because it is fundamental to our liberty, one
would expect, on the contrary, the Supreme Court would have been compolled
to "brush aside" any state opinions which held the infringement of such a fundamental federal constitutional right "too slight" for strong and effective protection, as would be provided by the exclusionary rule.
It is interesting to note that "using a commonly followed practice among tho
states as evidence that a contrary practice violates due process has found favor
primarily in dissenting opinions." Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process
Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 331 (1957). (Emphasis
added.) On some occasions, surveys of the various jurisdictions have led different
Justices to contrary conclusions. Id. at 330, 332.
Are the Justices sometimes simply impressed by what they want to be? Mr. Justice Frankfurter found "the contrariety of views of the States" on admitting the
fruits of illegal searches "particularly impressive" in Wolf, 338 U.S. at 29, never
alluding to the universal state prohibition against obtaining evidence by unreasonable search and seizure. Yet, on an earlier occasion he thought it "significant that
the constitution of every State contains a clause like that of the Fourth Amendment
and often in its precise wording," Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 160 (1947)
(dissenting opinion), and maintained "it tells volumes that in 1938, New York, not
content with statutory protection, put the safeguard into its constitution." Ibid. The
various state constitutional provisions are collected in Note, 85 ConxNy.T. L.Q.
625, 626-27 n.9 (1950). But when the same Justice wrote the majority opinion
excluding confessions obtained in violation of federal prompt-commitment requirements, McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), he buttressed this exercise
of supervisory power over the lower federal courts by pointing to the "impressively
pervasive [state] requirement" that arrested persons be promptly committed, id.
at 343, never alluding to the fact that no state in the union excludes evidence on
such grounds alone. Indeed, as Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out in his Tyrroll
Williams Memorial Lecture this year, the recent state trend is In the other direction.
See Douglas, The Means and the End, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 103, 114. See also Note,
8 DE PAUL L. REv. 410, 414-15 (1959).
16. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. 11Ev. 1, 30 (1950). See also Handler, The Fourth Amendment, Federalism and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 8 SmtAcusE L. 11v. 166, 174 (1957).
While the present federal rule of exclusion in search and seizure cases stems from
the Weeks case, there had been an "earlier excursion" to this effect, as McCormick
puts it, in Boyd v. United States, 116 US.-616 (1886). McCoiuiCx, EvmNc- 294
(1954). In the course of striking down a federal order calling for the production by
the defendant himself of self-incriminating private papers, Boyd viewed the compulsory production of such papers as the equivalent of an unreasonable search and seizure
and the use of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment as a form
of compulsory self-incrimination condemned by the fifth. Id. at 630-35. See also
Brandeis, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928)
"[E]very unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the Individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth." No less a
friend of the fourth amendment than Osmond K. Fraenkel, however, concedes that
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the Boyd result could rest on self-incrimination alone. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches
and Seizures, 34 HAnv. L. REv. 361, 367 (1921).
If one accepts Boyd's conceptual basis for the rule of exclusion, the result in
Wolf may be readily justified. For it was well-settled by the time of Wolf that
due process did not require the immunity from self-incrimination provided by the
fifth amendment. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
Professor Louis Pollak suggests that Wolf may be justified on this basis. Pollak, Mr.
Justce Frankfurter: Judgment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 67 YA= L.J. 304,
321 n.105 (1957). See also Note, 35 Comm.x. L.Q. 625, 629 (1950), considering, but rejecting, this approach to Wolf.
There are a number of things wrong with the approach, however.
For one thing, as many commentators have pointed out, see, e.g., Atldnson,
Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures,
25 COLum. L. REv. 11, 27 (1925); Grant, Constitutional Basis of the Rule Forbiding the Use of Illegally Seized Evidence, 15 So. CAd.L. Rnv. 60, 65-67 (1941);
Comment, 58 YAIu L.J. 144, 156-57 (1948), since Boyd it has become well settled
that a corporation is not a "person" within the meaning of the privilege against selfincrimination and hence not entitled to invoke the fifth, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 (1906), yet it is now equally well settled that a corporation may invoke
the rule against the use of evidence seized in violation of the fourth, e.g., Silverthome
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
For another thing, the physical evidence typically excluded in search and seizure
cases, e.g., narcotics, counterfeit money, liquor, is beyond the scope of the protection generally accorded the fifth amendment. The prevailing view, and the one
expounded by Wigmore, is that the privilege against self-incrimination only furnishes protection against "testimonial compulsion.' A second approach regards the
privilege as a protection against "enforced activity" on the accused's part, e.g.,
giving a specimen of his handwriting; but not against "enforced passivity," e.g.,
taking his finger prints or blood samples. A sparsely supported and lightly regarded
third view bars any evidence secured by compulsion from the accused, though only
-passive submission" is necessitated. See the icussion and collection of authorities
in INBAU, Sr..-INCRUan xA-soN: WHAT C.w
AccusED Pmnsox BE Co.%PELL
To Do, 3-8, 87 (1950); McComnca, EVImzCE 263-66 (1954); 1 MonG , BASmc
PaoBr.ms or EvDENcE 140-42 (1957); 8 WIGmoE, EVIDENCE §§ 2263, 2265 (3ad
ed. 1940). Thus, taking either the most prevalent or second-most prevalent view
of the privilege against self-incrimination, it is difficult to see how it lends support
to a rule of exclusion in search and seizure cases. But see the construction placed on
the privilege by Douglas, J., concurring in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 179
(1952); dissenting in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 443 (1957).
Still another objection to the Boyd approach is raised by the different protection
against derivative use of illegal evidence in the confession and search and seizure
fields.
It was early held that when "involuntary" confessions are extorted by federal
officials, the privilege against self-incrimination protects the accused against the
use of such confessions. See the elaborate discussion in Bram v. United States, 168

U.S. 532, 542-48 (1897). See also Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting

in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 140 (1954): "I think the Fifth Amendment
of itself forbids all federal agents . . . to force a person to confess a crime; forbids
the use of such a federally coerced confession in any court, state or federal; and
forbids all federal courts to use a confession which a person has been compelled
to make against his will."
Professor Edmund Morgan finds nothing in the early English authorities to
suggest that the exclusion of extorted confessions has its roots in the privilege
against self-incrimination, Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34
Muix. L. REv. 1, 18 (1949), but he forcefully argues that the privilege should apply
to inquisitions by the police. Id. at 27-30. See also McCormick, The Scope of Prvilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TExAs L. REv. 447, 453 (1938), characterizing
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pression. But did not "the power of the beaten track" 17 portend a
different result? Had not the Court, in Brown v. Mississippi,18 a full
generation earlier, and in the many confession cases between Brown
and Wolf again and again resolved essentially the same dilemma
against the claims of local power and policy? Had not the Court
done so regardless of the evidentiary value of the confessions?"
20

Why in Wolf was the Court's reach shorter and its grasp less firm ?
Any basic consideration of the unreasonable search and seizure soon
identifies it as an integral part of a broader problem. The third degree,
the unlawful arrest, the official invasion of individual privacy each repre-

sent abuses of the public force by officers charged with enforcement of the
law -abuses
which must be controlled if values that have been thought
to be of importance are to be maintained. Each springs from common
motivations and common impulses. . . . Consistency of approach to
problems so intimately related would seem to be a matter of considerable
importance ...
Brain's concept of the privilege against self-incrimination - "as but a crystallization
of the doctrine as to confessions" -as
"an historical blunder," but adding that "the
kinship of the two rules is too apparent for denial."
There is at least as much to be said, probably a good deal more, for the Brain
approach to confessions and self-incrimination as there is for the Boyd approach to
searches and seizures and self-incrimination. However, while the overwhelming
weight of authority permits the reception in evidence of facts discovered as a result
of obtaining an inadmissible confession, see note 109 infra, "knowledge gained by
the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it" in search and seizure cases.
Silverthomne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. at 392. Unless and until the
Supreme Court widens the protection against "involuntary" confessions to cover the
use of evidence uncovered as a result, the disparity of treatment afforded Illegal
confessions and illegal searches may be considered still another reason why the
search and seizure rule cannot be said to derive support from the fifth amendment.
See Grant, supra at 63-64, 68.
All in all, then, it is not surprising that none of the five Wolf opinions alludes
to a relationship between the exclusionary rule and the privilege against selfincrimination. Indeed, if the Boyd approach were controlling, Wolf would probably
have been a per curiam affirmance.
Even the Boyd approach, however, fails to explain why a confession obtained in
violation of fourteenth amendment due process is excluded while physical evidence
so obtained is not- an issue considered at length in this Article. For, as pointed
out above, if the exclusionary rule in the search and seizure field is the child of the
privilege against self-incrimination, the exclusionary rule in the confession area is
too, if not more so. Yet coerced confessions, even those independently established
as trustworthy, are banned by the fourteenth amendment despite the fact the
privilege against self-incrimination, as such, is not a requirement of duo process.
17. "[T]he power of precedent, when analyzed, is the power of the beaten track."
CARDozo, TnE GaowmH OF T= LAW 62 (1924).
-I8. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
19. See the discussion in note 109 and text accompanying notes 115-20, infra.
20. Cf. Freund, op. cit. supra note 11, at 111-12:
Marshall Foch is said to have "advised [his younger officers] to watch the
movement of a parrot in its cage, which progresses by reaching out one claw,
grasping firmly, and pausing before bringing the other claw into position grasp, pause, grasp, pause was his description of successful forward movement,
and whatever its application to modern warfare, it is not a bad motto for
constitutional litigation."
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S[Ilf the demands of federalism are not such as deny to the Court
power to supervise the interrogatory practices of state police officers in
the interest of procedures most likely to preserve the integrity of basic
individual immunities, such supervision of police practices in2 the interest
of preserving basic rights of privacy seems likewise justifiable. '

I would go still further. I would argue tha isofar as (1) selfrestraint of a reviewing court far removed from the scene and (2)
deference to state judges and juries, militate against Supreme Court
interference with local police practice, there is much more to be
said for noninterference in confession cases than in the search and
seizure field.
As an outstanding state supreme court justice has observed:
The confession cases generally follow a rather set pattern... . Violence
and threats on the part of the interrogating officers are alleged. These allegations are almost always denied. On rare occasions there will be objective
evidence that the prisoner suffered injuries while in custody; in such cases
there will be conflicting testimony as to how they were incurred ...
In this state of the record different inferences may be drawn. The
police may have had good reason to suspect the defendant, and their interrogation may have been a legitimate inquiry. The delay in arraignment
may have been due to the lack of complete evidence to support a charge
and to reluctance to disclose the evidence that was available. Or, on the
other hand, the delay may have been designed to keep the defendant from
obtaining legal protection, and the interrogation may have been directed
less to securing the correct answers than to forcing a particular answer.
The record is often barren of the evidence which would help resolve this
conflict. It frequently fails to show the actual mental and physical condition of the defendant, or, more important, the course of the interrogation
itself-the questions put and the responses of the defendant.m

Again and again, the confession cases-unlike the search and
seizure cases-find the Supreme Court engaged in the "uncomfortable business" of overturning jury findings upon disputed evidence; "as the crude practices of Brown v. Mississippi, namely,
hanging and beating become outmoded, and more subtle pressures
such as the protracted interrogation and the preparatory terror
with deferred examination, are resorted to, doubt and dissent increase." 23
21. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1, 25, 29 (1950).
22. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HAv• L. REv. 1, 11
(1956).
23. McCowMci, EvmEN E 242, 244 (1954).
On the other hand, juries do not pass on the illegality of a search. In the federal
courts and in the courts of most exclusionary states, the defendant is deemed to have
waived his objection to the admission of illegally seized evidence ifho does not
make a pre-trial motion to suppress, unless circumstances exist which justify his
failure to do so. And a refusal to suppress the evidence cannot be subsequently
attacked at the trial If a defendant is justified in raising the question for the
first time at the trial, generally the trial court resolves the matter outside the
presence of the jury. See, e.g., CoRNraus, Sn.uAcn AN Smzunt §§ 343, 344 (2d
ed. 1930); 2 UNDERHuL, CnmaAL EvmIENc § 413 (5th ed. Herrick 1956, Supp.
1959); 2 Wm okHTo,
PmnNAL EviDENcE § 701 (12th ed. Anderson 1955).

-
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The problems of proof in search and seizure are rarely of the
same magnitude. Generally, the facts are much less complicated, the
evidence much less conflicting. The Colorado Supreme Court clearly
recognized that Wolfs protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures had been violated.24 The United States Supreme Court did
not so much as allude to the "facts" of the case. "That officers of
the law would break and enter a home, secrete such a device [a
microphone], even in a bedroom, and listen to the conversation of
the occupants for over a month would be almost incredible," said
the Court in Irvine v. California,the other great search and seizure
case coming up from the state courts, "if it were not admitted.""
And if we regard Rochin v. California as a case of aggravated search
A few confession examples should suffice. In Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940), although evidence as to coercion had twice been submitted to juries who
found the confessions to be voluntary, the Court ruled that the confessions had been
secured in violation of due process. In Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945),
the highest court of the state, empowered to make new findings of fact on appeals
from death sentences, bad unanimously sustained the jury's verdict that the confessions were not coerced, "after a painstaking review of the facts," id. at 430 (dissenting opinion of Stone, C.J.). But the Supreme Court's "independent determination on the undisputed facts," id. at 404, was to the contrary (5-4). In Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), the Court proceeded to inquire whether "the undisputed evidence suggests that force or coercion was used," id. at 599, and concluded
it did (5-4) over forceful protests that the majority had (1) simply "conjectured"
from the printed record that defendant "was an impressionable innocent lad, likely
to be panic-stricken by police surroundings and that all his testimony must be
accepted as true except where expressly admitted by him to be false"; (2) "seems to
have laid aside all the conflicting testimony and then, without seeing or hearing the
witnesses, has attempted to draw, from the meager balance of the record, important
inferences of callousness and coercion on the part of the examining officers.' Id. at
618-19 (dissenting opinion of Burton, J.). In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143
(1944), although state courts and jury had accepted the testimony of defendant's
family physician, two disinterested businessmen of high standing, and an experienced
court reporter, to say nothing of the officers involved, against the uncorroborated
statements of the defendant, that the confession was not coerced, see dissenting
opinion of Jackson, J., id. at 163, a majority of the Court found the circumstances
inherently coercive," id. at 154. In Leyra v. Deuno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954), the trial
court submitted to the jury under proper instructions the question whether subsequent confessions were tainted by an earlier involuntary confession. The jury found
they were not and the New York Court of Appeals, which had struck down the
earlier confession on the first appeal, upheld the subsequent confessions on the
second appeal, see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Minton, id. at 584. But
the Supreme Court found "the undisputed facts . . . irreconcilable with petitioner's mental freedom"; the relation of the involuntary confession and the subsequent
confessions were "so close that one must say the facts of one control the character
of the other ......
Id. at 561.
It is true that the author of the Wolf opinion concurred in the Ashcraft dissent,
but he concurred in the results in Malinski and Haley and joined in the majority
opinion in Leyra. All in all, "Frankfurter's present readiness to join Court majorities
ruling confessions coerced represents a marked shift from the rigidity of the Ashcraft dissent." Pollak, Mr. Justice Frankfurter: Judgment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 67 YAT.P L.J. 304, 319 (1957).
24. Wolf v. People, 117 Colo. 279, 187 P.2d 926 (1947).
25. See text at note 58 infra.
26. 347 U.S. 128, 132 (1954). (Emphasis added.)
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and seizure, here again the illegal means of obtaining the evidence
was frankly set forth in the testimony by one of the deputies." Most of the straight fourth amendment cases are likewise quite
free from conflict and conjecture as to what in fact occurred.23
Rather they turn on the legal significance to be given the substantially undisputed evidence. It was clear that the police possessed a
valid warrant of arrest in Harrisv. United States29 and United States
v. Rabinowitz 0 It was equally clear in Trupiano v. United States 1
that the arrest was lawful, notwithstanding the lack of a warrant,
since a felony had been committed in an officer's presence. In all
three cases the dispute was over whether or not, as an incident of
the legal arrest, the place of arrest could be searched -without a
search warrant 2 In United States v. Jeffers, the Court pointed out
that "the Government admits that the search of the hotel room . . .
was unlawful"; 33 the case turned on whether a nonoccupant of the
room had standing to suppress the seizure of his narcotics. Of course,
the Court has differed sharply as to what constitutes "probable
cause," but rarely as to the concrete, subordinate facts present in a
particular case.34
While the Court moves into the area of state criminal procedure
under certain obvious handicaps, it also does so -withcertain advantages. As a judge of a state court of review has observed:
One of the advantages of judicial review generally, it seems to me, lies
in the fact that the reviewing court is removed from the local atmosphere.
That advantage, which exits in all cases, is underscored in criminal cases,
in which local sentiment often runs inordinately high.... [I]t is hard
indeed for any judge to set apart the question of the guilt or innocence of
a particular defendant and focus solely upon the procedural aspects of
the case ....
The more remote the court, the easier it is to consider the
case in terms of a hypothetical defendant accused of crime, instead of a
particular man whose guilt has been established.35

Again, however, if there is this to be said for Supreme Court review of confession cases, does it not apply all the more so to cases of
search and seizure?
27. 342 U.S. 165, 166 (1952).
28. Whether there is the requisite "federal participation" in illegal state activity
or whether the evidence was turned over to federal authorities on a "silver platter'
does present most difficult problems of proof. See the discussion in section H-C

infra. But this problem does not arise, of course, in a Wolf-type or Brinegar-type
case.
29.
30.
31.
32.
Class

331 U.S. 145 (1947).
339 U.S. 56 (1950).
334 U.S. 699 (1948).
See Reynard, Freedom From Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second
Constitutional Right?, 25 Im. L.J. 259, 289-306, 312 (1950).

33. 342 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1951).

34. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Johnson v. United States, 33 U.S. 10 (1948); United
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
35. Schaefer, supra note 22, at 7.
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Many illegally procured confessions are tainted with unreliablity." At least, more often than not, doubts must be raised about
their reliability. On the other hand, the trial judge is not likely to
have much doubt about the evidentiary value of illegally seized
narcotics or counterfeit money. If it is indeed difficult for any judge
"to set apart the guilt or innocence of a particular defendant and
focus solely upon the procedural aspects of the case," does not the
victim of an illegal search - typically "caught red-handed" 37 - appear more "obviously guilty" than the victim of a coerced confession?
To consider another premise of Wolf, it may well be that "the
public opinion of a community can far more effectively be exerted
against oppressive conduct on the part of police directly responsible
to the community itself than can local opinion . . . upon remote
authority." 3 8 But the more significant questions are has it been and

will it be so exerted? Not, I am afraid, nearly often enough. If it is
1
not "good politics" to "observe civil liberties" in this country, I9
36. When the occasion has demanded it, however, the Court has also struck
down corroborated and hence trustworthy confessions procured by unconstitutional
means. See the discussion at notes 115-20 and in note 109 infra.
37.
Decisions under the Fourth Amendment, taken in the long view, have not
given the protection to the citizen which the letter and spirit of the Amendment would seem to require. One reason, I think, is that wherever a culprit Is
caught red-handed, as in leading Fourth Amendment cases, it is difficult to
adopt and enforce a rule that would turn him loose. A rule protective of lawabiding citizens is not apt to flourish when its advocates are usually criminals.
Douglas, J., dissenting in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959).
38. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 32. (Emphasis added.)
To the same effect is the dissenting opinion, the same day, by Mr. Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Murphy, in Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 181 (1949).
39.
I am a fairly consistent reader of British newspapers. I have been repeatedly
impressed with the speed and certainty with which the slightest invasion of
British individual freedom or minority rights by officials of the government is
picked up in Parliament, not merely by the opposition but by the party In power, and made the subject of persistent questioning, criticism, and sometimes
rebuke. There is no waiting on the theory that the judges will take care of it.
In this country, on the contrary, we rarely have a litical issue made of any
kind of invasion of civil liberty. On the contrary, district attorneys who have
been rebuked by the courts are frequently promoted by the public. The attitude
seems to be, leave it to the judges. Years after the event takes place, the judges
make their pronouncement, often in the form of letting some admittedly guilty
person go, and that ends the matter. In Great Britain, to observe civil liberties
is good politics and to transgress the rights of the individual or the minority
is bad politics. In the United States, I cannot say that this is so.
JAcKsoN, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENr 81-82
(1955).
It may well be, as the late Justice Jackson suggests, that the long-held habit of
"leaving it to the judges" has in large measure caused the American public to be
less alert and less enlightened. Nevertheless, whatever the historical reasons, does
not the indifference of the American people to invasions of civil liberties now strongly
militate against "taking it away from the judges"?
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have seen no evidence that it is better politics at the local level than
the national level On the contrary,Ere is good reason to think
that all too often at the local level it may not be "good politics" at
all. Consider, for example, some of the disturbing findings in the
Report of the PresidentsCommittee on Civil Rights:
In one place the brunt of illegal police activity may fall on suspected vagrants, in another on union organizers, and in another on unpopular racial or religious minorities, such as Negroes, Mexicans, or Jehovah's Witnesses. But wherever unfettered police lawlessness exists,
civil rights may be vulnerable to the prejudices of the region or of dominant local groups, and to the caprice of individual policemen. Unpopular,
weak, or defenseless groups are more apt to suffer.40
The almost complete immunity from punishment enjoyed by lynchers
is merely a strildig form of the broad and general immunity from punishment enjoyed by41whites in many communities for less extreme offenses
against Negroes.
The prejudices of communities where civil rights violations occur
often defeat federal law enforcement. Evidence of this is found in the
behavior of juries ...
Similar local prejudice thwarts the efforts of the FBI to obtain information from local citizens-even including local law-enforcement officers.
Speaking of the problems encountered by the FBI in civil rights cases,
Mr. Hoover stated: "We are faced, usually, in these investigations, with
what I would call an iron curtain, in practically every one of these cases
in the communities in which the investigations have to be conducted .... "
Local prejudice also intereferes with the efforts of federal law enforcement officers because of the fear it instills and the silence it inspires in
government witnesses.

Are these the communities on whose public opinion we are asked

to rely?43

40. PREsmNf's Co.iha-rim ON CIVIL BIGHTS, To SEcuRE TnusE
(1947) (hereafter referred to as the Pansmr's Co.LrrraT
REPoRT).
See also Hopxms, OtR LAwLr.ss PoLc 321 (1931):

Ricrrrs

25

Not one instance of police lawlessness in a thousand shows that lawlessness
visited upon a spectacular criminal. It is visited upon individual e-prisoners,
lone workers in routine crime. It is visited upon the youthful imitation gangsters, the boys of 18 and 19 who -numerously of late- set out blunderingly to
be "ad:' It is visited, in exceedingly numerous instances, upon mere indigents

and morons and vagrants and unemployed men and migratories and drug
addicts and immigrants and illiterates, an appallingly numerous class in this

country, cases for the hospitals and the social agencies and the educational
system and the employment bureaus, but regarded everywhere by the police
as their prey.
Ernest Jerome Hopkins, a newspaperman who worked extensively with police,
was a special field investigator for the Wickersham Commission. In the preface to
Hopkins' book, Zechariah Chafee, Jr. lauds him for his "notable skill and enterprise in breaking through the barriers of silence which surround official lawlessness."
41. PnsmEN's Coaurrrrim REPORT at 24. See the discussion at pp. W0-25 of
the report. See also Hopxms, op. cit. supra note 40, at 55-56.
42. PnF._sENT's Co anTTrEE REPORT at 124-25. Specific examples are cited at
these pages.
43. I do not mean to suggest that southern police have a monopoly on the mis-
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Particularly where the rights of a member of a racial minority are
at stake, reaction to invasions of liberty is often found far beyond
the confines of the particular community in which they occurred.
On such occasions, at least, is it not a fair question to ask whether
or not widespread opinion can be or is likely to be more effective
upon local officials than upon national authority?
While the Wolf opinion is conspicuous for its failure to reconcile
the confession cases with those involving search and seizure, a number of astute commentators have suggested a possible basis for the
disparity in treatment: "physical violence is regarded as a more senous invasion of personal rights than is an illegal trespass or search
and seizure"; 44 "unreasonable searches and seizures generally do
not involve the same danger to the physical and psychological wellbeing of the suspect as does the brutality of the third degree"; 40
will ordi"the indignity suffered by long questioning and jailing 40
narily be felt more keenly than an invasion of one's home."
These may be good reasons for the court to scrutinize confession
cases with greater care and to review them less begrudgingly, but
they do not justify the present rigid dichotomy. They do not satisfactorily explain why the Court, in a particular confession case, will
pounce on state police misconduct although "concededly, there was
no brutality or physical coercion" and "psychological coercion is by
no means manifest," 47 while in a particular search and seizure case,
although state police measures are "almost incredible" 4" and the
indignities inflicted almost unimaginable, it will only growl a bit.
It is interesting to note that the distinction between physical violence or brutality and other types of police misconduct is a distinction which the late Mr. Justice Jackson seems to have drawn even
as between illegally obtained confessions. 49 The distinction does
treatment of racial minorities or that members of dominant racial groups aro not
also mistreated. See, e.g., note 54 infra.
44. Schaefer, supra note 22, at 14-15.
45. Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between
Judge and Jury, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 317, 349 (1954). (Emphasis in original.)
46. Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. Riv.
411, 431 (1954).
47. Harlan, J., dissenting in Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 200 (1957). Consider also the Leyra and Spano cases discussed at note 50 infra.
48. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132 (1954).
49.
Of course, no confession that has been obtained by any form of physical violonco
to the person is reliable and hence no conviction should rest upon one obtained
in that manner. Such treatment not only breaks the will to conceal or lie, but
may even break the will to stand by the truth. Nor is it questioned that tho
same result can sometimes be achieved by threats, promises, or Inducements,
which torture the mind but put no scar on the body. If the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Watts case were based solely on the State's admissions
as to the treatment of Watts, I should not disagree.
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1949) (concurring opinion). (Emphasis
added.)
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reconcile Wolf and Irvine with Rochin. And if Jackson's approach
to confessions were the prevailing one the distinction would transcend the boundaries between confession and search and seizure law.
But it is fairly clear that this is not the prevailing view in the confession field. Indeed, the three confession cases decided the same
day as Wolf have been described as those "that provide perhaps the
best illustration of the attitude of the modem Court" in the confession area since "in none is there any substantial evidence of overt
physical brutality on the part of the police." 50 Surely, there is much
Physical violence or threat of it by the custodian of a prisoner . . . serves
no lawful purpose, invalidates confessions that otherwise would be convincing,
and is universally condemned by the law. When present, there is no need to
weigh or measure its effects on the will of the individual victim. ... [J]udges
long ago found it necessary to guard against miscarriages of justice by treating
any confession made concurrently with torture or threat of brutality as too
untrustworthy to be received as evidence of guilt.
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
Professor Paulsen's comments on Mr. Justice Jackson's language in Stein are equally
appropriate to Jackson's language in Watts:
True, the language of Justice Jackson bespeaks a doctrine of a conclusive presumption of untrustworthiness. But it is commonplace that a conclusive presumption of a fact eliminates the legal significance of that fact. And thus, at
least in the case of physically extracted confessions, the veracity of the confession is irrelevant. Indeed, the veracity of such a confession may be confirmed
by other evidence 'substantiating it in detail. The confessions in Stein were
confirmed in this way, and yet the Court's opinion states that the convictions
could not have stood had the evidence sustained defendants' contention of police
violence.
Paulsen, supra note 46, at 428.
The inconsistency in Justice Jackson's approach to police violence does not escape
Professor Paulsen's attention:
But even in the absence of confirming evidence one may feel certain that a
few slaps by the police on the face of some hardened criminal with a long
history of dealing with the police would not move him to fabricate a confession. Why not allow the use of such a confession? Certainly in part becauso the
police have engaged in forbidden conduct of a most serious kind and will
not be permitted to keep the advantage of it.
bid.
50. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and Criminal Justice, 8 DE PA L L.
REv. 213, 235-36 (1959).
Perhaps even better illustrations are Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954), and
the latest Supreme Court confession case, Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
In Leyra the Court overturned a conviction resting on a confession induced by
the subtle, nonviolent methods of a police psychiatrist. The lack of physical brutality in Leyra is underscored by Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent in Breithaupt v.
Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 443 (1957). Joining in this dissent was Mr. justice Black,
author of the majority opinion in Leyra.
In Spano, the petitioner was questioned by numerous persons for approximately
ei&t_.staghtJours into the early momingbefore he confessed. His only respite
during this period occurre-dawlien he was "ansfi.r-ed--toanother police station. His
requests to contact the attorney whom he had already retained were ignored.
The Court noted at some length that, per instructions, a fledgling policeman
who was a "childhood f4fd" of petitioner's repeatedly importuned him to confess, falsely staM- thBat1] own job and the welfare of his family were in jeopardy.
In reversing on due process grounds, the Court concluded that "petitioner's will was
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truth in the observation that "today the third degree probably consists more in persistent, prolonged questioning accompanied by a
lack of sleep, food and various other discomforts, than in physical
violence." 51
In any event, while the various reasons why, by and large, illegal
searches and seizures pose a less serious threat than do confessions
may be good grounds for concluding that the fourth amendment
rights are not so "basic to a free society" as to be "implicit in 'the
concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the
States," the Court concluded unanimously that they were. And this
point is no longer in serious dispute. 2 The real question, then, is
whether or not the distinguishing features of coerced confessions
and illegal searches are such that the remedy of exclusion is warranted in one case but not the other. I think not. Indeed, I think
these distinguishing features cut the other way.
I share the view that the incidence of sensational police misconduct is much lower in the search and seizure field than in the confession area. I agree that illegal searches are typically less offensive
to the dignity of the citizenry and less often characterized by vio.
lence and brutality than are illegal interrogatory practices. But for
precisely these reasons they are also less likely to attract the interest
of the press, less likely to arouse community opinion, less likely to
excite the sympathy of jurors.
It is in large measure because "illegal searches and seizures lack
the obvious brutality of coerced confessions and the third degree
and do not so clearly strike at the very basis of our civil liberties as
do unfair trials or the lynching of even an admitted murderer"
e5 8
that "no other constitutional guarantee is so openly flouted with so
little public outcry."54 It is in large measure because this is so that
overborne by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused." 360 U.S. at
323.
51. Paulsen, supra note 46, at 412-13.
52. This is not to deny that the Court resolved it with surprising case. So the
discussion at notes 72-8 infra.
53. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 447-48, 282 P.2d 905, 913 (1955). See
also Comment, 47 Nw. U.L. R1v. 493 (1952).
Cahan saw California adopt the exclusionary rule. See the discussion at note 230-.
35 infra and accompanying text.
54. Comment, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 493 (1952). The findings of this Comment
are considered in a discussion of the limitations of the exclusionary rule in note 250
infra.
A dramatic example is People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 437-38, 282 P.2d 905,
907 (1955):
[W]ithout fear of criminal punishment or other discipline, law enforcement
officers, sworn to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of California, frankly admit their deliberate flagrant acts in violation
of both Constitutions and the laws enacted thereunder. It is clearly apparent
from their testimony that they casually regard such acts as nothing more than
the performance of their ordinary duties for which the city employs and pays
them.
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For various illustrations of the cavalier way in which the protection against
unreasonable search and seizure is treated and the inter-relationship of unlawful
arrest, unlawful search, prolonged detention, and the third degree, consider some
of the instances reported in Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of
Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182, 1195, 1197-98, 1201-02, 1205-06 (1952)
(based inter aa on interviews with policemen of all ranks, judges, attorneys and
magistrates; attendance at preliminary hearings in Divisional Police Courts; and an
examination of over 300 transcripts of such hearings):
One person was arrested after police found drugs in his apartment, which
they had raided merely because they found his name in a notebook in the possession of a suspect arrested the previous day. Another man was arrested simply
because the police "believed" a known user had visited him. Known drug addicts and those with a record of drug conviction are often searched for no other
reason. These people are called "police property" because the police think
they have a right to stop them at any time for a "check-up."
The police were candid in admitting that they make numerous "spot checks"
(random arrests) in the "dope areas" of Philadelphia....
Ilf the police know that the suspect has a record of past lottery, convictions, his plea [that he was going to play the numbers himself, which is not
illegal] will not be given credence; for here, too, certain persons are considered
police property" and receive special treatment. They are followed and frequently
searched at random. Persons in their company are often subjected to the same
treatment... .
Three-quarters of the arrests for disorderly conduct appear to be illegal, in
that that charge is used to cover lawful conduct of which the police disapprove.
In liquor, gambling or prostitution raids, the usual police practice seems to be to
charge all customers found in the establishment with disorderly conducL No
case examined showed any evidence of disorderly conduct on the part of any
of these people, and invariably they were discharged by magistrates. One
reason the police arrest everybody caught in their net is the feeling among
members of the force that the greater the number of arrests, the more likely
their superiors and the public will think they are doing an efficient job. Instances have been reported where mixed groups of whites and Negroes have
been arrested simply because of their fraternization.... The charge [disorderly
conduct] has been used against members of the Progressive Party, allegedly for
no other reason than their party affiliation, or that they meet in mixed groups.
Negroes who assert their rights against the police apparently do so in some
cases at the risk of arrest.
The Round-up is a spectacular species of detention and interrogation. A
recent example occurred in connection with Philadelphia's notorious DiCrisclo
taxi slaying, where the police raided various homes and, in one night, rounded
up more than thirty teen-age negro suspects who were taken to the stationhouse and intensively questioned without being booked. Those who satisfied
the police of their innocence were released. Out of this group, three ultimately
confessed to the killing.
The round-up is u
not only when the police are attempting to solve a
particular crime but also when they are attempting to stamp out a "crime
wave" in a neighborhood. In 1942 the citizens of one section of Philadelphia
were being terrorized by criminals who practically every night committed at
least one serious crime of violence. The police were occasionally able to trace
the culprits to two poolrooms and a taproom, but could not pick them out of
the crowds which habitually congregated there. Early one morning the police
simultaneously raided these three establishments and moved every person
found therein to the station-house for "screening." It took the police two days
to investigate the 300 persons taken into custody. Those who could prove they
were regularly employed were immediately released. From the remainder the
police culled enough knives and guns to fill several baskets. A dozen of the
men were known criminals, wanted for major crimes. It is reported that the
crime rate in this locality during the next 60 days dropped 80% in the case
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there is a special need for judicial intervention. 5 If the Court is unwilling to rely fully on tort actions, criminal prosecutions and internal police discipline to check misconduct in the confession field,
why, then, is it content to do so in the search and seizure field?
of the most serious crimes and 50% generally. When this activity was reported
to the Justice Department as a flagrant violation of constitutional rights, an
investigation was made. The conclusion of the U.S. Attorney was that prosecution would be useless, since no jury would ever convict the officers.
See also Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 28-29
(1957):
Although only a few of the police reports which were examined givo any
figures relevant to this problem, the limited information which is available Is
significant. Out of a total of 27,146 Detroit suspects whom the police recorded
as having been arrested in 1955, 22,477 or nearly 83 per cent were released without being charged. For the last four years the Baltimore reports show the discharge of 95 per cent of those arrested on suspicion. There were 2,235 arrests
of "suspicious characters" in 1952, 2,096 of the same in 1953, 2,609 "hold for
investigation" in 1954, and 3,025 of the same in 1955; of this total of 9,905
for the four-year period, 9,421 were "dismissed," apparently before the preliminary bearing. In Lincoln, Nebraska, in 1954, out of 187 arrests for "Investigation," 184 were dismissed. Cleveland information is incomplete, being
available only for 1953 and 1954 and only for suspects 'held for Investigation
by members of the Detective Bureau," thus excluding alldetentions by other
branches of the force. Of the 25,400 persons held by the Detective Bureau
during these two years, 67 per cent were released without charge. We have
already noted the high discharge rates for vagrancy and disorderly conduct In
Chicago and San Francisco, the high dismissal rate on felony bookings In Los
Angeles, and the probability that all these figures are gross underestimates
because they do not reflect completely unrecorded detentions. It is reasonable,
therefore, to hypothesize that the great majority of persons arrested on suspicion are released without charge.
55. Even the apostles of judicial self-restraint recognize the strong claims for
judicial intervention in the field of civil liberties. See HAND, TnE BuL OF Ricirrs
69 (1958); JACKSON, THm STRUcGLE For JumDcIAL Su'mnAcv, 285 (1941).
And of all the civil liberties, few, if any, command a higher priority for judicial
aid than does the protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Murphy and Rutledge, dissenting
in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 156 (1947):
[I]t is precisely because the appeal to the Fourth Amendment is so often made
by dubious characters that its infringements call for alert and strenuous resistance. Freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, easily summon powerful
support against encroachment. The prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizure is normally invoked by those accused of crime, and criminals have fev
friends.
See also Jackson, J., joined by Frankfurter and Murphy, J.J., dissenting In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949):
We must remember that the extent of any privilege of search and seizure
without warrant which we sustain, the officers interpret and apply themselves
and will push to the limit. We must remember, too, that freedom from unreasonable searc'h-diff T m some of the other rights of the Constitution in that
there is no way in which the innocent citizen can invoke advance protection.
For example, any effective interference with freedom of the press, or free
speech, or religion, usually requires a course of suppressions against which the
citizen can and often does go to the court and obtain an injunction. Other
rights, such as that to an impartial jury or the aid of counsel, are within the
supervisory power of the courts themselves. Such a right as just compensation
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B. Violations of the Fourth Amendment v. Violations of the
Fourteenth
Does Wolf stand for the proposition that obtaining evidence by a
search which would have violated the fourth amendment if made
by federal officers necessarily violates the fourteenth amendment
when made by state officers?
Wolf does not say in so many words that all of the fourth amendment (with the possible exception of the exclusionary rule, which
may be required by the amendment itself) is implicit in the fourteenth, that every unreasonable search is a per se violation of due
process. Rather, it declares: "The security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society.""0 The opinion
could conceivably stand for the more limited pro osition that only
certain outrageous violations of the fourth amen ent strike at its
very "core" and thereby offend due process; that only protection
against certain aggravated types of unreasonable searches and seizures is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Thus, shortly
after Wolf was decided, one commentator suggested that here, as,
for example, in the right to counsel cases, 'a single principle of
the Bill of Rights may be obligatory on the states in some situations
and not in others. 57
Conceivably, but not very likely. If this were the meaning of
Wolf, then whether a particular search by state officers was not
only illegal but also unconstitutional would, of course, turn on particular facts. But no facts whatever are given, let alone discussed,
for the taking of private property may be vindicated after the act in terms of
money.
But an illegal search and seizure usually is a single incident, perpetrated by
surprise, conducted in haste, kept purposely beyond the courts supervision
and limited only by the judgment and moderation of officers whose own interests and records are often at stake in the search. There is no opportunity for
injunction or appeal to disinterested intervention. The citizen's choice is quietly
to submit to whatever the officers undertake or to resist at risk of arrest or
immediate violence.
S6. 838 U.S. at 27.
57. Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1948-49, 17 U. CHL L. REV. 1, 33
(1949). See also Foote, supra note 54, at 41.
Professor Roy Moreland goes so far as to read Wolf for the proposition that "the
Fourth Amendment of the Bill of Rights is not included in the due process clause'
since the use of illegally seized evidence would be "manifestly impossible under the
holding in the Weeks case" if it were. MoazsAw, MsODEN CmuNAL PnocEDunE
132 (1959). (Emphasis in the originaL) It appears that he has balked, somewhat
understandably, at the notion that the substantive protection furnished by one of
the Bill of Eights may be fully covered by due process, yet be stripped of its
procedural implementation. But this is the very notion that runs through the
Wolf majority opinion. After all, prior to the Weeks rule the protection against unreasonable search and seizure, whatever it was worth, was still in the fourth
amendment.
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in Wolf. Not by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority,
nor by Mr. Justice Black, concurring, nor by Justices Murphy, Rutledge or Douglas in their separate dissents. Indeed, none of the five
opinions so much as indicates who Wolf was (a practicing physician) or the crime for which he was convicted (conspiracy to
commit abortion) or what evidence was seized (appointment books
from his office). As Mr. Justice Jackson later pointed out in Irvine
v. California, "the opinions in Wolf were written entirely in the
abstract. . .. "58

Moreover, although the author of the Wolf majority opinion does
not directly address himself to the question, throughout his opinion
he certainly seems to equate the substantive protection against unreasonable searches and seizures furnished by the fourteenth amendment with the specific guarantees of the fourth:
The precise question for consideration is this: Does a conviction by a
State court for a State offense deny the "due process of law" required
by the Fourteenth Amendment, solely because evidence that was admitted at the trial was obtained under circumstances which would have
rendered it inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in
a court of the United States because there deemed to be an infraction of
the Fourth Amendment . . .

The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police
. . . is . . . implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty" and as such en-

forceable against the States through the Due Process Clause.
But the immediate question is whether the basic right to protection
against arbitrary intrusion by the police demands the exclusion of logically relevant evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure
because, in a federal prosecution for a federal crime, it would be excluded.
We hold .. .that in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime
the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure . . . though we have
interpreted the Fourth Amendment to forbid the admission of such
evidence. ....59

And while concurring and dissenting opinions do not necessarily
constitute the most accurate and dispassionate interpretations of
the main opinion, it is noteworthy, at least, that Mr. Justice Black,
in his concurrence, "agree[s] with the conclusion of the Court
that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of 'unreasonable searches
and seizures' is enforceable against the states," 0 0 and Mr. Justice
Murphy, author of the principal dissent, "of course . . . agree[s]
with the Court that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits activities
58. 347 U.S. at 183.
59. 338 U.S. at 25-33.
60. Id. at 39.
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which are proscribed61 by the search and seizure clause of the
Fourth Amendment."
Furthermore, if the author of the Wolf majority opinion did not
view the fourth amendment as obligatory (theoretically, at any
rate) on state officers in all situations, he certainly missed some
golden opportunities to say so. In Stefanelli v. Minard, where the
Court refused to enjoin the use in a state prosecution of evidence
illegally seized by state police, once more writing for the majority,
he seems to perfunctorily accept the fact that the searches by state
police involved therein violated the fourteenth because "it is not
disputed that these searches, if made by federal officers, would
have violated the Fourth Amendment."6 And in Rochin v. California, instead of treating the illegal entry into the accused's bedroom, the struggle to prevent him from swallowing narcotic capsules and finally the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents as
incidents comprising an aggravated illegal search, and thereby one
violating due process, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, again writing for
the majority, likened it instead to a verbal confession.0 As Mr.
Justice Jackson noted later, "although Rochin raised the search-andseizure question, this Court studiously avoided it and never once
mentioned the Wolf case." 6 4
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Irvine, looks back on Wolf
as holding "that the rule of the Weeks case was not to be deemed
part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
hence ...not binding upon the States."6s Still no indication that
the substantive part of the fourth amendment is not to be deemed
part of the due process clause.
Finally, only this year, in Frank v. Maryland,6 dealing with the
conviction of a home owner under a city health code for resisting
the daytime inspection of his dwelling house without a warrant,
the Court, through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, noted that "we have
said that '[t]he security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion
by the police' is fundamental to a free society and as such protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Wolf v. Colorado ..., 6 and
61. Id. at 41.

62. 342 U.S. 117, 119 (1951).
63. 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952).
64. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954).
65. Id. at 148.
66. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
A month after the Frank decision, the four dissenters in that case voted to note
probable jurisdiction in a quite similar case, Ohio x. rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S.
246 (1959). Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan and Whittaker (who, along with
Mr. Justice Stewart, had made up the Frank majority) noted that Price is "controlled by, and should be affirmed on the authority of, Frank," id. at 248. Mr. justice Stewart recused himself because the case came from the Ohio Supreme Court,
where his father then served.
67. 359 U.S. at 362-63.
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immediately proceeded to a consideration of the due process question. In sustaining the conviction against due process attack, the
Court relied heavily on fourth amendment precedents as to what
is an "unreasonable search and seizure.""' If the fourth offers a
greater measure of substantive protection against searches and seizures than does the fourteenth, Frank would seem to have been an
excellent time to draw such a distinction.
The failure of the Frank majority to do so is underscored by the
four-man dissent by Mr. Justice Douglas. His premise- unchallenged by the majority-is that "the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment enjoins upon the States the guarantee of
privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment ...whatever may
be the means established under the Fourth Amendment to enforce
that guarantee." 69 And he goes on to 70
treat the case as if it raised
a straight fourth amendment question.
The "now you violate the fourteenth amendment-now you
don't" Wolf majority opinion evoked the wry dissent from Mr.
Justice Murphy that "it is disheartening to find so much that 7is1
right in an opinion which seems to me so fundamentally wrong."
On the other hand, but for the tendency of winners to be more
gracious than losers, one who approves the net effect of Wolf might
well protest, too. Protest that there is so much that is wrong in an
opinion that so clearly arrives at the right result. Or at least, at
a result so amply supported by authority. For when all is said and
done, the intermediate ruling in Wolf that obtaining evidence by
means of an unreasonable search and seizure necessarily violates
due process is certainly debatable.
If, for example, so crucial a right as the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions guaranteed by the sixth amendment 72 is not
68. Id. at 364-66.
69. Id. at 374.
70. Thus, Mr. Justice Douglas protests at the outset that "we witness...
an inquest over a substantial part of the Fourth Amendment"; regards the authority of health officials to "come without a warrant and demand entry as of right" as
"a strange deletion to make from the Fourth Amendment"; charges that the majority "misreads history when it relates the Fourth Amendment primarily to searches
for evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions" since "the protection of the
Fourth Amendment has heretofore been thought to protect privacy when civil
litigation, as well as criminal prosecutions, were in the offing"; and relies heavily
on Judge Prettyman's opinion in District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C.
Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950), for the proposition that
the fourth amendment applies alike to health inspectors and police officers. Id.
at 374-78.
71. 338 U.S. at 41.
72. As Illinois Supreme Court Justice Walter Schaefer observed in his 1956
Holmes Lecture:
Of all of the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented
by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any
other rights he may have .... [Procedural rules] are designed for those who
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fimdamental enough to be fully embodied in the concept of due
process, but turns on "an appraisal of the totality of facts in a
given case," 73 it is difficult to see why the due process clause does
not similarly "formulate a concept less rigid and more fluid" 74 than
the specific command of the fourth.
The term "unreasonable search and seizure" covers a multitude
of sins. It runs the gamut from relatively technical or trivial infractions to flagrant, deliberate and persistent ones. Compare, for
example, the "constitutionally unreasonable! search in lones v.
United States 5 (a daytime search warrant had expired by the time
petitioner's home was searched, although apparently there was
"probable cause" to believe petitioner had committed a felony and
was in the house) with the "almost incredible" activities in Irvine
v. California (repeated illegal entries into petitioner's home, first
to install a secret microphone and then to move it to the bedroom
and the bedroom closet, in order to listen to the conversations of
the occupants-for over a month). There is much to be said,
therefore, for an approach which would only apply the fourth
amendments protection against unreasonable search and seizure to
the states in some situations and not in others, one which would have
caused the Court in Wolf to stop and ask: Is this the kind of illegal
search that our polity will not endure? 76
The apparent unanimity of agreement that the substantive protection provided by the fourth amendment is filly embodied in the
fourteenth is particularly puzzling in light of the lesser status afforded the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination.
For only a few years prior to Wolf, the author of the Wolf opinion,
speaking for a 4-3 majority of the Court, had had occasion to point
out:
We are immediately concerned with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
intertwined as they are, and expressing as they do supplementing phases
kmow the rules, and they can become a source of entrapment to those who
do not. Substantive criminal law also presents difficulties to the uninitiated.
The elements that constitute a particular offense and the circumstances under
which a single charge may include lesser offenses are not widely known outside
the legal profession.
Schaefer, supra note 22, at 8. To the same effect see, e.g., BEA.EY, Tim RicuT
To CouNsEL ix A2EmRcAx CouRTs 1 (1955); FELiN, Tim Dm-m
,,er's
Cria-rs

112 (1958);

PuTKANitm, AmmqmsTrrAoN or

CrmuN..

LAw

183 (1953); Rib-

ble, A Look at the Policy Making Powers of the United States Supreme Court and
the Position of the Individual, 14 WASH. & Ln- L. REv. 167, 173 (1957).
73. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
74. Ibid., quoted with approval in the recent case of Crooker v. California, 357
U.S. 433, 441 (1958).
75. 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
76. Cf. Cardozo, J., in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937): "Is
that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him a hardship so
acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it."
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of the same constitutional purpose -to
maintain inviolate large areas of
personal privacy. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 ...
"We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two amendments. They throw great light on each other. For the 'unreasonable
searches and seizures' condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost
always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence
against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth
Amendment; and compelling a man 'in a criminal case to be a witness
against himself,' which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws
light on the question as to what is an 'unreasonable search and seizure'
within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment ... " Boyd v. United
77
States, supra, at 633.

"Even if the historical meaning of due process of law and the
77. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489-90 (1944), upholding the
use in a federal prosecution of self-incriminating testimony obtained by state
authorities under a state immunity statute. See also Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S.
371 (1958), and Mills v. Louisiana, 360 U.S. 230 (1959), discussed at notes 33540 infra and accompanying text.
Quite recently, in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), the Court again
speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, again quoted the Boyd passage with
approval. Id. at 364-65. Noting that "it is not necessary to accept any particular
theory of the interrelationship of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to realize
what history makes plain, that it was on the issue of the right to be secure from
searches for evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions or for forfeitures that
the great battle for fundamental liberty was fought," and stressing that In the instant case "no evidence for criminal prosecution is sought to be seized," id. at 36566, the Court sustained the conviction of a home owner under a city health code
for resisting the day-time inspection of his house without a warrant.
I think one may consistently deny that the fourth and fifth amendments are
procedurally interrelated, i.e., that the exclusionary rule must or should rest on the
concept that the use of illegally seized evidence is a form of compulsory self-incrimination, see the discussion at note 16 supra, and still agree that substantively
the two amendments have much in common. See, e.g., Atkinson, Admissibility of
Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25 COLUM. L. Rlzv.
11, 15, 17 (1925):
The holding in the prevailing opinion of the Boyd case that the Fourth
Amendment was violated, as well as the Fifth, was probably not necessary for
the decision of the case. At any rate, the minority, contending that only the
Fifth Amendment had been violated, came to exactly the same conclusion as
the majority.
The orthodox position would be to say that in the Boyd case only the Fifth
Amendment was violated while in the Weeks [and other search and seizure]
cases only the Fourth Amendment was infringed. It is natural to make this distinction in view of the manner in which the provisions are separated in historical growth and constitutional statement. Yet from the standpoint of policy it
would seem that the two provisions have much in common. They are both
based upon the idea that the government's authority to infringe upon personal
privacy should be limited. The Fourth Amendment is generally a limitation
upon enforcement officers, and the privilege against self-incrimination is a limitation upon prosecutors and trial courts. The former is ostensibly to protect
physical privacy; and the latter the privacy of one's knowledge. Privacy Is just
as much and as unreasonably infringed by the seizure of a document or a chattel as by compelling a person to produce the same or to testify concerning
them in such manner as to incriminate himself; and the practical result is the
same.
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decisions of this court did not exclude the privilege [against self-incrimination] from it," the Court has said, "it would be going far to
rate it as an immutable principle of justice which is the inalienable
possession of every citizen of a free government."7 8 Why, then,
considering the "intimate relation" between the fourth and the
fifth amendments, did the Court so rate the protection against unreasonable search and seizure? If "the immunity from compulsory
self-incrimination .... might be lost, and justice still be done,"70 1
how can it be said of the "supplementing phase of the same constitutional purpose" that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if
[it] were sacrificed"? 80
Nor is it amiss to note that while the Wolf majority was sufficiently impressed with Palko v. Connecticut to adopt its concept
of and verbal formula for due process,8 ' it was quite unconcerned
about the apparent listing of the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures in Palko as outside the protection of due
process.8 2
78. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113 (1908).
79. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (opinion of Cardozo, J.).
80. "If the Fourteenth Amendment has absorbed them, the process of absorption
has had its source in the belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed." 302 U.S. at 326.
A year before the Wolf case, Osmond K. Fraenkel pointed out, Recent Developments in the Federal Law of Searches and Seizures, 33 Iowa. L. BRv. 472, 491

(1948):

[Tihe Supreme Court has stated that the various guarantees of the Bill of
Bights will be included in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
only if they are "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." (Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)] Yet the guarantees of the Fourth
Amendment have been said to be "of the very essence of constitutional liberty."
[Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921)] Surely there is no substantial difference between those two descriptions.
What the Court told us in Gouled was that both the right against unreasonablq

search and seizure and- the right against self-incrimination "are to be regarded as
of the very essence of constitutional liberty," but at the time this was said the
self-incrimination clause had already been held not to be implicit in due process.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). It also told us on this occasion that

the "guaranty" of these two rights "is as im ortant and as imperative as are the

guaranties of the other fundamental rights oF the individual citizen," 25Z US. at

304, but heading its list of other fundamental rights was trial by jury which, likewise, had already been held to fall outside of due process. Maxwell v. Dow, 176
U.S. 581 (1900).
81. 338 U.S. at 26-27.
82. In the course of discussing various provisions of the "original bill of rights"
which are not embodied in the fourteenth amendment, Mr. Justice Cardozo states:
'As to the Fourth Amendment, one should refer to Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 398." 302 U.S. at 324.
At that page, the pertinent portion of the Weeks opinion reads:
As to the papers and property seized by the [local] policemen, it does not
appear that they acted under any claim of Federal authority such as would
make the Amendment applicable to such unauthorized seizures. The record

shows that what they did by way of arrest and search and seizure was done
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One might note, too, that while Mr. Justice Jackson agreed with
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Wolf, that the fourth amendment's protection against search and seizure "is basic to a free society" and
"therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such
enforceable against the States," Frankfurter, that same day, agreed
with Jackson in his Brinegar dissent that the fourth amendment
was "directed only against the new and centralized government,
and any really dangerous threat to the general liberties of the people can only come from this source." 3
Whatever might have been the case, however, Wolf did it the
hard way. Wolf took the circuitous route that a violation of the
search and seizure clause by state police is a violation of due process
but that this is an instance where one may be executed or imprisoned on evidence obtained in violation of due process and yet not
be deprived of life or liberty without due process of law after all.
C. What Hath Wolf Wrought?
I am aware that we must decide the case before us and not some other
case. But that does not mean that a case is dissociated from the past and
unelated to the future. We must decide this case with due regard for
hat went before and no less regard for what may come after.8 4
All who observe the work of courts are familiar with what Judge Cardozo
described as "the tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limits
of its logic." 85
'Twill be recorded for a precedent;
And many an error by the same example
Will rush into the state. It cannot be.86

Why, it might be asked, fuss at all with the intermediate finding

in Wolf that an illegal search and seizure is a violation of due process ? Why not dismiss that part of the opinion as an exercise in metaphysics by way of dictum 7 and be done with it? How the Court
before the finding of the indictment in the Federal court, under what supposed
right or authority does not appear. What remedies the defendant may have
against them we need not inquire, as the Fourth Amendment is not directed to
individual misconduct of such officials. Its limitations reach the Federal Government and its agencies.
83. 338 U.S. at 181.
84. West Virginia Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 660-61 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
85. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J.,dissenting; quoting from CARiozo, TnE NATURE OF THm JUDICLAL Pnocss 51 (1925)).
86. The Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene I.
87. Cf. Frankfurter, J.,for the majority in Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117,
119 (1951):
The precise holding in that case [Wolf] was "that in a prosecution in a State
court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure." . ..Al-
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did it may be esthetically displeasing, but what the Court did, for
all practical purposes, was to exclude search and seizure from due
process coverage. And after all, what courts do, not what they say,
is what matters, is it not?
One trouble with this approach is that not infrequently it is much
easier for courts to do what they do because earlier courts have said
what they have said.
That Wolfs intermediate finding signifies little, if anything, is
sad enough.88 Much more cause for concern, however, is the actual
though our holding was thus narrowly confined, in the course of the opinion
it was said: "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free
society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause ....
.
88.
Perhaps the thing most striking about the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter is the entirely general character of the analysis. Little attention is given
to the devices actually available under Colorado law whereby individual rights
of privacy may be asserted and encroachments upon such rights by state officials may be deterred and discouraged. It is assumed that Volf may sue in the
state courts to recover damages against the offending officers. But the majority
show no disposition to subject the adequacy of such device to any real test.
Conspicuous by its absence is the statement of any minimum standards which
a state must satisfy to convert the federal right of privacy from wish to reality.
It would seem that the practical effect of the Wolf case is virtually to leave for
local determination, unimpeded by federal judicial supervision, the matter of
making effective a federal guarantee of a basic constitutional immunity.
Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45
IXL. L. REv. 1, 9 (1950).
It might be said, further, that the Wolf opinion affirmativey evidences a disposition not to probe beyond the letter of the law:
Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of
deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to condemn as falling
below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause a State's
reliance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally
effective.
338 U.S. at 31. (Emphasis added.) As Justice Traynor pointed out for the majority
in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 440, 282 P.2d 905, 908 (1955):
The court [in Wolf] did not state that the other methods of deterring unreasonable searches and seizures must be "consistently enforced" and be "equally
effective." Except in extreme cases [citing Rochin], it is apparently willing to
leave the matter of deterring unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers
entirely to the states and is not yet ready to condemn methods other than the
exclusion of the evidence as falling below "minimal standards" even though the
state makes no effort whatever to enforce them and in practical effect, therefore,
has no method of making this basic constitutional guarantee effective.
A glimmer of hope is offered by Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the Court in
Irvine, 347 U.S. at 134:
Now that the Wolf doctrine [the guarantee of the fourth amendment is binding
on the states] is known to them, state courts may wish further to reconsider their
evidentiary rles. But to upset state convictions even before the states have
had adequate opportunity to adopt or reject the [exclusionary] rule would be
an unwarranted use of federal power.
This is a curious statement, is it not? Since when does the Court affirm convictions
to give the state courts time to revalue criminal procedures violating due process? If
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and potential impact of Wolf's ultimate finding: evidence secured
by illegal search and seizure violates due process but. .... "
In related areas of individual liberties, state prosecutors after
Wolf no longer had to deny that federal law applied or had been
violated, let alone content themselves with such denials. They
could quite propertly retort, "So what?"
Thus, in Schwartz v. Texas,9 the wiretapping counterpart of
Wolf, the state argued in part:
If anything, the petitioner in the Wolf case presented a stronger argument
for reversal than that which is raised here. There the evidence in question was obtained in violation of both the Colorado Constitution and,
through the application of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution
of the United States. Here the most that can be said is that a federal
statute was violated. 91

This is hardly the most that can be said for Schwartz. Indeed, in
some respects the case posed stronger grounds for reversal than
Wolf. For Schwartz involved, as do apparently most wire-tapping
California did not have "adequate opportunity" to adopt or reject the exclusionary
rule by the time Irvine was decided, why did the Court upset the Rochin conviction
two years earlier? Would Jackson say that the reversals in, e.g., Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right of the accused, at least in trial of capital case, to have aid
of counsel is guaranteed by due process), or Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(refusal to afford full review solely because of poverty is denial of duo process and
equal protection), constitute "unwarranted use of federal power" because the state
courts were not given an "adequate opportunity" to adjust their rules in light of the
Court's new pronouncements? Besides, it is now ten years since Wolf.
Unless and until an "adequate opportunity" presents itself, what can be said
for Wolf in the meantime? Professor Francis Allen conjures up some situations
where Wolf's recognition that an unreasonable search violates duo process conceivably might have some actual consequences: e.g., if a state court were to admit
illegally obtained evidence on the explicit ground that the defendant had no rights
which the state need respect, or if a state were to prosecute a person for resisting
a state search and he were to defend on the ground that the state action violated
due process, or if Congress should decide to legislate against state police misconduct. He then concludes that "the most expanded view of what practical consequences may fairly be expected to flow from the recognition . . . [in Wolf] of a
ederal right of privacy indicates only a small area in which federal power is likely
to be employed to give that right meaning and reality." Allen, supra at 11. See
also Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice,
8 DE. PAUL L. REv. 213, 241 (1959).
Wolf may have wrought a major change in search and seizure law after all. To
the extent that the "silver platter" doctrine, i.e., that illegally seized evidence may
be used in a federal prosecution if state officers present it to federal authorities on a
"silver platter," rests on the theory that state agents commit no federal violation
when they conduct an illegal search, Wolf vitiates the doctrine. But all save one
of the many federal cases which have dealt with this point since Wolf have continued to apply the doctrine, and most have not even considered the impact of
Wolf. See the discussion at notes 200-06 infra.
89. Cf. Freeman, Civil Liberties-Acid Test of Democracy, 43 MINN. L. R-v.
511, 528 (1959): "The Supreme Court must discontinue terminating each statement
of the ideals of liberal democracy with the word 'but.' Sometime they must begin
the next sentence with 'therefore.'"
90. 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
91. Brief for Respondent, p. 11.
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cases, a double violation of federal law: once when the communication was "intercepted," again when its contents were "divulged"
in court. 92 Thus Schwartz dealt not only with a specific violation
92. Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103 (1934)
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958), reads in part: "[N]o person not being authorized by the
sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted communication
to any person . . .
The Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have taken
the position that section 605 does not prohibit wire tapping alone, only tapping
followed by "divulgence," and, further, that it is not a "divulgence" when one
member of the government communicates to another, but only when he communicates outside the government. See, e.g., Brownell, The Public Security and Wire
Tapping, 39 Comm. L.Q. 195, 197-99 (1954); Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792, 793 (1954); Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An
Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 165, 168--b9 (1952). For
able criticisms of this position, see MoRELAND, MoDEZN Cna AmmL
Paocuran 14245 (1959); Donnelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wire Tapping Controversyj,
63 Y-&LE L.J. 799, 800-03 (1954).
The statutory language is obviously susceptible of the interpretation that only an
interception and divulgence constitute the offense, but it seemed fairly clear after
the second Nardone case, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), perhaps even after the first, see
302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937), that either would suffice.
Although the second Nardone case did not involve a direct "divulgence," but
rather information gained as a result of the taps, the Court reversed, noting that
"we are here dealing with specific prohibition of particular methods in obtaining
evidence." 308 U.S. at 340. (Emphasis added.) It applied the principle that "the
essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is
that . . . it not be used at al,'"id. at 340-41 (emphasis added), and held that once
the accused establishes that "wire-tapping was unlawfully employed .. .-as was
plainly done here- the trial judge must give opportunity . . . to the accused to
prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous
tree." Id. at 341. (Emphasis added.)
The Court also seemed to regard either an "interception" or a "divulgence" a
violation at one point in the recent case of Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 100
(1957):
The crux of . . . [the Nardone] decisions is that the plain words of the statute
created a prohibition against any persons violating the integrity of a system of
telephonic communication and that evidence obtained in violation of this
prohibition may not be used to secure a federal conviction.
But then it seemed to leave the question open, id. at 100, n.5: "Because both an
interception and a divulgence are present in this case we need not decide whether
both elements are necessary for a violation of § 605."
Nevertheless, does Benanti, can Benanti, really leave open the "interception"
question? State officers alone "intercepted" the communication; federal authorities
only "divulged" its existence. Yet, the Court seems to treat "divulgence" alone as a
violation of § 605:
In this case the statute was violated if not earlier at least upon the disclosure
to the jury of the existence of the intercepted communication, for Section 605
forbids the divulgence of "the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning" of the intercepted message. . . .
Although state agents committed the wiretrap, we are presented with a federal
conviction brought about in part by a violation of federal law, in this case in a
federal court ....
Id. at 100, 102.
The Court seems to be reading "no person not being authorized by the sender
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of federal law on the part of state police but, unlike Wolf, a specific
violation of federal law by the state prosecutor as well. Whether
or not the conviction would have been upheld if Wolf had not been
on the books certainly seemed debatable.
But with Wolf on the books, the result is understandable. There is
an obvious incongruence in excluding illegally seized evidence from
the state courts on the one hand while admitting unconstitutionally
seized evidence on the other.9 3 Nevertheless, Wolf's momentum carried a good distance in Schwartz. Where due regard for federalit now overstate relations had only precluded an exclusionary rule,
94
rode an exclusionary rule built right in the statute.
The perniciousness of the Wolf opinion is probably best demonstrated by Irvine v. California,which upheld a conviction based on
incriminating conversations heard via a concealed microphone illegally installed in defendant's home.
Perhaps never has a court so castigated instant police misconduct
while affirming a conviction.95 Once again, however, the state could
successfully retort, "So what?" 96
shall intercept any communication and divulge the . . . existenco" to mean "Intercept or divulge" to find "divulgence" alone a violation. If so, how can it avoid
reading the same statutory language in the disjunctive to find "interception" alone
a violation?
93. Cf. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121 (1942):
While this court has never been called upon to decide the point, the federal
courts . . .have denied standing to one not the victim of an unconstitutional
search and seizure to object to the introduction in evidence of that which was
seized. A fortiori the same rule should apply to the introduction of evidence
induced by the use or disclosure thereof to a witness other than the victim of
the seizure. We think no broader sanction should be imposed upon the Government in respect of violations of the Communications Act.
But cf. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 97, 102 (1957) (barring use of wiretap
evidence gathered by state officials in federal prosecution): "[C]onfronted as we aro
by this clear statute, and resting our decision on its provisions, It Is neither necessary
nor appropriate to discuss by analogy distinctions suggested to be applicable to the
Fourth Amendment."
For a discussion of the close parallel between the wire-tap and search and seizure
cases prior to Benanti and the departure from this practice in Benanti, see Bradley
& Hogan, Wiretapping: From Nardone to Benanti and Rathbun, 46 CEo. L.J. 418.
426-84 (1958).
94. See the discussion in note 92 supra.
95.
Each of these repeated entries of petitioner's home without a search
warrant or other process was a trespass, and probably a burglary, for which
any unofficial person should be, and probably would be, severely punished.
.. .That officers of the law would break and enter a home, secrete such a
device, even in a bedroom, and listen to the conversation of the occupant for
over a month would be almost incredible if it were not admitted. Few police
measures have come to our attention that more flagrantly, deliberately, and
persistently violated the fundamental principle declared by the Fourth Amendment as a restriction on the Federal Government ...
347 U.S. at 132.
96. Thus, it noted in its brief at pp. 58-59, 60-61:
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And a majority of the Court agreed. It mattered not that the
police lawlessness in Irvine was much more serious than in Wolf,
that the searches and seizures in Irvine were much more shocking.9T
Wolf held that not all police misconduct which violates the protection against search and seizure necessarilyvitiates a subsequent convictionY 8 But Irvine utilizes Wolf for the proposition that absent
"brutality to the person" all police misconduct which violates the
protection against search and seizure-no matter how "deliberate"
or "flagrant" or "obnoxious" or "incredible"-necessarily does not
vitiate the conviction. 9 Wolf as now applied, immunizes illegal state
searches from collateral attack, so long as there is no hysical
coer°°
cion, whatever else the nature and extent of the illeglty.
Four Justices protested eloquently in Irvine, but they were badly
plagued by Wolf. Indeed, the "swing man," Mr. Justice Clark, conThe United States Supreme Court has consistently refused to hold that the
basic right to protection against arbitrary intrusion by the police, protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment, demands the exclusion of relevant evidence in
state courts merely because it was obtained by an unreasonable search and
seizure.
Here we have an entry into the petitioner's house, the placing of a microphone therein, and the subsequent gathering of evidence by use of the microphone. This is no more than seizure of evidence after an illegal entry, and the
use of such evidence has been held not to deprive the accused of any right
of due process of law...
97. "We are urged to make inroads upon Wolf," noted Jackson, "by holding that
it applies only to searches and seizures which produce on our minds a mild shock,
while if the shock is more serious, the states must exclude the evidence or we will
reverse, the conviction. ...
We think ... that a distinction of the kind urged
would leave the rule so indefinite that no state court could know what it should
rule in order to keep its process on solid constitutional ground." 847 U.S. at 13-84.
But cf. Jackson's successor on the Court, Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices
Reed, Burton and Minton, dissenting in Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 220
(1956) (thae case is discussed at notes 193-99 infra.): "[H]ad the petitioner hero
been cohi.'eted in the state courts by use of this [illegally seized federal] evidence,
I take it'that Wolf means we would not have interfered, at least absent any showing
of a, more aggravated search and seizure than this record discloses." (Emphasis
addaed.
Foi some doubts as to the "definiteness" achieved by Irvine, see the discussion in
note .160. infra.
98: Although, apparently, the misconduct necessarily violates due process. See
section I-B supra.
99. "However obnoxious are the facts in the case before us, they do not involve
coercion, violence or brutality to the person, but rather a trespass to property, plus
eavesdropping" 347 U.S. at 133.
il0._"Surely the Court does not propose to announce a new absolute, namely
that even the most reprehensible means for securing a conviction will not taint a
verdict so long as the body of the accused was not touched by State officials." Id. at
146. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting.) But not even the involuntary extraction of blood
from an unconscious person by state officials vitiated the conviction in the later case
of Breithaupt v. Abram, 852 U.S. 482 (1957).
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curred with "great reluctance" solely on the authority of Wolf.'0
And Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting separately, pointed the finger
10 2
of blame squarely at Wolf.

Not so Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who filed the principal dissent.
As I read him, he protests that Wolf marked only a "bare" violation
of due process, but Irvine, as did Rochin, goes "far beyond." '0'
"[W]hat is decisive here, as in Rochin, is additional aggravating
conduct which the Court finds repulsive."10 4 Rochin controls, not
Wolf, because in Rochin, as in Irvine, the means used to obtain evidence "was offensive to prevailing notions of fairness," 101 was "resort to methods that offend civilized standards of decency and
7
fairness," 10 6 that "offend elementary standards of justice."1
Is this not a strange argument, considering that any unreasonable
search violates due process? Do not all such searches therefore con101.
Had I been here in 1949 when Wolf was decided, I would have aplied the
doctrine of Weeks. . . to the states. But the Court refused to do so then, and
it still refuses today. Thus Wolf remains the law and, as such, is entitled to the
respect of the Court's membership ...
In light of the "incredible" activity of the police here, it is with great
reluctance that I follow Wolf. Perhaps strict adherence to the tcnor of that
decision may produce needed converts for its extinction. Thus I merely concur
in the judgment of affirmance.
347 U.S. at 138-39. (Clark, J., concurring).
With the Court split 4-4 in Irvine, however, it might be said that in a very real
sense it is Mr. Justice Clark himself who "refuses today" to at least mollify the
harsh implications of Wolf, declining as he does to invoke the Weeks doctrine
against even "aggravated" illegal state searches.
102. "The departure from that principle [the exclusionary rule laid down in
Weeks] which the Court made in 1949 in Wolf v. Colorado . . .is part of the deterioration which civil liberties have suffered in recent years." Id. at 151.
103. Mr. Justice Frankfurter does not say this in so many words, but, this, it is
submitted, is a fair summary of what he does say. That is, when we recall his
intermediate holding in Wolf that an unreasonable search by State officers is itself
a violation of due process. Frankfurter's own language in Irvine is as follows:
The conviction in the Rochin case was found to offend due process not because
evidence had been obtained through an unauthorized search and seizure or was
the fruit of compulsory self-incrimination. Neither of these concepts, relevant
to federal prosecutions, was invoked by the Court in Rochin, so of course the
Wolf case was not mentioned. While there is in the case before us, as there
was in Rochin, an element of unreasonablesearch and seizure, what is decisive
here, as in Rochin, is additional aggravating conduct which the Court finds repulsive ...
There was lacking here physical violence, even to the restricted extent employed in Rochin. We have here, however, a more powerful and offensive control over the Irvines' life than a single, limited physical trespass. Certainly the
conduct of the police here went far oeyond a bare search and seizure.
Id. at 144-46. (Emphasis added.)
104. Id. at 144-45.
105. Id. at 143.
106. Id. at 144.
107. Id. at 148.
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stitute sufficient "aggravating conduct"? Are not all such searches
therefore offensive to "decency" and "fairness" and "justice"? And
if not, why then do we say they violate due process?
Wolf s influence has not been limited to search and seizure and
wiretapping cases. Its far-reaching implications have been felt even
in the confession area. For in Stein v. New York,' Mr. Justice Jackson for the Court again put Wolf to use, this time to take some disturbing sideswipes at what had generally been regarded as the
Court's basic confession rationale: coerced confessions are excluded not only to guard against erroneous convictions but - however impressive the corroboration of the incriminating statements,
however overwhelming other evidence of guilt- to deter improper
police methods in obtaining the confession. 0 9
108. 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
10q. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), the first fourteenth amendment
confession case, had not been on the books very long, when Professor Charles T.
McCormick, drawing on state as well as federal cases, asked, The Scope of Privilege
in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEXAS L. Rnv. 447, 457 (1938):
Can we not best understand the entire course of decisions in this field as an
application to confessions both of a privilege against evidence illegally obtained
- a privilege more clearly emerging in the decisions as the courts more clearly
perceive the hidden inequities of torture-and of an overlapping rule of incompetency which excludes the confessions when untrustworthy?
See also McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of
Confessions, 24 TEXAs L. REv. 239, 245 (1946).
After a careful analysis of the many Supreme Court confession cases from Brown
to Stein, Professor Monrad Paulsen concludes, The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Third Degree, 6 STAiw. L. BRv. 411, 429 (1954):
If anything is clear, it is this: The confession cases are the result of the application of not one, but two constitutional standards. First, a conviction cannot
stand if it is based on a confession which has been extracted by police methods
which create too great a danger of falsity; the means used must be considered
in relation to the defendant and his probable power of resistance. Second, a
conviction will be reversed when the confession was obtained by methods which
themselves offend due process; here no inquiry into probable falsity is relevant.
The "trustworthiness" test is a minimal constitutional guarantee designed to
protect the accused against erroneous convictions. The 'police methods" test,
on the other hand, exists, "not out of tenderness for the accused but because we
have reached a certain stage of civilization."
See also, e.g., Bmsmr., CONTROL Ova IrLEAL ENToncaMENT-r or TM CrMsu- A.
LAw: ROLE oF THE Suprnrar CouRT 70-86 (1955); Allen, The Wolf Case: Search
and Seizure, Federalsn,and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1, 26-29 (1950);
Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge
and Jury, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 317, 347-48 (1954); Perlman, Due Process and the
Admissibility of Evidence, 64 HLuv. L. REv. 1304, 1308-10 (1951).
However, if one of the purposes of the confession doctrine is to protect individuals from "coercive" practices, regardless of the truth or falsity of the particular confession obtained as a result, then "not only would confessions resulting from
such practices be excluded, but any evidence gained as a 'fruit' of the confession.
. . . Otherwise police and prosecuting authorities will not be inhibited from carrying on 'coercive' practices." Comment, 17 U. Cm. L. REv. 706, 715-16 (1950).
See also Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw.
U.L. Rzv. 16, 28-29 (1953). Yet-while the Supreme Court has not passed on the
question-where a confession, itself inadmissible because coerced, furnishes informa-
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Stein dealt with a prevalent but questionable trial procedure
whereby if the voluntariness of a confession presents a "fair question of fact" the trial judge admits it, instructing the jury to disregard it if they find the confession to be involuntary. 10 In the course
tion which leads to the uncovering of physical evidence, e.g., the stolen property, the
murder weapon, such evidence is almost universally received in evidence. Indeed,
many courts also admit the portions of the confession corroborated by such evidence.
See, e.g., 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVmENCE §§ 357-58 (12th ed. Anderson 1955);
3 WiGMoRE, EviDENCE §§ 856-59 (3d ed. 1940); 2 UNDmULL, CRImINAL EVIDENCE
§ 404 (5th ed. Herrick 1956).
While it is obvious that the "police methods" approach may sometimes exclude
confessions which have been sufficiently corroborated to satisfy the "trustworthiness"
test, the converse may also be true.
For example, what if the police of one jurisdiction secure a coerced confession
which is sought to be used in the courts of another jurisdiction? In this connection,
consider the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson, joined in by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, in Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 70 (1951):
Even if we should assume that Texas officials coerced this confession, they
were not acting at the request of Nebraska nor in any sense as her agent.
Before we could reverse the conviction we would have to decide a question not
heretofore answered in any decision that I recall, namely, whether Nebraska
merely by admitting a coerced foreign confession in evidence would deny due
process. Insofar as the reason for exclusion is to prevent convictions on coerced
confessions, which are shown by legal experience to be intrinsically unreliable,
I should suppose that any defect in its origin would adhere in the confession
wherever offered. Insofar, however, as the reason for exclusion is to deter states
from attempting coercion in order to bring about convictions, the reason would
hardly apply to a case where a state of confession sought no conviction and
the state of conviction did not seek the confession. But here there is no need to
resolve such difficult questions . . .for I find no coercion .. . even If Nebraska be held to answer for the conduct of every official involved.
Consider also a situation in which the confession is "coerced by private persons,
without color of state action, and introduced in evidence by the state," a hypothetical raised in Perlman, supra at 1310.
110. The "New York view" (although the procedure is not confined to New
York) and other variations in trialprocedures employed in determining whether a
challenged confession may be considered by the jury is carefully discussed in Meltzer, supra note 109, at 319--39.
Professor Meltzer concludes, id. at 351, 352-53:
A defendant in a criminal trial should at the trial stage be entitled to a cleancut adjudication as to whether he has been deprived of rights conferred by
the federal Constitution. The New York procedure clearly does not provide for
such an adjudication. Under that procedure the judge does not resolve the
voluntariness issue, the jury theoretically is supposed to but may not resolve
that issue. And even if the jury does determine that issue in favor of the defendant, it is likely that the jury cannot achieve the purpose behind its determination- the insulation of its deliberations against a confession which It
has heard...
In summary, the Court's analysis [in Stein] does not meet the constitutional
difficulties raised by the New York rule as to judge-jury allocation. Its first
hypothetical alternative, a determination of voluntariness by the jury, involves
the risk that this determination will be influenced, if not dominated, by the
other evidence of guilt. Its second alternative, a determination of involuntariness and disregard of the confession by the jury, does not involve any difficulty
once the assumption of jury regularity is accepted. But . . .if the assumption
of jury regularity is not made, the New York procedure involves the possibility
that the jury convicts on the basis of either a confession which it found in-
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of sustaining the constitutionality of this procedure, Mr. Justice
Jackson took the occasion to comment:
We could hold that such provisional and contingent presentation of the
confessions [to the jury] precludes a verdict on the other sufficient evidence after they are rejected only if we deemed the Fourteenth Amendment to enact a rigid exclusionary rule of evidence rather than a guarantee against conviction on inherently untrustworthy evidence. We lave
refused to hold it to enact an exclusionary rule in the case of other
illegally obtained evidence. Wolf v. =o o.... . Coerced confessions
are not more stained with illegality than other evidence obtained in violation of law. But reliance on a coerced confession vitiates a conviction
because such a confession combines the persuasiveness of apparent conclusiveness with what judicial experience shows to be illusory and deceptive evidence. A forced confession is a false foundation for any conviction,
while evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure, wire tapping, or
larceny may be and often is of the utmost verity."1

An able commentator thought itodd for the Court to look to the Wolf case for the rationale behind its
confession doctrines. That case clearly did not involve, and the Court's
opinion did not mention, the Fourteenth Amendment's ban against
coerced confessions. . . . [T]he Wolf case does not contain even a whisper that the Fourteenth Amendment will2 permit the reception of reliable
evidence no matter how it is acquired."

But is it so odd that Stein looked to the Wolf case after all? Not,
it seems, when one looks to Colorado's brief for the reason behind
its contention that even though the search itself be held illegal the
fruits of the search should be received in evidence:
Counsel [for Wolf] next cite a number of cases where this court has held
that a conviction based upon a confession obtained by duress or coercion
is a conviction obtained without due process of law, and hence illegal.
They then argue, by analogy, that evidence obtained as a result of an
illegal search falls in the same category ....
A 'ery important distinction arises between the two classes of evidence.
In the first case, a confession obtained by duress or coercion is not
voluntary or a confession the voluntariness of which it did not adjudicate. It
is- difflcul" to square a procedure which involves such possibilities with the
requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
To the same effect is Paulsen, supra note 109, at 424-25. But see Scott, State Crimlnal Pro6edure, The Fourteenth Amendment, and Prejudice, 49 Nw. U.L. RB,. 319,
320 (-1954). See also Miller, The Supreme Court's Review of Hypothetical Alternatives in a State Confession Case, 5 SmRAcusE L. REv. 52, 59-61 (1953).
Since the above articles were written, the Supreme Court seems to have settled,
for a while at any rate, that where a confession it finds coerced constitutes part
of the 'evidence before the jury and a general verdict of guilty is returned, the
coerced confession vitiates the judgment even though the jury were instructed to
disregard the confession if they found it was not voluntarily made. See Spano v.
New Y6rk, 860 U.S. 315, 324 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568
& n.15 '(1958).
111; 46 U.S. at 192.
112. Meltzer, supra note 109, at 349.
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competent evidence. This because it does not, by its very nature, bear
the stamp of verity.11 3

This is the only basis found in the briefs for treating confessions
obtained in violation of due process differently from other evidence
obtained in violation of due process. Is it so surprising then that
the Court should later regard Wolf as implicitly approving the
"trustworthiness" rationale? If, as Jackson states in Stein, "coerced
confessions are not more stained with illegality than other evidence
obtained in violation of law," 114 or at least other evidence obtained
in violation of the Constitution, why else indeed was the evidence
admitted in Wolf?
What really seems odd is not so much that Jackson used Wolf as
he did in Stein, but that Frankfurter accepted Colorado's ultimate
contention in Wolf. For he is the leading antagonist of the "trustworthiness" confession test on which Colorado's contention was
based." 5 Indeed, the very day the Court decided Wolf, the author
of the Wolf opinion, writing for the majority in other cases, was
rejecting the "trustworthiness" test. For that day the Court reversed
113. Brief for Respondent, p. 22. And in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74
(1949), decided the same day as Wolf, the government, in contending that the
use in a federal prosecution of evidence illegally seized from defendant by state
officers does not violate due process, observed, Brief for Respondent on Reargument,
pp. 88-40:
The applicability of the due process concept was also fully considered in
People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d 165, 169, 124 P.2d 44, certiorari denied, 317
U.S. 657, where the court said: " . . . A criminal trial does not constitute a

denial of due process of law so long as it is fair and impartial. * * * While
the United States Supreme Court has held that the due process clause includes
the guarantee of the Fifth Amendment against compulsory self-incrimination
to the extent that the Amendment forbids the use of a confession obtained by
coercion or torture * * * *, it has done so because a confession obtained by
coercion or torture is so unreliable that its use violates all concepts of fairness
and justice. * * * The use of evidence obtained through an illegal search and
seizure, however, does not violate due process of law for it does not affect the
fairness or impartiality of the trial."
114. 346 U.S. at 192.
115. Perhaps the best articulation of the deterrent rationale of the confession
cases is Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the majority in Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952):
It has long since ceased to be true that due process of law is heedless of
the means by which otherwise relevant and credible evidence is obtained.
This was not true even before the series of recent cases enforced the constitutional principle that the States may not base convictions upon confessions,
however much verified, obtained by coercion ...
To attempt in this case to distinguish what lawyers call "real evidence" from
verbal evidence is to ignore the reasons for excluding coerced confessions. Use
of involuntary verbal confessions in State criminal trials is constitutionally obnoxious not only because of their unreliability. They are inadmissible under the
Due Process Clause even though statements contained in them may be independently established as true. Coerced confessions offend the community's sense
of fair play and decency.
Clear statements of this approach are also found in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's

1959]

WOLF AND LUSTIG

1119

three convictions resting on coerced confessions" 0 without dis-

puting the accuracy of Mr. Justice Jackson's observation that "in
these cases before us the verification is sufficient to leave . . . no

doubt that the admissions of guilt were genuine and truthful." 11 7
In the principal confession case, Watts v. Indiana,"'.Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said for the Court:
In holding that the Due Process Clause barspolive procedure which

violates the basic notions of our accusatorial mode of prosecuting

crime and vitiates a conviction based on the fruits of such procedure, we

apply the Due Process Clause to its historic function of assuring appropriate procedure before liberty is curtailed or life is taken.'1 0

And more specifically:
In the petitioner's statements there was acknowledgement of the pos-

session of an incriminating gun, the existence of which the police inde-

pendently established. But a coerced confession is inadmissible under
the Due Process Clause even
though statements in it may be independ20
ently established as true.

Whether or not it is odd, then, it is certainly ironic that Jackson,
bested by Frankfurter, champion of the "deterrent" approach to
confessions, in cases decided the same day as Wolf, should, when
he reasserts his "trustworthiness" position for the majority in Stein,
manage to turn Wolf against Frankfurter.
The foregoing discussion of Wolf's impact in various fields of
personal liberties necessarily causes us to ask the same questions
somewhat categorically answered at the very outset of this Article:
What does Wolf mean? Can we explain it? Can we justify it in
light of other due process cases?
An obvious possibility, as Mr. Justice Jackson suggested in Stein,
is to distinguish between the reliability of real and verbal evidence.
But this neat distinction just won't do. Not only is it unpalatable
enough, as we have seen, when we consider the Justice who spoke
for the Court in Wolf and the confession opinions he penned the
same day, but it is more unpalatable still when we consider the cases
which have followed Wolf.
If reliability of the evidence itself, rather than the legality of
opinion for the majority in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), set forth in the

text accompanying notes 119 and 120 infra.
See also his earlier concurring opinions in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,
416-18 (1945) and Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 607 (1948).
116. Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338
U.S. 62 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
117. 338 U.S. at 60 (concurring in the result in Watts and dissenting in Turner
and Harris). See also Jackson, J., id. at 58: "Checked with external evidence they
[the confessions in each case] are inherently believable and were not shaken as to
truth by anything that occurred at the trial."

118. 338 U.S. 49 (1949).

119. Id. at 55. (Emphasis added.)
120. Id. at 50n.2.
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the means employed in securing it, were the test, what about
Rochin? 121 After all, it is possible for real evidence to be placed
in a house without the occupant's approval or his knowledge of its
incriminating nature,'22 but it would take a rash man indeed to try
to disassociate himself from the contents of his stomach. Nevertheless, the stomach contents were excluded.
If there be any evidence more trustworthy than the contents
of one's stomach it is probably a sample of one's blood. Thus, Breithaupt v. Abram 13 would be a per curiam affirmance instead of a
full-sized opinion if competency of the evidence were the only test.
The Court, however, focused on the methods employed in taking
the sample, noting that it was "taken by a skilled technician," 14
"under the protective eye of a physician," 125 in accordance with a
"procedure [which] has become routine in our everyday life," 12 0
reassuring us that it has been "assured . . . that every proper medi27

cal precaution is afforded an accused from whom blood is taken." 1
It is fairly clear that under circumstances constituting Rochin-type
brutality, blood samples will be excluded too.'
121. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See also note 47 supra.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (petitioner stored
narcotics in hotel room of aunts without their permission or knowledge).
123. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
124. Id. at 437.
125. Id. at 435.
126. Id. at 436.
127. Id. at 438.
128. Cf. United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1957). Defendant was charged with carnal knowledge of a female under sixteen. There was
evidence that the complaining witness was menstruating at the time of the alleged
offense. When informed. that chemical tests would be run on his penis to determine
the presence of blood, defendant protested verbally and resisted physically. While
one officer overcame his resistance by twisting his arm or arms behind his back,
another pulled his trousers down and swabbed his penis with four different patches
of chemically treated cotton. The evidence was thrown out on various grounds.
Judge Youngdahl did "not hesitate to conclude that the defendant was deprived
of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. No matter how great its relevance, the Court could not permit the admission of evidence secured as a result of
so flagrant an abuse of basic rights and liberties." Id. at 382-83.
But cf. Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 914 (1958), 58 CoLT.m. L. REv. 565 (1958). Customs officers had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant had heroin cached in his rectum. A qualified doctor attempted manual removal, but defendant refused to cooperate. He was
then taken to a nearby hospital, where his resistance sharpened. He was forced to
undress and to bend over. A qualified doctor, unable to reach the cache manually,
undertook to remove the object with the aid of an anoscope and forceps. A portion of an outer rubber sheath surrounding the narcotics tore, greatly alarming defendant, who thenceforth fully cooperated. Several enemas later the heroin was
finally recovered. The Ninth Circuit, by a 2-1 vote, sustained the admission of the
heroin into evidence over search and seizure, self-incrimination and duo process
objections.
If the Supreme Court would have reached the same result in Rochin even if the
officers in that case had had a valid search warrant, and I think it would, I am not
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Another possible way to explain Wolf is to draw a distinction between physical violence or brutality and other types of police
misconduct. But, as I have endeavored to show in a preceding
section, this does not withstand analysis either. Are we not, then
forced to challenge Mr. Justice Jackson's easy assumption in Stein
that "coerced confessions are not more stained with illegality than
other evidence obtained in violation of law"?
D. The Plimsoll Lines of Due Process
I cannot escape the conclusion ... that in combination [these circumstances] bring the result below the Plimsoll line of "due process." 1.9
The possibility has been explored that Frankfurter, J., was relying on
the fact that a ship has two Plimsoll marks, one for summer and the other
winter. And a ship sailing on both salt and fresh water has a pair for
each. On reflection, however, this appears merely to augment the difficulties.1 30

Two or more plimsoll marks of due process would indeed "augment the difficulties." But while a single plimsoll mark of due process suffices when we measure the admissibility of confessions, two
or more plimsoll marks, it seems, are exactly what we employ when
we consider the admissibility of physical evidence.
The era of two-plimsoll mark due process may be said to have
dawned with the Wolf case. The case stands, or has come to stand,
for the proposition that obtaining evidence by searches which would
have violated the fourth amendment if made by federal officers
necessarilyviolates the fourteenth amendment when made by state
officers, i.e., falls below the first plimsoll line of due process.13' But
the use of such evidence is something else again. The use is not
considered a violation of the fourteenth-Wolf and later cases
establish- unless police methods in obtaining the evidence constiat all sure that Backford was correctly decided. I agree with the Blackf ord dissent

that the majority's likening the situation to the enforced opening of a clenched fist
containing narcotics, 247 F.2d at 753, is most inapposite. Nor do I find very convincing the majority's argument that the pain Blackford endured was "self-inflicted"
because he refused to cooperate fully. 247 F.2d at 752. This approach can take us
a long, long way.

129. Frankfurter, J., concurring in Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 199 (1957).

The plimsoll line is the load line on the sides of British merchant vessels, to indicate the line of submergence permitted by law. The act of Parliament to prevent
overloading was the result of Samuel Plimsolls efforts. It can be argued that above"
rather than "below" the plimsoll line more aptly indicates that due process has not
been satisfied, but there is respectable authority for describing an overloaded ship
as one loaded below the plimsoll mark. See Field, Frankfurter, J., Concurring, 71
HIArv. L. REv. 77, 80 n.18 (1957).
130. Field, supra note 129, at 80 n.16.
131. See section I-B supra.
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tute a gross violation or a special kind of violation of due process,
13 2
i.e., dip below the second plimsoll line.
The language in Stein to the contrary, notwithstanding, 133 it seems
that whether or not secured by brutal or violent methods, whether
or not independently established as true, confessions obtained in
violation of due process are taboo. It seems that they are ipso facto
inadmissible, and, if admitted, ipso facto reversible error. 134
Not so other evidence obtained in violation of due process.
As to this other evidence, it seems, we must ask further questions.
132. See discussion of the Irvine case at notes 95, 97-100 supra and accompanying text. See also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. at 434:
There is argument on behalf of petitioner that the evidence used here, the
result of the blood test, was obtained in violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . New Mexico has rejected, as it may, the exclusionary rule. . . . Therefore, the rights petitioner claims afford no aid to
him here for the fruits of the violations, if any, are admissible in the State's
prosecution.
Although the short shrift the Court made of any possible search and seizure objections in Breithaupt is significant, it is highly questionable whether the case
presented such an issue at all. The police had abundant grounds to believe that
petitioner was driving under the influence of liquor; the case turned not on probable cause, but on the type of treatment to which petitioner was subjected. Not
on whether it was reasonable to conduct a "search," but on the reasonableness of
the methods employed, considering the pain, danger and indignity involved. This
would seem to raise a straight due process question. See Allen, Due Process and
State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 24-25 (1953);
Bachelder, Use of Stomach Pump as Unreasonable Search and Seizures, 41 J. Clu.t.
L. & CRUMINOLOGY 189 (1950); 58 CoLUm. L. REv. 565, 567 (1958). But a number of lower federal courts have regarded the use of evidence obtained as a result
of physical examinations of validly arrested persons as presenting search and seizure
issues. See, e.g., Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), ccrt.
denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958) (admitting narcotics finally removed from rectum
by use of enemas) (likening search of body to search of premises); United States
v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1957) (excluding testimony that scientific
tests run on defendant's penis revealed presence of blood); United States v. Willis,
85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1949) (excluding narcotics extracted by use of
stomach pump).
133. See text at note 111 supra.
134. Thus, in the most recent confession case decided by the Supreme Court, the
reversal in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (the facts are set forth in
note 50 supra), the Chief Justice said for the majority:
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not
turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deeprooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law;
that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods
used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals
themselves.
The State suggests, however, that we are not free to reverse this conviction,
since there is sufficient other evidence in the record from which the jury might
have found guilty, relying on Stein. . . . But Payne v. State of Arkansas, 350
U.S. 560, 568 . . . authoritatively establishes that Stein did not hold that a
conviction may be sustained on the basis of other evidence if a confession
found to be involuntary by this Court was used, even though limiting instruc-
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By how much did it violate due process? Was it a "shocking" violation or only a "mild" one? These are the distinctions the Court
drew in Rochin, and indicated in Breithaupt it will draw again
when the occasion demands it. Yet it is small wonder that the
Court has declined to articulate its approach in quite these terms.1 35
A right protected by due process is after all "basic to a free society" and "therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty,"' '
"of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," 37 one of
the "'immutable principles of justice' as conceived by a civilized
society," 138 a "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,"
40

3

as to

"lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."
This is rather minimal, is it not?
Yet Wolf teaches us that it is not minimal enough, that some
"fundamental" rights are less "fundamental" than others, less "immutable" than others, less "basic" than others. That evidence is not
to be excluded unless it was obtained in violation of sub-minimal
standards, unless it was obtained by means which fell below the
second plimsoll line. And Irvine teaches us that some "incredible"
and "flagrant" violations of due process are less "incredible" and
"flagrant" than others and only when such violations are sufficiently
"incredible" and "flagrant," do we exclude their fruits. Are there,
then, at least three plimsoll lines of due process: a bare or mild
violation, an aggravated violation, and a grossly aggravated
violation?
Can there really be such a thing as a "bare" or "mild" violation of

tions [i.e., instructions that the jury could rely on the confession only if they
found it to be voluntary] were given.
Id. at 320-21,324.
See also the discussion in note 109 supra; notes 115-20 supra and corresponding
text.
135. See the extracts from the Irvine and Breithaupt opinions at notes 95, 97, supra
and note 132 supra respectively. The author of the Wolf majority opinion has similarly
declined. See the extracts from his Irvine dissent at note 103 supra and the text at notes
104-07 supra.
136. Frankfurter, J., in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), drawing upon
Justice Cardozo's famous language in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937).
137. The oft-quoted words of Cardozo, J., in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937).
138. Frankfurter, J., concurring in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 60 (1947),
apparently drawing upon the famous words of Mr. Justice Brown in Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898): "It is sufficient to say [of 'due process of law']
that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea
of free government which no member of the Union may disregard."
139. The oft-quoted words of Cardozo, J., in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.

97, 105 (1934).
140. The oft-quoted words of Van Devanter, J., in Herbert v. Louisiana, 272
U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
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due process? How do you mildly violate what is "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" even "for the lowliest and the most
41
outcast"?

"Toremove the inducement to resort" to due process violations,
certain violations at any rate, it was observed in a coerced confession case, "this Court has repeatedly denied use of the fruits of
illicit methods." 142 What about the inducement to resort to unconstitutional state searches and seizures? Confronted with police
procedure violative of due process in Watts v. Indiana, another
coerced confession case, this one handed down the same day as
Wolf, the Court pointed out that "in holding that the Due Process
Clause . . .vitiates a conviction based on . . . such procedure, we

apply the Due Process Clause to its historic function of assuring
appropriate procedure before liberty is curtailed or life is taken" I
What happened to the "historic function" of due process in Wolf?
How did the Court "assure appropriate procedure' then? Or did a
federal trial judge who lacks Mr. Justice Frankfurter's finesse never.
theless come closer to the truth with the somewhat ungracious remark that "an unreasonable search by a state agent or official is
not such a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment as will invoke
operation of that Amendment"? 144

To use the fruits of certain violations of due process, at any rate,
Frankfurter was to say in Rochin v. California, is "to sanction the
brutal conduct," to afford it "the cloak of law," "to brutalize the
temper of a society." 14' But to use the fruits of other violations of
due process, Frankfurter seems to have said in Wolf, is to do none
of these things. No sanction. No cloak. No effect on society's temper.
Or not enough to worry very much about.
Indeed, Wolf is not only difficult to reconcile with other due
process cases, but with Frankfurter's - and the Court's -

earlier

views about applying and implementing the rights of the accused
generally, whether or not such rights are grounded in the
Constitution.
A notable example is the second Nardone case, 1 40 where Frankfurter wrote for the majority that not only must wire-taps be excluded but likewise information gained as a result of such taps. It
is true that since Nardone dealt with federal police and federal
141. "This Clause [due process] exacts from the States for the lowliest and the
most outcast all that is 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'"
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 27.
142. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 607 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
143. 338 U.S. 49, 55 (1949) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.),
144. MacKey v. Chandler, 152 F. Supp. 579, 581 (W.D.S.C. 1957) (setting aside
a verdict for punitive damages under the Civil Rights Act). (Emphasis added.)
145. 342 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1952).
146. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
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courts, whereas Wolf involved state police and state courts, the
cases can be readily distinguished on the basis of due regard for
federal-state relations. But can they be validly distinguished? How
does due regard for federal-state relations explain away the underlying principles and basic premises of the second Nardone case?
"To forbid the direct use of [wire-tapping] methods . . . but to
put no curb on their full indirect use, Nardone tells us, "could only
invite the very methods deemed 'inconsistent with ethical standards
and destructive of personal liberty.""' If this is so, when Wolf puts
no curb on even direct use of illegal state seizures how-with all
due regard for federal-state relations -do we manage to avoid inviting the very state methods deemed a violation of due process?
Regarded "pertinent" in Nardone is the search and seizure principle
that "the essence of a provision forbidding the acquistion of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall
14 8
not be used before the court, but that it shall not be used at all."
If this is so, when Wolf finds that the federal constitution does forbid the acquisition of evidence by means of illegal state searches
how-with all due regard for federal-state relations- does it manage to reduce the remedy of exclusion to an unessential ingredient
of the constitutional provision?
Argument by analogy to Nardone may seem unfair in light of the
subsequent holding in Schwartz v. Texas149 that the wire-tap ban
does not bar the use of state taps in state proceedings. But by that
time state prosecutors had a very considerable advantage. They had
Wolf on the books. 50
McNabb v. United States,""' striking down confessions secured
in the course of prolonged pre-commitment detention, marks another notable occasion when the Court articulated its views on the
implementation of procedural rights.
True, the case dealt with an exercise of the Court's supervisory
powers over the administration of federal criminal justice. But if
McNabb's reasoning is sound, once again it is difficult to see how
or why such reasoning should be limited to federal prosecutions.
A conviction resting on evidence secured in violation of "the
procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to
stand without making the courts themselves accomplices in
willful disobedience of law," Frankfurter said for the majority in
McNabb.52 Yet, according to Wolf, convictions resting on evidence
147. Id. at 340.
148. Id. at 340-41 (emphasis added), quoting with approval from Silverthorno
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
149. 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
150. See discussion at notes 90-94 supra.
151. 318 U.S. 3832 (1943).
152. Id. at 345.
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secured in violation of the procedure which the Constitution has
commanded somehow can stand without involving the courts in
such "willful disobedience." To make the McNabb evidence the
basis of a conviction in the federal courts "would stultify the policy
which the Congress has enacted into law." "' But, to make the Wolf
evidence the basis of a conviction in the state courts somehow does
not stultify the policy which the Constitution has enacted into
law. 54
So long as the case does "not involve coercion, violence or brutality
to the person," Irvine tells us, there are no holds barred in securing
physical evidence. 5 ' This is hard to believe. Will the Court not
balk at, say, a hidden microphone under the psychiatrist's couch or
in the confessional?156 At hidden telescreens in the bedroom, if not
hidden microphones?
Maybe not. After all, Irvine itself is hard to believe.
153. Ibid.
154. The McNabb Rule, of course, stirred much controversy. But controversy,
it appeared, over whether the remedy of exclusion should be extended to nonconstitutional areas. As late as a year prior to Wolf, no less a critic of exclusionary rules
than Mr. Justice Reed seemed prepared to accept the proposition that once the
method of obtaining evidence was found to violate constitutional rights, exclusion
automatically followed. Speaking for the four dissenters in Upshaw v. United States,
he protested that the McNabb Rule as now applied makes exclusion "automatic on
proof of detention in violation of the commitment statute," 335 U.S. 410, 424
(1948) and thusis now made analogous to the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the
Bill of Rights through unreasonable search and seizure or through compulsion
or by the denial of due process...
This Court by decision has excluded evidence obtained by unreasonable
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment or by coercion to a degree
that violates the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendments because the admission of
such evidence would imperil the efficacy of those constitutional rights...
In criminal trials, the method of obtaining evidence has never been a reason
for barring its use except where constitutional rights were violated.
Id. at 424, 427. (Emphasis added.)
But the following year came Wolf -and with it the discovery that even the
begrudging Reed had exaggerated the importance of "the efficacy of those Constitutional rights."
155. 347 U.S. at 133.
156. Too far-fetched? Consider Fraenkel, Wiretapping Infringes Human Rights;
Not Necessary for Law Enforcement, Harvard Law Record, April 24, 1958, p. 1, col.
2; p. 3, col. 2: "We have found out recently that prison offlcials have 'bugged' the
rooms in which prisoners talked with their lawyers and confessed to their priests."
Consider Lanza v. New York Joint Legislative Comm. on Cov't Operations, 3
N.Y.2d 92, 143 N.E.2d 772, cert. denied 355 U.S. 856 (1957), 42 MINN. L. Rsv.
664 (1958). Although the court refused to enjoin the above-named committee from
making a part of the public record of its investigation a tape recording of an alleged private conference in a county jail between a lawyer and his client, it stressed
that "it is not claimed that the recording will be used in connection with any action
or proceeding directed against Lanza," id., at 99, 143 N.E.2d at 775, and pointed
out that if it were "any resulting determination would be annulled by the courts on
the ground that the interference with his right to counsel had destroyed his consti-
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And the reasoning in Irvine is about as unpalatable as the result.
To exclude the evidence on the ground that it involved a more
serious and more shocking violation than did Wolf "would leave the
rule so indefinite that no state court could know what it should rule
to keep its processes on solid constitutional ground."5'
Any more so than the due process requirements pertaining to
confessions? The right to counsel? 58 Any more so than the rule
finally formulated in Irvine itself?
"However obnoxious are the facts in the case before us," said
Mr. Justice Jackson for the Irvine majority, "they do not involve
tutional right to a fair trial." Id. at 98, 143 N.E.2d at 775. As the Lanza opinion
indicates, a wire-tap violation of the attorney-client privilege is especially vulnerable
to due process attack.
The hypotheticals raised in the text are not foreclosed by the doctor-patient and
clergyman-penitent privileges. For one thing, about one-third of the states deny
such privileges. See VANDERBILT, editor, Mn uum
STArmAins oF JuDcLtj AD,MIIsrhAlaoNr 344, 346 (1949). Moreover, even among those jurisdictions which
have a statutory doctor-patient privilege, many are restricted to civil cases or apply
only in a limited way to criminal prosecutions, e.g., some privileges are inoperative
in homicide cases. See DEWrr, PnrvI.=Gm CoirNreCiONs BmvmeN PuysicuAN
AND PATrENT 236-40 (1958); MODEL P NAL CODE § 4.09, comment (Tent. Draft
No. 4,1955). Moreover, where a physician is directed by law enforcement officials
or the court to examine the accused in order to ascertain his physical or mental
condition for purposes of a criminal prosecution, the confidential relationship does
not exist. DEWTE, supra at 110-14. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 209 Ark. 180, 189
S.W.2d 917 (1945), a capital case, permitting a state hospital physician to testify
to defendants confession made during the course of a mental examination.
It should be noted, too, that the doctor-patient privilege does not cover clinical
psychologists who engage widely in psychotherapy and whose functions and relations with their patients are often identical to those of the psychiatrist; only a handful of states have granted them a special testimonial privilege. DEWrr, supra at 87;
Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World: Part II, 41 MnqN. L. REv. 731,
738-35 (1957); Note, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 384, 387-88 (1952).
Finally, even though the requisite confidential relationship may be found to exist,
a state court may hold (wrongly, it is believed) that the privilege does not protect
against the testimony of an "eavesdropper," electronic or otherwise, even though
the defendant was unable to take effective precautions against being overheard.
Cf. Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567, 120 N.E. 209 (1918) (eavesdropper
exception to marital communication privilege applies where dictograph was planted
in cell where defendant and wife were held). The case is criticized in McContcur,
EvmENcE 175 (1954).
157. 347 U.S. at 134.
158. In addition to the confession cases discussed in note 23 supra, see, e.g.,
Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 890 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957);
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
As for the right to counsel in state prosecutions, while it appears that there is
a "Eat requirement!' in capital cases, at least at the trial stage, in other cases want
of counsel violates due process only when under all the circumstances it deprived
defendant of a "fair trial." Bute v. Illinois, 338 U.S. 640 (1948); Foster v. Illinois,
332 U.S. 134 (1947); Betts v. Brady, 816 U.S. 455 (1942). Thus, "in noncapital
cases only a number of imprecise elements indicate the dangers which a state must
face if it conducts a trial without counsel or an offer of counsel." BEmA-EY, THm
icenr To CouNSEL IN A?.mucAN Coua-m 194 (1955). E.g., compare Gyger v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948), with Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948). See
generally, e.g., BanN-Y, op. cit. supra at 191-98; FELL2.AN, Tim DzEE'AN.-r's

1128

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

coercion, violence or brutality to the person.""

0

[Vol. 43:1083

What if they did?

How much and what kind of coercion or violence would warrant
exclusion?'0 0 Would a lesser amount of police violence suffice in
the case of an aggravated illegal search, such as Irvine, than a

"mild" case, such as Wolf? How much less?
"Arbitrariness," yes. But how much "definiteness" did we really
purchase in Irvine at so dear a price?'(;' True, we can achieve defi115-18 (1958); Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of
Criminal Justice, 8 DEPAuL L. REv. 213, 226-31 (1959).
Not even the capital cases are free from doubt. In Crooker v. California, 357 U.S.
433 (1958), the Court took the view that deprivation of counsel during pretrial proceedings violates due process "provided" the accused "is so prejudiced thereby as
to infect his subsequent trial with an absence of 'that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice,"' id. at 439 (emphasis added), finding no such
prejudice in the instant capital case. But the four concurring justices in Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), took the view that once a person is formally
charged with a capital crime the requirements of duo process afford him an absolute
right to legal representation, or at least to the assistance of counsel he himself
has retained. Crooker was distinguished away on the ground that the police there
were questioning a suspect in the course of an investigation when his requests for
a specific attorney were denied. A majority of the Spano Court, however, did not
reach this question, since it found "involuntary" the confession obtained In thie
absence of counsel. See the discussion in note 50 supra.
159. 347 U.S. at 133.
160. Taking a blood sample from an unconscious person does not amount to sufficient "coercion" or "brutality" when performed by a "skilled technician."
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). What if performed by those "not competent to do so"? What if the person were conscious and voiced his objection? What
if he physically resisted? What if he regained consciousness only to be chloroformed
before he could offer physical resistance? Or before he could oven voice an objection? What difference, if any, if the police had illegally arrested the person or
unlawfully broken into his home and then taken (or had a physician tako) a blood
sampling?
Breaking into the home of an accused, unsuccessfully trying to pry open his mouth,
and then pumping out the contents of his stomach does constitute the requisite degree
of "brutality." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). What if by falsely reprosenting to the accused that his health was greatly endangered the police had Induced
him to "agree" to the extraction? What if the officers had managed to retrieve the
contents by putting a hand down the accused's throat? What if, after a desperate
struggle, they had knocked it out of his mouth? Or the desired results had been
achieved by shoving laxatives down his throat? What difference, if any, if the police
had had a valid search warrant in the first place?
This is definiteness?
E.g., compare People v. Martinez, 130 Cal. App. 54, 278 P.2d 26 (1954), with
People v. Dawson, 127 Cal. App. 2d 375, 273 P.2d 938 (1954). In both cases
police officers saw defendant put what turned out to be a package of heroin in his
mouth and obtained it after a struggle. The evidence was admitted in Dawson,
where one officer "put his arm around" defendant's neck, another hand-cuffed him
and the evidence was spit out after a "slight struggle"; but excluded on duo process
grounds in Martinez, where defendant was "choked and wrestled to the ground"
by three officers until he spit out the evidence. "Apparently, had Dawson resisted
law enforcement officers as fiercely as did Martinez, the former too could have
been a free man." 2 U.C.L.A.L. Rmv. 565, 566 (1955).
See also the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions in the Blackford case,
whose facts are set forth in note 128 supra.
161. See the discussion in the preceding note.
%GHirrs
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niteness by wiping out the "coercion" or "brutality" exception altogether and admitting all real evidence however revolting or repulsive the methods used to obtain it. But the one thing that is clear is
that the Court will not allow the states such unrestricted freedom.
The line must be drawn somewhere along the way.
If this is so, and if definiteness is so precious a commodity, would
not a good deal of it have been achieved by drawing the line at
due process? By forbidding the states to receive the products of
searches conducted in violation of due process however bare the
violation? By regarding unconstitutionalmethods as ipso facto sufficiently "offensive" or "shocking" methods?
But then, there is the Wolf case.
II. THE "SnLvEn PLATE" DocrTmw
A. A Conceptual Approach: Can the Doctrine Survive Wolf and
Other Recent Cases?
Is not all that can be said for the five Justices comprising the Wolf
majority is that they "marched impressively up the field and then
came back again to where they started"? 10 2 Perhaps not. Perhaps
they only came part of the way back.
Weeks, of course, is best, known for the exclusionary rule which
bears its name,but it also stands for another rule, a rule of admissibility:
As to the papers and property seized by the [local] policemen, it does
not appear that they acted under any claim of Federal authority such

as would make the Amendment applicable to such unauthorized seizures.
The record shows that what they did by way of arrest and search and
seizure was done before the finding of the indictment in the Federal
court, under what supposed right or authority does not appear. What
remedies the defendant may have against them we need not inquire, as
the Fourth Amendment is not directed to individual misconduct of such
officials. Its limitations reach the Federal Government and its agencies.103

Wolf chose not to follow the Weeks exclusionary rule, but in the
course of its circuitous route did it knock out the Weeks-Byars rule
162. Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1948-49, 17 U. Cm L. Rv. 1,
34 (1949).
This irreverant comment may well have been inspired by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
own language in City of Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685, 693-94 (1948),
where he dissented from a ruling remitting the controversy to a federal agency on
the ground that it had not made a "jurisdictional" finding:
The Commission may very well now formally make such a finding . . . which in
fact is writ large in the Commission's report . .. and the weary round of litigation
repeated to the futile end of having this Court then, forsooth, express an opinion
on the merits opposed to that of the Commission .... This danger if not likelihood of thus marching the king's men up the hill and then marching them down
again seems to me a mode of judicial administration to which I cannot yield
concurrence.

168. 282 U.S. 888, 898 (1914).
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of admissibility,6 4 the rule which has come to be known as the
"silver platter" doctrine? 165
Prior to Wolf, federal courts confronted with evidence wrongfully
seized by local police could only hypothesize that if such evidence
had been seized by federal police under similar circumstances there
would have been a violation of the fourth.
But in the courtroom, as elsewhere, "if's" and "would have been's"
do not count for much. Since the limitations of the fourth were not
thought to reach beyond federal officers, when local police wrongfully seized evidence they did not violate the federal constitution,
nor any federal law for that matter. No more, to turn to a couple of
analagous "silver platter" situations by way of example, than do
state authorities today when, pursuant to a state immunity statute,
they compel self-incriminating statements from a witness later used
against him in a federal prosecution,"0 6 or when investigating possible state offenses, they detain a suspect for an unduly long period
before commitment, obtaining statements which later constitute the
basis of a federal conviction for a federal crime."0 7
Whatever this conceptualism is worth, Wolf seems to have dis164. The rule is often called the Byars rule after the leading case of Byars v.
United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), where the Court first pronounced the "participation doctrine," striking down a federal conviction resting on illegally seized evidence because "the attendant facts here reasonably suggest that the federal prohibition agent was not invited to join the state squad as a private person might
have been, but was asked to participate and did participate as a federal enforcement officer, upon the chance, which was subsequently realized, that something
would be disclosed of official interest to him as such agent." Id. at 32. But In the
course of the unanimous opinion, per Mr. Justice Sutherland, the Court observed that
"we do not question the right of the federal government to avail itself of evidence
improperly seized by state officers operating entirely upon their own account." Id.
At 33.

165. "The crux" of the Byars doctrine, said Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Lustig
v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949), "is that a search is a search by a
federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a
silver platter."
166. The use of such evidence in a federal prosecution was upheld in Feldman
v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944), by a 4-3 vote. More recently, the Supreme
Court has sustained contempt convictions of persons who, though granted state
immunity, refused to answer questions put to them by state grand juries investigating possible state offenses because their answers might incriminate them under
federal law. See the discussion of the Knapp and Mills cases at notes 335-40 infra.
167. Statements made during a prolonged and hence illegal detention by federal
authorities are excluded from the federal courts under the McNabb rule, but such
detention by state authorities does not, of itself, constitute a violation of duo
process. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S.
55 (1951); cf. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958). Thus unless the state
authorities detaining the suspect are acting in collaboration with federal authorities
the statements they obtain are admissible in federal prosecutions. Indeed, most of
the federal courts which have passed on the question admit such statements even
though secured by federal interrogation of the state-detained suspect. See the discussion at notes 345-56 infra.
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pelled it. After the Wolf decision, federal trial courts confronted
with evidence seized by local police under circumstances which
would have constituted a violation of the fourth if federal police
were involved are necessarily dealing with evidence obtained in
violation of due process, are they not? 16s
How one frames the question about the continued vitality of the
"silver platter" doctrine may depend on what conceptual reasons
one assigns to the Wolf result.
One who still adheres to the approach taken in Boyd v. United
States,'" i.e., the admission of evidence seized in violation of the
fourth amendment is condemned by the self-incrimination clause
of the fifth, would probably conceive the post-Wolf "silver platter"
problem in terms of whether or not the fifth amendment precludes
federal court use of evidence seized in violation of the fourteenth.
For reasons I have discussed earlier, however, I share the view that
there is no longer much to be said, if there ever was, for the selfincrimination approach to the search and seizure cases. 170 Evidently
the Court is of the same view, for all of the Justices avoided this
approach in Wolf, although it pointed the way to a ready solution
7
of the problem raised therein.1 1

The post-Wolf silver platter issue has sometimes been said to turn
on whether the Weeks exclusionary rule is built right into the fourth
amendment and hence inapplicable to state agents (one interpretation of the Wolf result), or whether it is simply a rule of evidence
adopted by the federal courts to maximize the protection against
unreasonable search and seizure afforded by the fourth (another
interpretation) .2 While thb is indeed a "nice question,"'73 it seems
174
that it is also an immaterial one.
168. See section I-B supra.
169. 116 U.S. 616, 630-35 (1886).
170. See note 16 supa.
171. Ibid.
172. See Note, 42 Mnxm. L. REv. 121, 124-5 (1957); 57 Micu. L. Rev. 766,
767-69 (1959).
173. While Mr. Justice Black, concurring in Wolf, agrees "with what appears
to be a plain implication of the Court's opinion that the federal exclusionary rule is
not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate," 338 U.S. at 39-40, the implication of the
majority opinion is anything but plain. At most, Mr. Justice Frankfurter leaves open
the question whether Congress could negate the Weeks doctrine, id. at 33. See the
discussion in Note, 50 COLUm. L. REv. 364, 366-467 (1950). Mr. Justice Rutledge,
dissenting, joined by Mr. Justice Murphy, flatly rejects "any intimation that Congress could validly enact legislation permitting the introduction in federal courts
of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 48. In Irvine, Mr.
Justice Jackson, announcing the judgment of the Court and writing an opinion
joined in by Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Reed and Minton, looks back on
Wolf as a case which "declined to make the subsidiary procedural and evidentiary
doctrines developed by the federal courts limitations on the states." 347 U.S. at 132.
174. However, whether or not exclusion is required by the fourth amendment
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If exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the fourth is required by the amendment, this hardly precludes the Court from
formulating a similar rule as to state-seized evidence "in the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of criminal
would seem to bear significantly on the issue presented in Wolf: whether or not
exclusion is an "essential ingredient" of the protection against arbitrary Intrusion
by the police. Yet Wolf dec lined "to treat this remedy as an essential ingredient
of the right," 338 U.S. at 29, without ever resolving the fourth amendment question.
Conceivably-but not very likely- the fourth amendment could be construed
as barring "silver platter" evidence from the federal courts. That is, the fourth
could be found to contain a double prohibition against either the securing of evidence by federal authorities in violation of the protection against unreasonable
searches or the admission in federal court by federal authorities of evidence seized
in violation of this protection, regardless of who perpetrated the violation. Cf.
the wire tapping discussion at note 92 supra.
But if this were so, it was so before Wolf and every "silver platter" conviction
ever obtained has been wrongly obtained. Indeed, this interpretation of the fourth
would also seem to vitiate the settled doctrine that federal authorities may use
evidence seized by private persons and turned over to them. Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465 (1921).
Cf. the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Feldman v. United States, 322
U.S. 487 (1944), where the Court upheld the use in a federal prosecution of selfincriminating testimony obtained by state authorities under a state immunity
statute. Protested Mr. Justice Black:
Feldman was compelled to testify under oath in a creditors' compulsory
discovery proceeding in a New York court conducted pursuant to a state statute
which granted him immunity from state prosecution for any state crime he
might be forced to confess. Had he refused to testify he could have been
imprisoned ...
Testimony is no less compelled because a state rather than a federal officer
compels it, or because the state officer appears to be primarily interested at the
moment in enforcing a state rather than a federal law.
The very narrow problem thus presented .. .is whether federal courts can
convict a defendant of a federal crime by use of self-incriminatory testimony
which someone in some manner has extracted from him against his will. The
Court's holding that a defendant can be so convicted cuts into the very substance
of the Fifth Amendment ...
[History supports no argument that the framers of the Fifth Amendment
were interested only in forbidding the extraction of an accused's testimony,
as distinguished from the use of his extracted testimony. The extraction of testimony is, of course, but a means to the end of its use to punish.
Id. at 495, 497-99. See also Black's dissent in the Irvine case, 347 U.S. at 139.
But Mr. Justice Frankfurter, whose view prevailed in Feldman, stressed, 322 U.S.
at 492-93:
The Government here is not seeking to benefit by evidence which it extorted.
It had no power either to compel testimony in the state court or to forestall
such disclosure as a means of avoiding possible interference with the enforcement of the federal penal code.
Yet the language of the fifth amendment-"no person shall be . .. compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness aginst himself"-seems to lend Itself much
more to the argument that use of compelled testimony by a federal prosecutor In
and of itself violates the amendment than do the words of the fourth- the right
of the people to be secure .. . against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated'- support the analogous contention with respect to that amendment.

1959]

WOLF AND LUSTIG

1133

justice in the federal courts." 75 On the other hand, if the Weeks
doctrine is only a rule of evidence applied by the federal courts,
it by no means follows that the Court must or should apply it to
state-seized evidence as well as federal. 7 6
It seems much more profitable, then, to appraise the present
vitality of the silver platter doctrine by looking not to the origins
of the Weeks exclusionary rule, but to the bases for the Court's 'formulation and application of proper standards for the enforcement
of the federal criminal law in the federal courts," 7 as best illustrated by the McNabb rule.
One may quarrel with the position that "the real roots of the
McNabb rule" are found in a refusal to countenance "trials which
are the outgrowth or fruit of the Government's illegality" since they
"debase the processes of justice," 178 and yet readily agree that this
is one of the major considerations underlying the rule. Certainly, the
McNabb opinion is reminiscent of Mr. Justice Brandeis' famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States,17 where he protested that "in
order to preserve the judicial process from contamination," courts
should deny their aid to those who have violated the law or knowingly availed themselves of the fruits of such violations. 180 Quite
recently the Court, by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, expressed this no175. McNabb v. United States, 818 U.S. 332, 841 (1948).
176. After all, it was in reviewing a federal conviction for a federal crime, Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939), that Mr. Justice Frankfurter reminded us: "Any claim for the exclusion of evidence logically relevant in criminal
prosecutions is heavily handicapped." It may well be that the Court will find that
these handicaps are not overcome in a "silver platter" situation because of, for example, what it regards the greater force of community opinion against local, as
opposed to federal, police lawlessness, and hence the lesser need for judicial intervention; or what it regards as the insignificant deterrent effect of an exclusionary
rule which operates against state officers only when they happen to turn illegally
seized evidence over to federal authorities. But see the discussion at notes 38-43
supra and at section H-C-5 infra.
177. McNabb v. United States, 818 U.S. 832, 841 (1943).
178. Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rational and Rescue,
47 GEo. L.J. 1, 32 (1958). I share the general view, however, see Notes, 68 YAL.E
L.J. 1003, 1006 & n.5 (1959), 66 YArx L.J. 270, 277 n.29 (1956), and authorities
collected therein, that the foremost consideration underlying the McNabb rule is
the desire to check resort by officers to improper pressures during pre-commitment
detention and to avoid the difficulties of proof over what occurredbehind the closed
doors. See the discussion at notes 882-86 infra and corresponding text.
But the latter interpretation of McNabb furnishes the basis for another argument
against the old Weeks-Byars rule. See section H1-0-5 infra.
179. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928).
180. Id. at 484.
Compare the following:
Brandeis, J., in Olmstead:
Frankfurter, J., in McNabb:
When the Government, having full knowl- Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence
edge, sought, through the Department of secured through such a flagrant disregard
Justice, to avail itself of the fruits of these of the procedure which Congress has
acts in order to accomplish its own ends it commanded cannot be allowed to stand
assumed moral responsibility for the offi- without making the courts themselves ac-
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tion in the strongest terms, observing that since it "is charged with
supervisory functions in relation to proceedings in federal courts
.. . fastidious regard for the honor of the administration of justice
requires the Court to make certain that the doing of justice be made
so manifest that only irrational or perverse claims of its disregard
can be asserted."'
To the considerable, if somewhat uncertain, extent to which
McNabb rests on a reluctance to debase the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts, it is difficult to see how the "silver
platter" rule can withstand the combined weight of that case and
Wolf.
If in the exercise of its "limited function as the court of ultimate
review of the standards formulated by federal courts in the trial of
criminal cases," 182 the Court's reaction to violations of federal
"prompt commitment" statutes or rules has been that a "decent regard for the duty of [federal] courts as agencies of justice and custodians of liberty forbids that men should be convicted upon evidence secured under the circumstances revealed here," 183 what can
be said for the fate in the federal courts of evidence seized, albeit by
state officers, in violation of the federal constitution? However little
can be said for Wolf, where solicitude for federal-state relations led
the Court to uphold a state conviction based on unconstitutionallyseized evidence, how much less can be said for permitting a federal
conviction to rest on such evidence? If federal court standards
"are not satisfied merely by observance of those minimal historic
safeguards . . . summarized as 'due process of law,""18" is it too

much to expect that such standards at least require federal courts to
cers' crimes. . . And if this Court should complices in willful disobedience of law."
permit the Government, by means of its 318 U.S. at 345.
officers' crimes, to effect its purpose of
punishing the defendants, there would
seem to be present all the elements of a
ratification. If so, the Government itself
would become a lawbreaker. 277 U.S. at
483.
The court's aid is denied only when he We are not concerned with law enforcewho seeks it has violated the law in con- ment practices except in so far as courts
nection with the very transaction as to themselves become instruments of law
which he seeks legal redress. . . It is enforcement. We hold only that a decent
denied in order to maintain respect for regard for the duty of courts as agencies
law; in order to promote confidence in the of justice and custodians of liberty forbids
administration of justice; in order to pre- that men should be convicted upon oviserve the judicial process from contamina- dence secured under the circumstances
tion. Id. at 484.
revealed here." Id. at 347.
181. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
351 U.S. 115, 124 (1956). As pointed out by Hogan & Snee, supra note 178, at 32.
182. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. at 347.
183. Ibid.
184. Id. at 340. (Emphasis added.)
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exclude all evidence secured in violation of "those minimal historic
safeguards-?
Involving as it does a federal trial court and state police, the
"silver platter" situation contains an element of McNabb and an element of Wolf. The thrust of the foregoing discussion has been that
the fact that it is state police who have violated federal law, or at
least the federal constitution, does not render McNabb inapplicable, but the fact that the prosecution is in a federal court does validly distinguish Wolf.
At first glance, this position finds support in nothing less than
the express language of the McNabb and Wolf opinions themselves.
For, before they get down to the particular business at hand, both
opinions seem to assume that evidence secured by unconstitutional
means, whether the offenders be state or federal police, is inadmissible in a federal prosecution.
Thus McNabb states:
It is true, as the petitioners assert, that a conviction in the federal)
courts, the foundation of which is evidence obtained in disregard of
liberties deemed fundamental by the Constitution, cannot stand. ....
In the view we take of the case, however, it becomes unnecessary to
reach the Constitutional issue pressed upon us. For .. .the scope of
our reviewing power over convictions brought here from the federal
courts is not confined to ascertainment of Constitutional validity.....
[R]eview by this Court of state action expressing its notion of what will
best further its own security in the administration of criminal justice
demands appropriate respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so
basic an exercise of its jurisdiction. Considerations of large policy in
making the necessary accommodations in our federal system are wholy
irrelevant to the formulation and application of proper standards for the
enforcement of the federal criminal law in the federal courts.'8 5

And Wolf approaches the "immediate question":
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the policewhich is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free
society. It is therefore implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty" and as
such enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause ...
But the ways of enforcing such a basic right raise questions of a different
order ...
In Week . ..this Court held that in a federal prosecution the
Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an
illegal search and seizure. .

.

. The decision was a matter of judicial

implication. Since then it has been frequently applied and we stoutly
adhere to it. But the immediate question is whether the basic right to
protection against arbitrary intrusion by the police demands the exclusion of logically relevant evidence obtained by an unreasonable search
and seizure because, in a federal prosecution for a federal crime, it would
be excluded.18 6
185. Id. at 339-40. (Emphasis added.)
186. 338 U.S. at 27-28. (Emphasis added.)
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It does not take much reflection to realize that the pithiness of
the statements above has been achieved at the cost of complete
accuracy. That the presence of state agents may not be "wholly
irrelevant" to the formulation and application of federal court
standards." 7 But to recognize these passages as inconclusive is not
to write them off as insignificant. Do they not well demonstrate
that the main distinction drawn by the Court in its handling of
criminal cases is not between categories of police, but classes of
trial courts? That the dominant characteristic of Weeks and McNabb is not that evidence was illegally obtained by federal police
but that such evidence was sought to be used in federal prosecutions, just as the dominant consideration in Wolf was not that state
police violated due process but that the fruits of such violations
were admitted in a state court?
Support for this position may also be found in Benanti v. United
States,' which, since it involved state-gathered wiretap evidence
proffered in a federal prosecution, may be considered the wiretap
"silver platter" case. Relying on Schwartz v. Texas,"" which, to
pursue the analogy, may be regarded as the wiretapping counterpart to Wolf since it held state wiretap evidence admissible in state
courts, the government, in Benanti, strove hard to make the distinction between federal and state police the crucial one- but failed
spectacularly:
Respondents argue that the evidence obtained from the disclosed
wiretap should have been admissible by referring to Schwartz v. Texas.
.. . It is urged that as long as the wiretapping occurred without the
participation or even knowledge of federal law-enforcement officers, the
evidence should be admitted in federal court; the Federal Government,

being without fault, should not be handicapped. However, Schwartz v.
Texas does not indicate approval of such a proposition. Both a state
court and state law-enforcement officers were there involved. The ration-

ale of that case is that despite the plain prohibition of Section 605 [against
"divulgence" of the existence or contents of the intercepted message],

due regard to federal-state relations precluded the conclusion that Congress intended to thwart a state rule of evidence in the absence of a clear
187. Thus, later in the Wolf opinion the Court notes, 338 U.S. at 32-33:
There are, moreover, reasons for excluding evidence unreasonably obtained by
the federal police which are less compelling in the case of police under State
or local authority. The public opinion of a community can far more effectively
be exerted against oppressive conduct on the part of police directly responsible
to the community itself than can local opinion, sporadically aroused, be brought
to bear upon remote authority pervasively exerted throughout the country.
But see the discussion at notes 38-43 supra.
Consider also the argument set forth at notes 255-58 infra that the deterrent
effect of an exclusionary rule which operates against state officers only when they
happen to turn illegally seized evidence over to federal agents is too insignificant to be
worth the price. But see the discussion in section II-C-5 infra.
188. 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
189. 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
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indication to that effect. In the instant case we are not dealing with a
state rule of evidence. Although state agents committed the wiretap,
we are presented with a federal conviction brought about in part by a
violation of federal law, in this case in a federal court.lro

Due regard for federal-state relations, it is interesting to note,
did not so much as warrant discussion about whether Congress intended to thwart the operations of state police in this occasional
and indirect manner.
However, while Benanti quite obviously points the way, it does

not necessarily decide the "silver platter" issue. For as is evidenced
by the foregoing excerpt from the opinion, the force of the wiretapping analogy is weakened by the fact that section 605 of the Federal Communications Act contains a "built-in exclusionary rule,"
i.e., the act explicitly prohibits the "divulgence" of intercepted communications."' 1 Even so, the case is still of value. For, as the foregoing excerpt also indicates, section 605 prohibits "divulgence" in
state as well as federal courts. Yet, said the Court in Schwartz, this
is "simply an additional factor for a state to consider" in rejecting
or accepting the exclusionary rule. 9 2 At the very least, then, Benanti
and Schwartz well illustrate that the Court is less disturbed about
invoking an exclusionary rule against state police in a federal court
than imposing an exclusionary rule on state courts.
The priority of delicacy in federal-state relations takes on enhanced importance with Rea v. United States,'193 where the Court
went to the very brink of imposing a search and seizure exclusionary
rule on state courts by enjoining a federal agent, who was the chief
prosecution witness in a state case, from giving evidence obtained
in the course of an illegal search. If the federal district courts may
thus get so much mileage out of an illegal federal search in so sensitive an area of federal-state relations as state criminal proceedings
for a violation of state law, should they be less vigorous when facing
a situation less fraught with friction between state and nation:
efforts to use the fruits of an illegal state search in a federal prosecution? If federal district judges can and should so effectively, albeit indirectly, stultify state court proceedings based on searches
violative of the federal rules in the course of "policing those requirements,"- can it be they must not balk when evidence secured
190. 355 U.S. at 101-02. (Emphasis added.) Incidentally, if § 605 does contain a
"plain prohibition" against divulgence, why isn't this a "clear indication" that Congress intended to thwart state rules of evidence?
191. See note 92 supra.
192. 344 U.S. at 201.
193. 350 U.S. 214 (1956). The many problems raised by Rea are explored in
Eichner, Impact of the Rea Case on the Law of Illegal Search and Seizure, 9 U
FA. L. RE;v. 178 (1956), and Parsons, State-FederalCrossfire in Search and Seizure
and Self-Incrimination, 42 CoHE.NmL L.Q. 346, 349-63 (1957).
194. 350 U.S. at 217.
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in violation of the same "basic right," this time protected by the
fourteenth amendment, is proffered in their own courtrooms?
"Federal courts," Mr. Justice Douglas reminds us for the Rea
majority, "sit to enforce federal law."' 95 But if they sit to enforce
violations of the federal rules relating to searches and seizures, do
they not also sit to enforce violations of the federal constitution relating to searches and seizures? Rea makes much of the fact that
"the only relief asked is against a federal agent."' 0 But this, of
course, is also true of the "silver platter" situation. Indeed, there, the
accused asks much less-only that the federal court withhold its
aid from federal law enofrcement officials. The rule of exclusion,
as Mr. Justice Brandeis observed some thirty years ago, "is one, not
7
of action, but of inaction."

19

Conceptually, at least, it is not easy to see how the rule that the
fruits of illegal state searches may be used in federal prosecutions
survives Wolf. It is still more difficult to see how it survives Rea.
That the Court need not go as far as it did in Rea to overturn the
"silver platter" doctrine is evidenced by Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion for the four Rea dissenters which falls back on the language in
McNabb:
Indeed, in excluding the McNabb evidence in a federal trial, the Court
was careful to say:

"

. . . we confine ourselves to our limited function

as the court of ultimate review of the standards formulated and applied
by federal courts in the trial of criminal cases. We are not concerned vith
law enforcement practices except in so far as courts themselves become
instruments of law enforcement." 19s

But, of course, it is only when federal courts "themselves become
instruments of law enforcement" that the "silver-platter" rule comes
into play. The dissent protests, too, that when federal courts operate to exclude illegally seized evidence from state criminal proceedings they disregard the "only difference" between Wolf and Weeks:
. . IT]he
[
only difference I can see between the Wolf decision and
Weeks . . . excluding in federal criminal trials evidence obtained in
contravention of the Fourth Amendment, is the difference between state

and federal courts; in each case, the substance of the constitutional command is the same, but the nature of enforcement varies with the forum. 199
195. Ibid.
196. Id. at 216.
197. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. at 484.
198. 350 U.S. at 218-19.
199. Id. at 220. Although I admire the result reached by the Rea majority it
must be said that Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent is an outstanding piece of judicial
craftsmanship.
While some of Mr. Justice Douglas' language suggests the contrary, see 350
U.S. at 217-18, Harlan has the strong weight of what authorities there are behind
him when he observes, id. at 220, that "had the petitioner been convicted in the
state courts by use of this [illegally obtained federal] evidence, I take it that Wolf
means we would not have interfered, at least absent any showing of a more ag-
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If this is the "only difference" between Weeks and Wolf it is fully
preserved where state-seized evidence is excluded from federal
criminal proceedings.
Indeed, if the above passage from the Rea dissent is not a brief
for those who would overturn the "silver platter" doctrine, it is as
good a starting point as any from which to write one.
The Supreme Court has not considered the effect of Wolf or Rea
on the "silver platter" rule. 0 0 In the ten years since Wolf, or at least
the three years since Rea, have the lower federal courts put the
old rule to rest? Quite the contrary. The old rule has fared remarkably well. Of the eight courts of appeals passing on the rule since
Wolf, seven have adhered to it. Counting all post-Wolf federal appellate opinions, the scorecard reads in favor of the old rule better
than thirty cases to one,2 0 ' Judge Hastie, sitting by designation as a
gravated search and seizure than this record discloses." See Eichner, supra note 193,
at 185; Parsons, supranote 193, at 348 n.2.
Even the exclusionary states are split over the admissibility of illegal federallyseized evidence in their courts.
Cases from exclusionary states barring or indicating they will bar such evidence
are Little v. State, 171 Miss. 818, 159 So. 103 (1935); State v. Rebasti, 306 Mio.
336, 267 S.W. 858 (1924); see State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 67, 254 Pac. 788,
795-96 (1927); Walters v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 182, 186, 250 S.W. 839, 841
(1923); State v. Hiteshaw, 42 Wyo. 147, 152-54, 292 Pac. 2, 4 (1930). Cases
from exclusionary states admitting or indicating they will admit such evidence are
State ex rel. Kyhr v. District Court, 82 Mont. 515, 268 Pac. 501 (1928); State v.
Gardner, 77 Mont. 8, 249 Pac. 574 (1926); see People v. Touhy, 361 Ill.
332, 347,
197 N.E. 849, 857 (1935); Kaufman v. State, 189 Tenn. 315, 319-21, 225 S.W.2d
75, 77 (1949); Johnson v. State, 155 Tenn. 628, 630-31, 299 S.W. 800, 801 (1927).
Indeed, as Parsons observes, supra at 359, if the Supreme Court were to overturn state convictions based on illegally seized federal evidence, then the need to
grant early relie, as in Rea, would be significantly reduced.
200. However, the Supreme Court may well do so next term. See note 10 supra.
201. Second Circuit:
See the well considered dictum in United States v. Benanti, 244 F.2d 389, 392-93,
reo'd on other grounds, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
Fifth Circuit:
West v. United States, 259 F.2d 868 (1958) (per curiam); Grimes v. United
States, 234 F.2d 571 (1956); Watson v. United States, 224 F.2d 910 (1955) (alternative holding) (conviction reversed on other grounds); Helton v. United States,
221 F.2d 338 (1955) (conviction reversed on other grounds); Shurman v. United
States, 219 F.2d 282, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 921 (1955); Burford v. United States,
214 F.2d 124 (1954); Fredericks v. United States, 208 F.2d 712 (1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 1019 (1954); Serio v. United States, 203 F.2d 576, cert. denied,
346 U.S. 887 (1953); Scotti v. United States, 193 F.2d 644 (1952), affirming 102
F. Supp. 747 (S.D. Tex. 1950) (elaborate discussion by district court); cf. Johnson v. United States, 207 F.2d 314, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 938 (1953) (applying
"silver platter" doctrine to evidence seized by Cuban police). But cf. Henderson v.
United States, 237 F.2d 169 (1956) (defense of entrapment allowed in federal
prosecution though state officer, not acting in collusion with federal authorities,
induced defendant to commit the crime).
Sixth Circuit:
Graham v. United States, 257 F.2d 724 (1958); Brown v. United States, 255
F.2d 400 (1958) (per curiam); Collins v. United States, 230 F.2d 424 (1956)
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Judge of the District of Columbia Circuit,
registering the lone tally
22
against it in Hanna v. United States.
The score is overwhelming, but the manner in which the score
was compiled is much less impressive. Only three of the more than
(per curiam); Ford v. United States, 234 F.2d 835 (1956), cert. denled, 352 U.S.
972 (1957) (alternative holding); Frierson v. United States, 223 F.2d 255 (1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 970 (1956) (per curiam) (alternative holding).
Seventh Circuit:
United States v. Moses, 234 F.2d 124 (1956); United States v. White, 228 F.2d
832 (1956); United States v. Stirsman, 212 F.2d 900 (1954) (alternative holding);
United States v. Haywood, 208 F.2d 156 (1953).
Eighth Circuit:
Costello v. United States, 255 F.2d 389, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958);Jones
v. United States, 217 F.2d 381 (1954); Losieau v. United States, 177 F.2d 919
(1949).
Ninth Circuit:
Elkins v. United States, 266 F.2d 588 (1959), petition for cert. filed, 28 U.S.L.
WEEK 3008 (U.S. July 7, 1959) (No. 126); Rios v. United States, 256 F.2d 173
(1958), cert. granted, 359 U.S. 965 (1959) (Misc. No. 40); Andersen v. United States,
237 F.2d 118 (1956); Williams v. United States, 215 F.2d 695 (1954) (alternative
holding); Jaroshuk v. United States, 201 F.2d 52 (1953) (per curiam); Parker v.
United States, 183 F.2d 268 (1950); Symons v. United States, 178 F.2d 615, cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 985 (1950).
Tenth Circuit:
Euziere v. United States, 266 F.2d 88 (1959); Gaitan v. United States, 252
F.2d 256, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 937 (1958); Gallegos v. United States, 237 F.2d
694 (1956); United States v. Braggs, 189 F.2d 367 (1951) (alternative holding)
(proceeding for forfeiture of automobile used to remove and conceal whiskey).
The many federal judges who have continued to apply the "silver platter" doctrine
are in good company. So far as I can determine, all the texts and treatises which have
dealt with the point since Wolf have likewise continued to regard the "silver platter"
doctrine as a well-settled exception to the federal exclusionary rule. But nary a one has
so much as considered the impact of Wolf on the doctrine. See CORwIN, TiH CoNSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANs TODAY 209-10 (12th ed. 1958); FELLMAN, Tim
DEFENDANT's Ricrrrs 132 (1958); 4 JONEs, THE LAv oF EVIDENCE 1632 (5th cd. Card
1958); MACHEN, THE LAw OF SEARCH AND SFZURE 119-21 (1950); McConuMcK, Ev1DENCE 294 n.1 (1954); MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 107-08 (1959);
2 MORGAN, BAsic PROBLEMs OF EVIDENCE 205 (1957); 2 UNDERILL, CRUMINAL EviDENCE 1062 (5th ed. Herrick 1956); 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 706-07 (12th
ed. Anderson 1955); 8 WIOMoRE, EvDRNCE § 2184a (Supp. 1957).
202. 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958). In doing so, Judge Hastio relied heavily on
the view that the admission of unconstitutionally-seized evidence would impair the
integrity of the federal judicial process. Id. at 728. See discussion at notes 178-81 supra.
It should be noted that the government takes the position that not even Hanna
is to be reckoned a tally against the rule:
[W]e did not take the case to the Supreme Court because we regarded the
decision as laying down a rule of evidence for the District of Columbia, a
matter which comes within the Supreme Court's policy of noninterference with
local rules formulated by the courts of the District. See Fisher v. United Statcs,
328 U.S. 463, 476-77. The Supreme Court was so advised by the Solicitor
General in a letter to the Clerk in connection with the pending case of Rios v.
United States, in which the petitioner had called the Court's attention to the
Hanna decision.
Letter from Malcolm R. Wilkey, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
to Yale Kamisar, May 1, 1959, on file in Minnesota Law Library.
It is true that the Hanna opinion states at one point, 260 F.2d at 728: "On
principle and as a matter of sound policy in the administration of judicial proceed-
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thirty cases deciding the question in favor of the old rule in the
ten years since Wolf have so much as cited it 2 3 Reasonable men
can differ as to whether Wolf might just as well not have been written. But most of the federal courts appear to have gone further.
They seem to have taken the position that Wolf never was written.
Again and again, they have perfunctorily resolved in favor of the
admissibility of illegal state seizures with such comments as[W]hile these rights are basic it is equally fundamental that the protection of the Fourth Amendment does not extend to the activities of
state officers.... 204
ings in the District of Columbia we think all evidence obtained by violation of
the Constitution should be excluded." But the main thrust of the opinion is
otherwise:
In cumulative effect these several pronouncements by so many Justices of the
present Court support the rational argument that the Weeks and the Wolf decisions, considered together, make all evidence obtained by unconstitutional
search and seizure unacceptable in federal ourts....
What ... should be the controlling considerations when unconstitutionally
obtained evidence is offered in a court of the United States? ...
[T~he courts of the United States, the ultimate guardians of the Constitution,
cannot afford to play the "ignoble part" by themselves permitting the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence....
[W]e should not assume that the refusal of the federal courts to permit the use
of improperly obtained evidence will have no effect in persuading state as well
as federal officers to follow constitutional methods and procedures in obtaining
evidence.
Id. at 727-28.
Since the Hanna case involved a prosecution for a violation of the District of
Columbia penal code, it could be argued that the Court of Appeals sat as if it were
the highest appellate court of a state. That it could have excluded the illegally
seized evidence on the same grounds that the courts of an exclusionary state can
exclude evidence illegally obtained by the police of an admissibility state. Cf. Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the Privileges of Another Jurisdiction, 56
COLum. L. REv. 534, 537 (1956): "Where the forum recognizes the privilege, the
cases do not permit a confidential communication to be divulged even though it
was not privileged in C [the place where the communication took place.]"
A reading of the Hanna opinion in its entirety, however, demonstrates that the
Court of Appeals did not sit as the appellate court of the District, but as a federal
court, generally.
Quaere, if the Supreme Court reaffirms the "silver platter" doctrine, might it
still permit the federal courts in the District of Columbia to exclude illegal stateseized evidence, at least in prosecutions for violations of the District Code? Cf.
Griffin v. United States, 336 U.S. 704, 715 (1949): "ENlothing in our decisions
forecloses the Court of Appeals [of the District of Columbia] from selecting any
one in the range of choices open to it, each one having some rational basis. That
court has heretofore been recognized as the appellate tribunal for determining the
local rules of evidence." See also Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 476 (1946).
203. Rios v. United States, 256 F.2d 173, 175-76 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. granted,
359 U.S. 965 (1959) (Misc. No. 40) (noting, in passing, that the right to be secure in
person and property "is enforceable against both federal and nonfederal authorities,"
but not dwelling on how it is enforceable against the latter); United States v. Benanti,
244 F.2d 389, 392 (2d Cir.), revd on other grounds, 355 U.S. 96 (1957); Jones v.
United States, 217 F.2d 381, 382 (8th Cir. 1954).
204. Gallegos v. United States, 237 F.2d 694, 696 (10th Cir. 1956).
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Since an unreasonable search and seizure by a state official does not violate the Fourth Amendment, federal courts have held that their duty to
nor justifies the exclusion of
enforce the Constitution neither necessitates
205
evidence so obtained by state officials.
Even if the arrest, search and seizure in the instant case were unreasonable
the United States nonetheless was entitled to use [it] unless there was such
complicity by federal officials as to bring the seizure within the prohibition
of the [Fourth and Fifth] Amendments to the Constitution. 20

Do we dare ask about Rea? Of the fifteen cases which have adhered to the old Weeks rule of admissibility since Rea was handed
down,2 °7 none have explicitly considered what impact, if any, it has
on the "silver platter" doctrine.
All in all, the post-Wolf, post-Rea federal practice seems to amply
support the recent observation of a state supreme court justice that
"it is easy indeed to get used to a particular procedural system.
What is familiar tends to become what is right.' 208
What of Jones v. United States2"' and United States v. Benanti,I"
the two cases which considered but went on to reject the applicability of Wolf? Both conclude that whatever effect Wolf may have
had was offset by Lustig (decided the same day as Wolf) and
Irvine.
Benanti finds solace in the fact that the Weeks-Byars rule was
"again applied in Lustig.""' And so it was, the evidence being excluded on grounds of federal-state complicity, but with the explicit
reservation by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who announced the judgment of the Court, that "where there is participation on the part
of federal officers it is not necessary to consider what would be the
212
result if the search had been conducted entirely by State officers."
205. United States v. Moses, 234 F.2d 124, 125 (7th Cir. 1956).
206. Parker v. United States, 183 F.2d 268, 270 (9th Cir. 1950).
207. With the exception of United States v. White, 228 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1950),
decided ten days earlier than Rea, all cases in note 201 supra dated 1956 or later
were handed down after the Rea decision.
208. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HAnv. L. R.v, I,
7 (1956). Cf. Dean Acheson's comment on the administration of the loyalty program: "Familiarity breeds more than contempt, it breeds indifference." AcitESON, A
DEmOCRAT LOOKS AT His PARTY 129 (1955).
209. 217 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1954).
210. 244 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 355 U.S. 96 (1957). BOianti,
of course, is a wiretapping case, but the Court of Appeals turned to search and
seizure law to ascertain the principles which govern the admissibility of wiretap
evidence, id. at 391. In so doing, it engaged in a careful and extensive discussion
of the "silver platter" doctrine, id. at 392-93. In reversing, the Supreme Court hold
that the express language of the Federal Communications Act made it unnecessary
to turn to the search and seizure field by way of analogy. See notes 92, 93, 188-91
supra and accompanying text.
211. 244 F.2d at 392.
212. 338 U.S. at 79.
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Jones relies on the fact that the four Justices who dissented in
Lustig were of the view that the Weeks-Byars rule remained unchanged.113 And so they were. But four Justices are not quite

enough. Three other Justices, concurring in the judgment of the
Court, were just as convinced that "whether state or federal officials
did the searching is of no consequence to the defendant, and it
should make no difference to us." 21 4 The eighth member of the

Lustig Court, Mr. Justice Black, concurred in the judgment "substantially for reasons set out in his dissent in Feldman v. United
States" 215 on which occasion he bitterly protested the holding "that

an accused can be convicted in a federal court on words he was
forced to speak" because "the testimony was compelled by state
officers

. .

. not acting to enforce federal law."'- " The reasons set

out in Mr. Justice Black's Feldman dissent place him squarely in
the camp of the federal court search and seizure exclusionists. The
ninth member of the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, was, as has
already been noted, explicitly neutral on the point.
For whatever it is worth, two of the four Justices who opposed the
Court today; none of the
Weeks-Byars rule in Lustig are still on the
217
four who adhered to the old rule remain.

Anyway you view it, the most adherents of the Weeks-Byars rule
can get out of Lustig seems to be a draw.
Both Jones and Benanti attach great weight to a single sentence
in Mr. justice Jackson's four-man Irvine opinion:
evidence in
Even this Court has not seen fit to exclude illegally seized
2
federal cases unless a federal officer perpetrated the vrong. 18

Even if a majority of the Court had joined in Mr. Justice Jackson's
opinion, there would be considerable doubts about the significance
of the above sentence, unaccompanied as it is by any citation of

authorities, immediately followed as it is by the statement that
"private detectives may use methods to obtain evidence not open to
officers of the law."219
213. 217 F.2d at 383.
214. Mr. Justice Murphy, joined by justices Douglas and Rutledge, concurring,
338 U.S. at 80.
215. 338 U.S. at 80.
216. 322 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1944). See also the excerpts from Mr. Justice
Black's Feldman dissent in note 174 supra.
217. Of the Lustig dissenters, Chief justice Vinson and Mr. Justice Jacmon have
died and Justices Reed and Burton have retired.
218. 347 U.S. at 136. See the Benanti case 244 F.2d at 393 and the Jones case,
217 F.2d at 383.
219. 347 U.S. at 136. This statement is accompanied by a citation of cases, but
the only one cited as direct authority deals with private detectives; Lustig is only
cited as a "cf.," along with Feldman, a self-incrimination case.
This statement may only explain the preceding one. If it does not, if it is a
separate thought, it is arguably a different thought. For the Court does not say
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If the single Irvine sentence does warrant the continued application of the old "silver platter" rule by the lower federal courts - or
did until Benanti-it must be because it is fair play to tear bits out
of opinions primarily dealing with other questions. On this basis,
those who would overturn the old rule can score some points, too starting with the very same Irvine opinion.
For earlier, Mr. Justice Jackson said:
The decision in Wolf ...for the first time established that "[t]ihe
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police" is em-

bodied in the concept of due process found in the Fourteenth Amendment.
But Wolf, for reasons set forth therein, declined to make the subsidiary procedural and evidentiary
doctrines developed by the federal
2 20
courts limitations on the states.

It is ironic that in excluding illegal state seizures from the federal
courts the Hanna opinion 211 seizes on and builds upon still another
sentence in Mr. Justice Jackson's Irvine opinion:
Whether to exclude illegally obtained evidence in federal trials is left
largely to our discretion, for admissibility of evidence is governed "by

the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." 2222

In any event, if the single Irvine sentence were ever significant,
it seems that it no longer is. For in the recent Benanti case, Chief
Justice Warren recalled for a unanimous Court that the fate of the
"silver platter" rule "has remained an open question in this Court"
since Lustig.223 Yet the Chief Justice was one of those who three
years earlier had joined in Mr. Justice Jackson's Irvine opinion. Indeed, of the four who joined in that opinion, he alone still sat on the
Court when Benanti was written. 24
That the fate of the "silver platter" rule has remained in doubt
these ten years does not mean that its fate has been uninfluenced
by other decisions in the meantime. Indeed, the thrust of this section is that one who takes a conceptual approach to the problem
has good reason to regard the Wolf case, buttressed by the earlier
McNabb doctrine, and the Rea and Benanti cases, as "fixed points
from which boundaries are drawn and contours filled in" 22 _ and
that state officers may use methods to obtain evidence in federal cases not open to
federal officers. It says it has "not [yet?] seen fit to exclude" such evidence. This is
true. But this is not to deny that the question is open. Not once in the ten years
since Wolf has the Court seen fit to admit such evidence either.
220. 347 U.S. at 132. (Emphasis added.)
221. 260 F.2d at 728.
222. 347 U.S. at 134-35.
223. 355 U.S. at 102 n.10.
224. Mr. Justice Jackson has died and Justices Reed and Burton have retired.
225. "In the common-law process, decided cases become fixed points from which
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to find the old "silver platter" rule somewhere outside these
boundaries.
B. A PracticalApproach: What Is To Be Gained by Overturning
the Doctrine?
Conceptually or formally as I have endeavored to show, those
who would exclude the fruits of an illegal state search from the federal'courts seem to have the better of it. But far-reaching federal
questions are not often resolved on such grounds alone-least of
all where the issue causes so violent a clash of values between individual liberty and maximum deterrence, apprehension and conviction of the criminal as does the problem of search and seizure.
Whether or not the federal court exclusionary rule is to be invoked against state police, as well as federal, may well turn less
on the force of or radiations from precedents than on notions about
the efficacy and desirability of (a) the present exclusionary rule;
and (b) an exclusionary rule which would operate against the
police of another "sovereignty." If the exclusionary rule, as presently
employed in the federal courts and in the courts of two-fifths of
the states, accomplishes little or nothing, there is still less to be
said for going further and widening its scope to cover the "silverplatter" exception. On the other hand, even if the present rule is
deemed to have a significant effect on police practice, it may well
be that an extension of the rule to reach the police of another jurisdiction will prove a totally futile gesture.

(1) Some reflections on the present exclusionary rule- with particular attention to the recent California experience. An exhaustive consideration of the effects wrought by the exclusionary rule
could be the subject of a full-sized article, if not a full-length book.
Nor could such an analysis be very usefully undertaken without
detailed findings of field studies - findings not yet available.2" Nevboundaries are drawn and contours filled in. That is the process that has been used
from the outset in giving meaning to the due process clause." Schaefer, supra note
208, at 6.
226. Such findings may be available in the foreseeable future. See A.mucA.BARt FouNDATIoN, THE AD',MISTRATION OF CIU
STATES 124--27 (1955) (prepared by Prof. Arthur

,INALJUSTICE IN THE UNTEM

H. Sherry), contemplating that
research teams will determine inter alia the standards of conduct imposed upon the
police by laws relating to searches and seizures and arrests, the practices and procedures which the police actually pursue in this regard and "the effect of courts,
prosecuting attorneys and other agencies and institutions on the above listed
practices."
The Director of Field Research for the American Bar Foundation, Professor Frank
Remington of Wisconsin Law School, informs me that to date studies of police
administration in Detroit, Milwaukee and Wichita are "inconclusive" as to the
practical effects wrought by the rule of exclusion. He notes that it is particularly
difficult to appraise the rule in Michigan where, pursuant to a 1952 constitutional
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ertheless, the lack of adequate data need not preclude one from
tossing out some queries, making some suggestions and drawing
some tentative inferences from the bits of evidence we do have.
My excuse -and the volume of literature already written on the
subject is such that I need one 227 is the recent California experi-

ence: before and after the adoption of the exclusionary rule.
Wigmore has condemned the exclusionary rule for regarding
"the over-zealous officer of the law as a greater danger to the community than the unpunished murderer or embezzler or panderer."22 ,
I do not think this fairly states the issue.
The concept of the "over-zealous officer" or the "blundering conamendment, MICH. CONST. art II, § 10, illegally obtained dangerous weapons and
narcotics seized outside the curtilage of any dwelling house are admissible while
other fruits of illegal searches are not.
William Beaney, Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Princeton
University, has also been doing field work on this subject in connection with a
forthcoming book on pre-trial criminal justice.
227. Some commentators have written on the subject down through the years.
Professor John Barker Waite's attacks on the exclusionary rule include Public Policy
and the Arrest of Felons, 31 MICH. L. REv. 749, 763-67 (1933); Police Regulation
by Rules of Evidence, 42 MICH. L. REv. 679, 683-88, 691-93 (1944); Judges and
the Crime Burden, 54 MICH. L. REv. 169-72, 193-98 (1955); The Legal Approach
to Crime and Correction, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROn. 594, 600-03 (1958). Osmond
K. Fraenkel's defenses of the rule include Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34
HARv. L. REV. 361, 372, 385 (1921); Recent Developments in the Law of Search
and Seizure, 13 MINN. L. REV. 1, 8-15 (1928); Recent Developments in the Federal
Law of Searches and Seizures, 33 Iowa L. REv. 472, 498-500 (1948); Search and
Seizure Developments in Federal Law Since 1948, 41 IowA L. REv. 67, 84 (1955).
228. 8 WiGMOrE, EVIDENCE § 2184, at 37 (3d ed. 1940). See also Barrett, Exclusion
of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches- A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CALI ,.
L. REV. 565, 582 (1955): "Is not the court which excludes illegally obtained evidence
in order to avoid condoning the acts of the officer by the same token condoning the

illegal acts of the defendant?" Much of this generally excellent article is reprinted In
FRYER, editor, SELEcTED WRInNrs ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AND TIUAL 324 (1957).
Of course, exclusion of the evidence does not necessarily free a particular defendant.
On remand, he can still be, and he has been, convicted on legally obtained evidence, if
such is sufficient. I have a more fundamental quarrel with Professor Barrett, however.
I believe the question he raises would be better framed in terms of condoning police
misconduct generally or criminal acts generally.
I think that where courts use the products of official misconduct there is a significant
likelihood that large segments of the public will regard the police illegality as "not so
bad," else the courts would not have permitted the evidence to be used. I find it hard to
believe that the exclusion of evidence in a rape or murder or dope peddling case exerts
a comparable influence on the public imagination to the effect that rape, murder or
dope peddling is "not so bad." While I can readily comprehend how the judicial
reception of illegal evidence may foster police misconduct, it is difficult for me to see
how the exclusion of evidence in a particular rape or murder or dope peddling case
operates to promote future acts of rape or murder or dope peddling. If, as even many
opponents of the exclusionary rule seem to concede, see notes 238, 239 infra and
accompanying text, the exclusionary rule is the only existing adequate remedy against
police misconduct, I think it may fairly be said that admission of the evidence does
condone the kind of police illegality involved in the case for all practical purposes.
However, so long as there are ample alternative methods of bringing criminals to justice,
as there appear to be, it can hardly be said that exclusion of evidence in a particular case
condones the kind of crime involved in the case for all practical purposes.
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stable" 22 9 is not very helpful when we deal with the Chief of
Police-approved, deliberate and calculated illegality that characterized the leading case of People v. Cahan230 and accounts for
systematic police raids and round-ups.23 1
Furthermore, sad fact though it be, just about the only occasion
the Court has to protect the innocent victim of illegal search and
seizure is when it is confronted with a case involving the "apparently" or "obviously" guilty. The late Mr. Justice Jackson, scarcely a
"coddler of criminals," made the point well:
Only occasional and more flagrant abuses come to the attention of the
courts, and then only those where the search and seizure yields incriminating evidence and the defendant is at least sufficiently cornpromised to
be indicted. If the officers raid a home, an office, or stop and search an
automobile but find nothing incriminating, this invasion of the personal
liberty of the innocent too often finds no practical redress. There may
be, and I am convinced that there are, many unlawful searches of homes

and automobiles of innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating,
in which no arrest is made, about which courts do nothing, and about
which we never hear.
Courts can protect the innocent against such invasions only indirectly
and through the medium of excluding evidence obtained against those

who frequently are guilty."
This, at any rate, is the theory. Whether it works out this way
229. "The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." Cardozo,
J., rejecting the exclusionary rule in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150
N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
230. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). This case saw the California Supreme
Court overturn precedents of more than thirty years' standing to adopt the exclusionary rule. With the approval of the Los Angeles Chief of Police, officers surreptitiously installed microphones in two houses occupied by some of the defendants. Subsequently, arrests and seizures were made without warrants, most of thcm
after forcible entries not preceded by demands for admittance.
The California Supreme Court branded this police activity a "flagrant violation
of the United States Constitution (4th and 14th ame
nts), the California Constitution (art. I, § 19), and state and federal statutes," 44 Cal. 2d at 436, 282 P.2d
at 906. As Professor Paulsen has said of the Cahan case:
This police conduct is not only an example of illegality, it is illegality elaborately planned with the connivance of the Los Angeles Chief of Police. It is not the
case of the over-eager rookie misjudging the fine lines of the law of arrest. It is
constitutional violation as a matter of police policy.
Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw.U.L. REv. 65, 75-76 (1957)
(all subsequent references to Paulsen are to this article).
See also Schaefer, supra note 208, at 15.
231. See e.g., note 54 supra. Ernest J. Hopkins devotes an entire chapter to the
considerable extent to which there is official or departmental sanction for police
misconduct, Hopxms, Otrn L.wL~ss PoricE 45-60 (1931).
232. In a self-styled prologue to his dissent in Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 181 (1949). He was joined by Justices Frankfurter and Murphy.
See also PaEsmzr's Co4ran oN Crvir RIcTs, To SEcunE THusE Ricirrs 25
(1947): "Most of the victims of [police] abuses are ignorant, friendless persons,
unaware of their rights, and without the means of challenging those who have
violated those rights."

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1083

is something else again. Mr. Justice Jackson on another occasion
voiced some serious doubts that it did:
What actual experience teaches we really do not know. Our cases evidence the fact that the federal rule of exclusion and our reversal of conviction for its violation are not sanctions which put an end to illegal
search and seizure by federal officers. The rule was announced in 1914
in Weeks . .. The extent to which the practice was curtailed, if at all, is
doubtful. The lower federal courts, and even this Court, have repeatedly
been constrained to enforce the rule after its violation. There is no reliable
evidence known to us that inhabitants of those states which exclude the
evidence suffer less from lawless searches and seizure than those of states
that admit it ...
That the rule of exclusion and reversal results in the escape of guilty
persons is more capable of demonstration than that it deters invasions
of right by the police. The case is made, so far as the police are
concerned, when they announce that they have arrested their man.
Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing official,
while it may, and likely will, release the wrong-doing defendant.
It deprives society of its remedy against one lawbreaker because he has
been pursued by another. It protects one against whom incriminating
evidence is discovered, but does nothing to protect innocent persons who
are the victims of illegal but fruitless searches. The disciplinary or educational effect of the court's releasing the defendant for police 28misbe3
havior is so indirect as to be no more than a mild deterrent at best.

That the rule of exclusion does not put an end to illegal search
and seizure proves too little or too much. The laws against murder
and rape go back quite a bit further than _19L4-and they have not
exactly stamped out these practices either, or significantly curtailed
them for that matter.
That it has yet to be established that inhabitants of admissibility
states suffer less from lawless searches than those of exclusionary
states is hardly decisive. State X may have adopted the exclusionary
rule because its police have engaged in most serious or most extensive misconduct. State Y may have rejected the rule because its

police have not and do not commit violations of comparable magnitude or with the same degree of frequency. For example, I know

of no police misconduct in Minnesota which approaches the lawlessness of the Californiapolice in the recent cases of Rochin, Irvine
and Cahan;28 4 this may argely explain why Minnesota still admits

illegally seized evidence and California no longer does.2 5

233. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. at 135-37. For the persuasive view thnt "tile
ultimate test of the exclusionary rules is whether they deter police oflicials from
ren
aging in the objectionable practices," see Allen, Due Process and State Criminal
P1cedures: Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 29 (1953).

234. For a brief account of the facts in Rochin see text at note 63 supra; for

discussions of the facts in Irvine and Cahan see notes 95-97 supra and accompany-

ing text; and note 230 supra, respectively.
235. Only a year before the Cahan decision the California State Bar Committee
on Criminal Law and Procedure reported, 29 CAIAF. S.B.J. 263 (1954):
Serious criticism has been made of the California rule that illegally obtained

1959]

WOLF AND LUSTIG

1149

The failure to establish that the police of admissibility states engage in more shocking or more prevalent misconduct than their
exclusionary state brethren may not signify much for another reason, a reason which may become more apparent if we turn to the
field of labor relations for analogy. That the wages and working
conditions of certain nonunionized companies or industries compare favorably with their unionized counterparts hardly demonstrates that the employee gains little or nothing from unionism. Not,
at least, until we consider the extent to which the improved lot of
the nonunion man can be traced to a desire on the part of his employer to stave off unionism.
Similarly, that the courts of State X presently admit illegally
seized evidence does not necessarily mean that the police of State
X are uninfluenced by. the prospect that misconduct on their part
may lead to a change in the rule. For example, my conversations
with Minnesota chiefs of police at two state-wide institutes have
convinced me that (1) many, if not most, of them believe that the
switch to the Weeks rule by some states in recent years, notably
California, is largely a reaction to serious misconduct on the part
of the police of these states; (2) many, if not most of them, strongly
desire to avoid similar "incidents," so as not to give Minnesota courts
cause to reconsider, if not abolish, the present rule of admissibility.236
In any event, if it is persuasive to note the failure to establish
that inhabitants of admissibility jurisdictions suffer more from ilevidence is admissible against a defendant in a criminal action. Although the
United States Supreme Court in . . .Rochin . . .and most recently in Irvine
. .. has continued to uphold the California rule of admissibility, holding that the
problem was one for the state to decide, the opinions condemned the police
practices which were employed as "incredible' and "frightening" violations
of the California and federal constitutional guarantees against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Stanislaus County Bar Association, by resolution, has
advocated adoption of the federal rule of excluding evidence obtained through
the violation of constitutional rights, and the Board of Editors of the California
Law Review, as well as editorials in daily newspapers in the state, have condemned the present application of the California rule of admissibility in these
cases.,
The Committee agrees that the police practices in question are shocking
and are inexcusable violations of rights constitutionally guaranteed to the individual.
For the Committee's recommendations see note 238 infra.
Justice Jackson's condemnation of California police activity in Irvine is set
forth near the outset of the Cahan opinion, 44 Cal. 2d at 437, 282 P.2d at 906.
Traynor, J., also points out in Cahan that "deliberate, flagrant violations of the constitutional guarantees like those in the present case and in Irvine . .. may be as
dangerous to ordered liberty as the coercion of confessions," id.at 422 n.4, 282 P.2d
at 909 n.4. "We have been compelled to reach that conclusion [evidence obtained in
violation of constitutional grantees is inadmissable]," continues Traynor, "because
other remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional
provisions on the part of police officers ....
.. Id. at 445, 282 P.2d at 911.
236. An attitude which members of the Minnesota Law Faculty have nourished.
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legal searches than do those of exclusionary jurisdictions, then so is
the counter-observation that it also remains to be demonstrated that
the inhabitants of exclusionary states suffer more from crime than
do those in states which have rejected the Weeks rule.
Assume, if you will, that the exclusionary rule has not significantly deterred police misconduct. It does not necessarily follow
that we should abolish it. The reason for its failure, if it be a failure,
may well be that we have not bothered to plug some gaping holes
in the present rule. For example, there is some striking recent testimony to the effect that federal officials may have found
an ample
27
outlet in the state courts for their illegally seized goods.
The fact that there is little agreement and little evidence that
the exclusionary rule does deter police lawlessness is much less significant, I think, than the fact that there is much agreement and
much evidence that all other existing alternatives do not.218 Mr.
Justice Jackson had to admit as much in Irvine:
It was pointed out in Wolf . . . that other remedies are available for
official lawlessness, although too often those remedies are of no practical
237. Thus, shortly after California adopted the exclusionary rule, the District
Attorney for the City of San Francisco pointed out:
Here in San Francisco, as Chief Healy has indicated to you, and I am sure the
other officers will, the district attorney's office has been used very liberally by
the Federal agents for their cases which might not necessarily stand the legal
test required in a Federal court.
We had the so-called nonexclusory [sic] rule here whereby we could use any
evidence no matter how it was obtained ...
In April of this year our Supreme Court came down with People versus
Cahan and they ruled in effect that we must follow the Federal rule ...
So we must reject cases which are brought to us by Federal agents that we
would have accepted prior to April of this year.
Testimony of Thomas C. Lynch, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Ways and Means on Traffic in, and Control of, Narcotics, Barbiturates,
and Amphetamines 84th Cong., 2d Sess., at 707 (1956).
And the United States Attorney for the Northern District of California agreed:
As indicated by Mr. Lynch, the practice was for many years to divert Federal cases, that is, cases which were made as a result of Federal investigation,
into the State courts if there were any apparent weaknesses from the ovidentiary standpoint.
The anticipation of a motion to suppress in the course of a Federal trial
made it practical to divert the case and eliminate any possibility of either an
acquittal by reason of suppression of evidence, or actual dismissal of a case
because of the absence of evidence after suppression.
At the present time the Federal authorities, our office in particular, feel
that there is nothing to be gained by diversion of these cases to State courts.
Testimony of Lloyd H. Burke, id. at 738.
238. Among the many commentators who share the view that, under existing
conditions, tort remedies, criminal prosecutions and internal police discipline are woefully inadequate checks on police misconduct, see BEISEL, CONTROL OVER ILLECAL
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CnvnirAL LAw: ROLE OF THE SuPREME CounT 10-13
(1955); CORNELrUs, SEARCH AND SFxzuRE 42-46 (2d ed. 1930); HoPaNs, Oun
LAwLEss PoLIcE 28-30, 43, 48-51, 61-75, 89-92, 293 (1931); MAcHEN, Tim LAw
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avail. The difficulty with them is in part due to the failure of interested
parties to inform of the offense. No matter what an illegal raid turns up,
police are unlikely to inform on themselves or each other. If it turns up
nothing incriminating, the innocent victim usually does not care to take
steps which will air the fact that he has been under suspicion. And the
prospect that the guilty may capitalize on the official wrongdoing in his
oF SEAncH A
SEIzunE 138-42 (1950); McCoaanc, EviDEN E
nELn, Cnm mA, Paocrnvnn FRar Ampms To APPEAL 28-&1

293 (1954); On-

(1947); Corwin,
The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MIcir. L.
REv. 1, 191, 204-05 (1929); Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures, 41 VA. L. REv. 621 (1955); Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations
of Individual Rights, 89 MnN. L. REv. 493 (1955); Hall, Police and Law in a
Democratic Socety, 28 IND. L.J. 134, 152-57, 178 (1953); Paulsen, supra note
230, at 72-74; Wray, Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained, 26 TEN. L. 11E. 332,
46-51 (1959); Note, 100 U. PA.. L. REv. 1182, 1206-12, (1952); Comments, 47 Nw.
U.L. REv. 493, 502-07 (1952) [reprinted in 45 J. Cam. L., C. & P.S. 697, 703-07
(1955)] 58 YALE L.J. 144 (1948).
Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 ConNEm L.Q. 337, 369-85 (1939) constitutes one of the sharpest attacks ever made against the exclusionary rule. Yet the
author concedes that judgments against police "may avail little," id. at 386, and
maintains that "we must devise more effective means of enforcing civil judgments
against the officers, by garnishment or otherwise." Id. at 887. He suggests that "an
alternative would be to provide a remedy against the government by which the
officer is employed." Ibid. He also observes that while "criminal penalties . . .are
often, on paper, very severe .. .the problem .. .is to translate the paper remedy
into effective actuality," suggesting some summary proceeding in the nature of
contempt, in which the court would take the initiative ... without the intervention of the prosecutor." Id. at 388.
In Grant, Circumventing the Fourth Amendment, 14 So. CAL. L. R-v. 359, 372
(1941) the author takes the position that the exclusionary rule "has failed to curb"
unreasonable, searches "to any appreciable degree because of the numerous excep
tions to its application" and therefore "the Court would do well either to make
the prohibition more general, or to abandon it altogether. The latter would seem
to be preferable, especially if the legislature were to undertake to implement the
older remedies so as to render them more effective." Earlier in the article he says
of the tort remedy against the trespassing officer: "Yet the simple truth is, that
this remedy has long since been hopelessly discredited by facts." Id. at 865. He, too,
concludes, id. at 372, that the government should be held financially liable.
Peterson, Restrictions in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 40
(1957), is a-vigorous criticism of the exclusionary rule. But it is significant, I think,
that the author does not fall back on any existing alternative remedy. Rather, he proposes the establishment in each jurisdiction of a separate Civil Rights Office 'independent of the prosecution" and "charged solely with the responsibility of investigating and prosecuting alleged violations of the Constitution by law enforcement officials." Id. at 62. (The disadvantages of this proposal are considered by
Paulsen, supra note 230, at 73-74).
A year before the Cahan decision, the California State Bar Committee on Criminal
Law and Procedure balked at the exclusionary rule:
Although the exclusionary rule appears to be workable in federal cases, the
nature of the investigation in a federal criminal case, as well as the quality of
the investigating personnel, often is quite different from state cases. In a great
number of F.B.L, Treasury and Internal Revenue cases the investigation can
safely and properly be made over a period of time, with the arrest being the
final step. The local officer, on the other hand, often has to work sviftly. To
get results he makes his arrest with little intellectual consideration of reasonable and probable cause, and without time to prepare and obtain the issuance of a search warrant A parallel to this situation is found in federal nar-
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defense, or to obtain reversal
from a higher court, removes any motive
23 9
he might have to inform.

It may well be, as Wigmore asserts, that the Weeks rule is "illogical,"240 that "the natural way to do justice here would be to enforce
the healthy principle of the Fourth Amendment directly, i.e. by
sending for the high-handed . . . marshal who had searched without a warrant, imposing a thirty-day imprisonment for his contempt of the Constitution, and then proceeding to affirm the sentence
of the convicted criminal." 24 But will the day ever come when we
can so send for the transgressing marshal?
Is not Wigmore's view,
242
at most, "a triumph of logic over life"?
At this point, the pre-Cahan California experience seems quite
relevant:
[P]rior to the Cahan decision the police were under no substantial pressure to seek clarification of those rules. The issue of legality became crucial
so seldom that the police had, in effect, broad discretion in determining

the procedures to follow, subject only to community pressures, particularly those by the press, which rarely focused upon any but the most
cotics cases in California, where the great majority of investigations are turned
over to local officers because the federal rule makes the swift type of arrest
and seizure a practical impossibility.
29 CALIF. S.B.J. 263, 264 (1954). But the report continued:
It was not felt that criminal prosecution of peace officers would be feasible,
from a realistic standpoint, and civil action for damages brought by a criminal
defendant would not be a practical solution. Many officers are judgment-proof,
and under present conditions the measure of damages would be a practical
difficulty.
The Committee did feel, however, that the answer might lie in a new kind
of civil action, or better, a summary type of proceeding, for a substantial money
judgment in favor of the wronged individual, whether innocent or guilty, and
against the political subdivision whose enforcement officers violated that per-

son's rights.

Ibid.
James Coakley, District Attorney, Alameda County, California, contends that "an
examination of the cases, at least in California, will disclose that [in many situatioas] a policeman is a 'sitting duck' for a false arrest suit." Coakley, Restrictions in
the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 2, 4 (1957). I submit, however, that his data
speak louder than his conclusions, id. at 5:
Over the past twelve years in the City of Los Angeles, new claims for damages alleged to have resulted from police misconduct have averaged approximately $1,000,000 a year. The facts that the city wins 91 per cent of the
cases and that recoveries have averaged only 1/20 of 1 per cent of the total
amount claimed, do not discourage such litigation. As long as the arrest laws
remain as they are, the arrestee at least has a chance to recover damages.
239. 347 U.S. at 137. Many harsh critics of the exclusionary rule admit as much,
too. See note 238 supra.
240. 8 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184, at 35 (3d ed. 1940).
241. Id. at 40.
242. To borrow a phrase used by Dean Eugene Rostow in a somewhat different
context, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HAnv. L. IRLv. 193, 205
(1952).
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obvious abuses. Some law enforcement officials took advantage of the
paucity of precedents to justify common police practices as being reasonable under the circumstances and, hence, not within the constitutional
ban of "unreasonable" searches and seizure.
Others have come close to saying that admittedly illegal searches and
seizures are justified whenever (in their opinion) adequate control of
particular criminal activity cannot otherwise be had.
There was little direct pressure upon the police to conform to the
rules. In practice, police discretion in determining the reasonableness of
searches was rarely subject to check. The possibilities of the situation improving appeared slight. Law enforcement groups preferred the ambiguity
real incentive to take the risks inof seldom-litigated rules and had no
2 43
volved in seeking legislative action.

No less relevant are the post-Cahancomments of the Chief of Police

of Los Angeles:
It appears to many of us in the law enforcement field that our ability to
prevent the commission of crimes has been greatly iminished. The actual commisison of a serious criminal offense will not justify affirmative
police action until such time as the police have armed themselves with
information to constitute "probable cause" for an actual
sufficient
24 4
arrest

We will meticulously abide by the California Supreme Court's decision
in the Cahan case and subsequent cases dealing with the exclusionary
rule. The criminal will continue to benefit and the law-abiding public will
continue to pay the bill.
As long as the Exclusionary Rule is the law of California, your police will
respect it and operate to the best of their ability within the framework
of limitations imposed by that rule. We feel obligated to present the case
against this rule of evidence, to gather and print the statistics of its cost in
of how it affects our ability to protect you against
public security, to 2speak
45
the criminal army.

Why is the Chief so excited? The Cahan decision does not alter

the rules-on-the books governing police practices one iota. What
was a legal arrest before still is. What was a reasonable search be-

fore still is.
Is it unfair to ask the Chief why, prior to Cahan, he permitted
243. Barrett, supra note 228, at 577, 587. Professor Barrett's views on the limita-

tions of the exclusionary rule have been quoted at length by Chief Parker of the Los
Angeles Police. See PABam, PoLcE 128-29 (Wilson ed. 1957).
244. P, mm, op. cit. supra note 243, at 117 (statement filed with California
Judiciary Subcommittee on Illegal Searches, Seizures, and the Laws of Arrest;
January 1956).
245. "Id. at 125, 131 (excerpts from an address delivered at the Ebell Club, Los
Angeles, March, 1956).
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his officers to take "affirmative action" without bothering to arm
themselves with sufficient information to constitute "probable
cause ?"246Or to ask him why, prior to Cahan, Los Angeles police
were not "meticulously abiding" by state and federal constitutional
provisions regarding searches and seizures?2 47 Or why the police
will only work within the "framework of limitations" imposed by
law "so long as the Exclusionary Rule is the law of California ?"
Is there more persuasive testimony of the need for the exclusionary rule than the reaction of the Chief to the adoption of such a
rule?
Is there any reliable evidence that the exclusionary rule significantly affects police practice? While Mr. Justice Jackson thought
not, Mr. Justice Murphy was convinced that "the contrast between
states with the federal rule and those without it is . . .a positive
246. In his 1956 statement against the Cahan decision filed with the California
Judiciary Subcommittee on Illegal Searches, Seizures, and the Laws of Arrest, Chief
Parker told of a "recent local incident wherein an alert officer effected the arrest
of the suspects shortly after an armed robbery had been committed." The officer
was not even aware that any robbery had been committed, when he "observed two
men in an automobile being operated on Wilshire Boulevard." But "the general
appearance of the men and the car, and a slight bend in the license plate aroused
the officer's curiosity." PAnKER, op. cit. supra note 243, at 117. While "the officer's
actions in this case were roundly applauded by a grateful public, "Chief Parker
expressed some doubts as to whether "in retrospect" the case would "stand the test
of 'probable cause'." Ibid.
247. Article 1, § 19 of the California Constitution guarantees, as does the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution, "the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures" and provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."
A year prior to the appointment of the present Chief of Police of Los Angeles,
the U.S. Supreme Court stamped an unreasonable search or seizure a violation of
due process. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). See section 1-B supra.
Chief Parker's criticism of the California exclusionary rule brings to mind the
retort of U.S. Senator Robert F. Wagner:
I have no fear that the exclusionary rule will handicap the detection or
prosecution of crime. All the arguments that have been made on that score
seem to me to be properly directed not against the exclusionary rule but against
the substantive guarantee itself. . . .It is the rule, not the sanction, which
imposes limits on the operation of the police. If the rule is obeyed as it should
be, and as we declare it should be, there will be no illegally obtained evidence
to be excluded by operation of the sanction.
It seems to me inconsistent to challenge the exclusionary rule on the ground
that it will hamper the police, while making no challenge to the fundamental
rules to which the police are required to conform.
1 NEw YoaRx CoNsmrnroNA. COvENTOm, xvxsED RconD 560 (1938), reprinted
in MIcHAEL & WEcHSLER, CRLMAINAL LAW AND ITS ADmINISTRATION 1191, 1192
(1940).
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demonstration of its efficacy." 248 But even Murphy recognized
exceptions to the contrast." 249

"there are apparent
Perhaps the most that can be said at this time is that in some
jurisdictions there is some evidence that judicial action has positive
effect on police practice; in other jurisdictions there is not." °
248.
If proof of the efficacy of the federal rule were needed, there is testimony
in abundance in the recruit training prog
s and in-service courses provided
the police in states which follow the federal rule. St. Louis, for example, demands extensive training in the rules of search and seizure, with emphasis
upon the ease with which a case may collapse if it depends upon evidence obtained unlawfully. Current court decisions are digested and read at roll calls.
The same general pattern prevails in Washington, D.C. In Dallas, officers are
thoroughly briefed and instructed that "the courts will follow the rules very
closely and will detect any frauds." In Milwaukee, a stout volume on the law
of arrest and search and seizure is made the basis of extended instruction.
Officer preparation in the applicable rules in Jackson, Mississippi, has included
the lectures of an Associate Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court. The instructions on evidence and search and seizure given to trainees in San Antonio
carefully note the rule of exclusion in Texas, and close with this statement:
"Every police officer should know the laws and the rules of evidence. Upon
knowledge of these facts determines whether the . . . defendant will be convicted or acquitted. .. . When you investigate a ase . .. remember throughout your investigation that only admissible evidence can be used."
But in New York City, we are informed simply that "copies of the State
Penal Law and Code of Criminal Procedure" are given to officers, and that they
are "kept advised" that illegally obtained evidence may be admitted in New
York courts. In Baltimore, a "Digest of Laws" is distributed, and it is made
clear that the statutory section excluding evidence "is limited in its application
to the trial of misdemeanors. . . It would appear . . . that . . . evidence
illegally obtained may still be admissable in the trial of felonies.' In Cleveland,
recruits and other officers are told of the rules of search and seizure, but
"instructed that it is admissible in the courts of Ohio.... "A similar pattern
emerges in Birmingham, Alabama.
Wolf v. Colorado, 388 U.S. 25, 44-46 (1949) (dissenting opinion). (Footnotes
omitted.)
249.
Denver, for example, appears to provide as comprehensive a series of
instructions as that in Chicago, although Colorado permits introduction of the
evidence and Illinois does not. And, so far as we can determine from letters,
a fairly uniform standard of officer instruction appears in other cities, irrespective of the local rule of evidence.
Id. at 46.
250. I fully agree with the observation, Barrett, supra note 228, at 584-86, that excluding evidence and freeing criminals does not punish "evil" policemen.
The exclusionary rule cannot be expected to improve a police force which is
generally corrupt, inefficient and lawless. It is not a magic wand which will
solve the complex problems which constitute the "police problem" in so many
of our communi.ties. The police problem is far broader than the question of
illegal searches and seizures; problems of police lawlessness are inextricably
bound up with the more general problems of police organization, governmental
corruption and modem crime. The fundamental problem, of course is the general public morality of the community in which the police serve. If the public
tolerates a graft-ridden political administration, if the public really does not
want adequate law enforcement but prefers to keep the lid off (or even tilted)
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It is interesting to note that while a principal complaint of
critics of the exclusionary rule has been that the rule does not work
at all, a major objection to the recent Cahan decision has been that
the rule works only too well.
Thus, some six weeks after Cahan, the chief of the State Bureau
of Narcotics Enforcement reported that the new rule had cut
arrests of dope addicts and peddlers by state agents by nearly twofor gambling, prostitution, liquor violations, and the like, then the police department will reflect this attitude...
The main trust of the exclusionary rule is against the police department
which is trying to do its job of crime control but is overzealous in its methods.
The principal long-run benefit to be expected from the rule is that It will force
the administrators of such departments to discipline their forces to be more
careful to abide by the rules.
Illinois, an exclusionary state, seems to be a horrible example:
A shocking example of the failure of law enforcement because of corruption
is an activity which is a common occurrence in one of the branches of the
[Chicago] Municipal Court. In this court 70% of the gambling cases are dismissed on a motion to suppress the evidence because of an illegal search and
seizure. Day after day the same police squad testifies as to the nature of the
raids and the same small clique of lawyers make the motions to suppress. The
routine has become so common that there is now very little attention paid to
the facts and the motions are made and sustained as a matter of course ...
In most instances the farce played out in this branch of the Municipal
Court obscures the factual situation. There usually is no need for a search warrant in the kinds of cases that are before the court. An arrest warrant would
have been sufficient, the police having ample information and reasonable
grounds to get such a warrant. Also when the police make their raids, they
find gambling going on in their presence, with the evidence open to their view
and not concealed. A valid arrest warrant would make the seizure of this evidence a legal seizure. The assistant state's attorney, however, does not make this
point nor does the judge suggest it. Like robots, they go through the steps of
sustaining the motion to suppress the evidence.
A study of the records makes it clear that the raids are not conducted for
their nuisance value in plaguing the gamblers. Rarely is one gambler raided
more than once in a long period of time. Each of the gambling houses has its
turn to be raided, and the nuisance is negligible. An examination of the records
and a period of observation of this practice in the court is fairly convincing
that the raids are made to immunize the gamblers while at the same time satisfying the public that gamblers are being harassed by the police.
Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REv. 385, 391-92
(1951). See also DrTnscH, TnE TRouBLE WrrH Cops 14-15 (1955), awarding the
Chicago police force the booby-prize.
Opponents of the exclusionary rule conveniently overlook the many charges of
graft, corruption and inefficiency among the Chicago police when they trot out
Chicago court statistics to support their view that the exclusionary rul has been
an abysmal failure. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 238, at 55-56:
An examination of any available records reveals the complete failure of the
exclusionary rule as a means of disciplining police officers and deterring them
from conducting "illegal" searches and seizures as defined by supreme court
decisions. In 1950, in Branch 27 of the Chicago Municipal Court, out of 6,649
cases, motions to suppress the evidence on grounds of illegal searches and seizures were made in 4,673. And out of these 4,678 cases, motions to suppress
the evidence were granted in 4,593 or 98 per cent. While Branch 27 handles
mostly gambling and related violations, there were included 513 cases of carry-
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thirds."' And nine months after the adoption of the rule a chief
of police similarly protested that the Cahan decision had led to a
substantial reduction in narcotic arrests: 'During 1954 the comparative [seasonal] periods reflected a 15.7 per cent increase in such
arrests, while a 4.5 per cent decrease followed the Cahan
decision." 252
It may be that the rule of exclusion does not significantly deter
illegal arrests and searches or it may be that it enables too many
criminals to avoid arrest and search, but it is difficult to see how it
can be condemned on both accounts.
ing concealed weapons in which motions to suppress the evidence were made in
142 cases and granted in 129, or almost 91 per cent. Also included were 288
narcotics cases in which motions to suppress the evidence were made in 56
cases and granted in 56, or 100 per cent.
In addition to disregarding Chicago's extraordinary police problem, Peterson's
statistics are somewhat misleading. I regard the percentage of motions to suppress
which were granted an insignificant, if not immaterial, figure. Much more important, I think, is the percentage of total cases in Chicago Municipal Court in which
evidence was suppressed. These figures show an interesting pattern: 86.7 per cent
for "keeper of gaming house; 81.3, gambling; 74.3, numbers racket; 25.1, carrying
concealed weapons; 19.4, narcotic violations. Comment, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 493,
497-98 (1952).
Peterson fails to note that the Northwestern Law Review comment, supra, the
only authority he relies on for his data, makes these points, id. at 498-99:
Careful consideration must be given to the type of offense included in this
study, since this court does not deal with any of the more serious crimes. It is
interesting to note the difference in the percentage of illegal searches in the
two most serious offenses studied - carrying concealed weapons and narcotics
violations-and those in the gambling offenses. These figures, coupled with
the fact that with the passage of time the number of cases involving illegal
searches which have reached the Illinois Supreme Court has decreased, may
indicate that the exclusionary rule is most effective in discouraging illegal
searches in cases involving serious offenses, where conviction is important.
Conversely, where the police believe that a policy of harrassment is an effective
means of law enforcement, the exclusionary rule will not deter their use of
unlawful methods. From observations made in the court, it is obvious that the
police are aware of the requirements of the rule. Indeed, in gambling cases,
their testimony seems calculated to insure the exclusion of the seized evidence,
or at least to save time in disposing of a case in which the search is obviously
illegal . . .
A finding, however, that the rule has no substantial effect on police conduct
in minor offenses does not mean that the exclusionary rule should be abolished.
Unless some other device can be suggested which will reach all cases, the
problem facing the lawmakers and courts is that of finding some supplement to
the rule which will deter violations of the right of privacy in conjunction with
minor offenses.
251. See Barrett, supra note 228, at 589-90.
252. P_ mam, op. cit. supra note 243, at 121 (statement filed with California Judiciary Subcommittee, January, 1956). Apparently the impact of the Cahan decision
is still being felt. Thus, William B. McKesson, District Attorney of Los Angeles,
recently stated that "the Los Angeles County sheriff advises us that his office, in
1958, had a decrease of about 63.8 per cent in arrests for the sales of heroin, and a
decrease of about 50 per cent in arrests for the sales of marijuana as against
arrests in 1957." U.S. News & World Report, April 6, 1959, pp. 76, 80.
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Although the statements of the California law-enforcement officials above are, in a sense, admissions that the rule of exclusion does
substantially affect police practice, they were obviously self-serving
when made. 3 Much more reliable, I think, is the recent considered
judgment of the Attorney General of the State of California:
I believe further that because of this decision the police are doing better
work. Their investigations are more thorough and within American constitutional concepts. More guilty pleas have resulted because of the intensive pre-arrest work. For example, District Attorney Tom Lynch of San
Francisco has advised me that in gambling and narcotic raids, as well as in
other cases, the police discuss the facts with him and he is able to advise in
advance just what is necessary in order to make a good case.
In a great many instances, prior to the Cahan decision the police were
satisfied with an arrest. They were not too concerned with conviction
because the apprehension of the individual was sufficient in their minds.
In these cases the defendant, upon his dismissal, would feel that the
State was an equal violater of the law.
In the field of narcotics, much more intensive work is being done with
the peddler, the wholesaler and the seller. Prior to the Cahan case, the
officers, in order to justify their existence, felt it necessary to make a certain number of arrests. It was always easy to arrest a known addict upon
mere suspicion rather than do the tough, thorough work of getting to the
wholesaler and peddler.
I believe the over-all effects of the Cahan decision, particularly in view
of the rules now worked out by the Supreme Court, have been excellent.
A much greater education is called for on the part of all peace officers of
California. As a result, I am confident they will be much better police
officers. I think there is more cooperation with the District Attorneys and
this will make for better administration of criminal justice.
. . At first, I opposed the Cahan decision, but in the light of actual
experience
I now believe that the good will outweigh to a large extent
254

the bad.

While these observations only constitute some evidence about
the experience of one state, I submit that they fulfill the fondest

hopes and expectations of proponents of the exclusionary rule.
(2) The easy and uneasy cases for overturningthe "silver platter"doctrine. If the deterrent effect on the police of a particular jurisdiction is debatable even when the courts of the same jurisdiction
253. Perhaps we should overlook the rules of evidence, which regard an admis-

sion of a party-opponent no less an admission because self-serving when made. See,
e.g., McComaMcK, EviDEN CE 504 (1954).
254. Excerpts from letter from Governor Edmund G. Brown, then Attorney
General of the State of California ,to the Stanford Law Review, Dec. 7, 1956, on file
with the Stanford Law Review, quoted in part in Note, 9 STAN. L. Rev. 515, 538
(1957). I am indebted to the editors of the Stanford Law Review for sending me a
photostatic copy of the letter, which is on file in the Minnesota Law Library.
Since the state has no appeal from an acquittal, Brown suggests in his letter that
"the lower courts should resolve the reasonable differences of opinion in favor of
the state, particularly during the trial so that the Appellate Courts may eventually
work out by case law the very difficult law of search and seizure."
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regularly and uniformly exclude the fruits of illegal searches, what
can be said for an exclusionary rule which operates only sporadically against the police force of another jurisdiction?as What's the
Hanna decision to the Baltimore police whose lawlessness led to a
reversal of the conviction in the District of Columbia courts? '
Maryland state courts have admitted and will continue to admit
such evidence."' Can it seriously be contended that the Baltimore
police will be better-mannered the next time because of the fortuity
the last time that the suspect whose home they crashed had not
violated the laws of Maryland after all, but only those of another
jurisdiction? Why, then, have an exclusionary rule whereby the "obviously guilty" gain their freedom, but society gains nothing? 2s
This looms as a formidable defense of the old Weeks-Byars rule,
one which I will consider at some length in the succeeding sections
of this Article. It should be noted at the outset, however, that if adherents of the old rule so pitch their defense, it seems they must
withdraw from almost half the battlefield.
255. See United States v. Benanti, 244 F.2d 889, 393 (2d Cir.), rco'd on other
grounds, 355 U.S. 96 (1957):
Clearly the purpose of the [exclusionary] rule is to discourage such [unconstitutional] activities by overzealous law enforcement officers. . . . Of course, if an
unconstitutional search or seizure [by state officers in an admissibility state] was
not undertaken in order to secure evidence to be used in a federal court, a rule
of exclusion by such a court would serve no useful purpose, for the violation
would have occurred in any event. Exclusion in such a case would merely needlessly hamper the enforcement of federal law.
Cf. Mr. Justice Jackson, joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Callegos
v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 70 (1951):
Insofar . . . as the reason for exclusion [of coerced confessions] is to deter
states from attempting coercion in order to bring about convictions, the reason
would hardly apply to a case where a state of confession sought no conviction
and the state of conviction did not seek the confession.
For a discussion of the Gallegos case in particular and the reasons advanced for
excluding coerced confessions generally, see note 109 supra.
For an attempt to meet the argument set forth in the lower court Benanti opinion
see section II-C-5 infra.
256. Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958), it will be recalled,
is the one and only Court of Appeals case since Wolf to take the position that the
.silver platter" doctrine is dead. See note 202 supra and corresponding text. Defendant was convicted of housebreaking and larceny in the District of Columbia
on the basis of evidence illegally seized by Maryland state police in a pre-dawn
search of his Maryland motel room.
257. Maryland provides for the exclusionary rule only in misdemeanor cases,
with the exception of prosecutions for unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon and,
in certain counties, prosecutions for violations of specified gambling and lottery
laws, MD. CoDE ANN., art. 35, § 5 (1957). Maryland's checkered pattern was upheld against contentions that it violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment in Salzburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954), which traces the
history of the state's legislation in this field.
258. Judge Hastie, the author of the Hanna opinion, has been criticized for overlooking the uselessness of an exclusionary nile which operates against the police of
another jurisdiction. See 27 GEO. WASE. L. REv. 293, 395 (1959).
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For twenty-one states now follow the federal exclusionary rule.2 59
When evidence illegally seized by the police of these states finds
its way into the federal courts and defendant moves to invoke the
federal exclusionary rule it is difficult to see how the prosecutor can
so much as mutter "Why?" And if he does, he will be met with a
resounding "Why not?"
Why not, indeed? On such an occasion, the federal courts are not
"wasting" the rule, as might be regarded the case when the police
who seized the evidence hail from a nonexclusionary jurisdiction.
Rather, they are rounding out the state practice, they are reinforcing and implementing state policy.
I think claims of state policy do and should play a relatively minor
259. See Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531 (1956). Although, when territories, both Alaska
and Hawaii followed the Weeks rule, I do not add them to the twenty-one states in
the Weeks column since prior to statehood their courts felt bound by the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court. See United States v. Doumain, 7 Alaska 31,
35 (1923); Territory v. Ho Me, 26 Hawaii 331, 336-37 (1922).
Although the Court listed Oregon as an admissibility state in Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. at 38, I think the Annotation properly puts the state in the Weeks camp,
50 A.L.R.2d at 536 & n.1. In State v. Laundry, 103 Ore. 443, 494, 204 Pac. 958,
974 (1922) the Supreme Court of Oregon announced that "for the same reasons
which recommended it" to the United States Supreme Court, the Weeks rule
"ought [to] . . . be adopted and followed by the courts of this state." It adhered to
this position, after an extended discussion of the matter, in State v. McDaniel, 115
Ore. 187, 199-209, 231 Pac. 965, 969-72 (1925).
However, Oregon rejected the McNabb rule in State v. Folkes, 174 Ore. 568,
588-89, 150 P.2d 17, 25, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944). Somehow, the United
States Supreme Court, per Frankfurter, J., read this case as repudiating the Weeks
rule. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 38. But the Folkes opinion itself distinguishes
the problem of illegal search from that of prolonged detention: "When evidence is
seized by an illegal search, the illegality is the immediate and proximate cause which
produces the evidence, but . . . the confession, if voluntarily made, is only remotely,
if at all, connected with the fact that the officer disobeyed the [prompt commitment]
statute." Id. at 589, 150 P.2d at 25.
Although the Supreme Court of Oregon has not had occasion to pass on the
question in recent years, see State v. Olsen, 212 Ore. 191, 317 P.2d 938 (1957)
(evidence illegally seized by police of another state admissible in Oregon, assuming
it has exclusionary rule), the lower Oregon courts appear to be operating on the
premise that the state does still follow the Weeks rule.
Thus, to turn to the early history of Elkins v. United States, 226 F.2d 588 (9th
Cir. 1959), petition for cert. filed, 28 U.S.L. Wz=x 3008 (U.S. July 7, 1959) (No.
126), the District Court for Multnomah County suppressed the evidence obtained in
a search by Oregon officers on the ground that the search warrant issued was illegal.
Since a day prior to this ruling an indictment had been returned against petitioners
and the jurisdiction of a state district court to order suppression once an indictment
had been returned was challenged, the matter was reargued before the Circuit Court
for Multuomah County, a court of general criminal jurisdiction. This court again held
the search based on the above warrant illegal, and again granted the motion to
suppress the evidence. When federal authorities gained access to the illegally
obtained evidence and a federal grand jury returned an indictment against petitioners,
the Circuit Court for Multnomah County enjoined state officers from testifying
regarding the illegal search and seizure. Elkins v. Minielly, No. 238-958, Multnomnh
Cir. County Ct., Ore., April 15, 1957, set forth in app. E. to the petition for
certiorari in the Elkins case.
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rule in a federal prosecution for a federal crime..200 But let us assume
the contrary. Let us assume that claims of state policy are about as
important when state police have seized the evidence as when state
courts are asked to admit it.-"' Of what aid and comfort can local
policies possibly be to those who would admit evidence illegally
seized by the police of an exclusionary state?
The force of the first holding in Wolf that an unreasonable search
violates due process was diminished so as not "to preclude the
varying solutions which spring from an allowable range of judgment" 262 But how can or why should the force of that holding be
diminished when the judgment of the applicable state is that 'the
varying solutions" acceptable to Colorado and other admissibility
jurisdictions are inadequate if not illusory? When the courts of the
that the only real solution is the]
applicable state have concluded
23
federal rule of exclusion?
If "it is not for [the Supreme Court] to condemn . ..a State's
reliance upon other methods" 264 than exclusion, is it for the Supreme Court to thwart to any appreciable extent the State which
chooses to rely on the method of exclusion? Does not the Court do
so when it authorizes federal courts to receive in evidence the fruits
of state illegality,265 considering, as we must, the great extent to
0 How meanwhich state and federal crime legislation overlap?"°
ingful, how effective, can a state's adoption of the exclusionary rule
be when after its courts have branded an arresting officer's conduct
illegal and thrown out the evidence seized incident thereto, that
very same officer need only go to the federal authorities to convict his man on the very same evidence?67
260. See section 1I-A supra, particularly the discussion at notes 182-92.
261. E.g., Wolf v. Colorado. An outstanding commentator in this field has said
that Wolf "is intelligible only by reference to the claims of local policy." Allen, The
Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 DE PAuL L.
Rnv. 213, 253 (1959).
262. 338 U.S. at 28.
263. See, e.g., People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 447, 282 P.2d 905, 911, 913
(1955):
We have been compelled to reach the conclusion [that evidence obtained in
violation of constitutional guarantees must be excluded] because other remedies
have completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions
on the part of police officers....
If those guarantees were being effectively enforced by other means than excluding evidence obtained by their violation, a different problem would be
presented.
264. 338 U.S. at 31.
265. See e.g., People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 912 (1955):
"When, as in the present case, the very purpose of an illegal search and seizure
is to get evidence to introduce at a trial, the success of the lawless venture depends
entirely on the court's lending its aid by allowing the evidence to be introduced."
266. See note 363 infra.
267. The [California Superior] court held that the police officers did not have
probable cause for arresting Rios without a warrant of arrest, and that seizure
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When a federal court is confronted with evidence seized illegally
by the police of an exclusionary state, the evidence should be banned, it has been suggested, as a matter of "comity.""' I think there
of the evidence without a search warrant was therefore unlawful. Rios was then
acquitted [of the charge of violating state narcotic laws].
The police officer who had arrested Rios, after conferring with his superiors,
went to the federal narcotics office. As a result, an indictment was returned by
a federal grand jury, charging Rios with a violation of [federal narcotic laws].
This charge related to the same incident and narcotics involved in his state
prosecution.
[I]ncriminating evidence ... illegally seized, .. may nevertheless be received
in a federal prosecution, if the seizure was made without the participation of
federal officials. This is true even though the state wherein the evidence was
seized, as in the case of California, has a state exclusionary rule similar to the
federal court exclusionary rule announced in Weeks ...
We see no reason why the same rule should not be applied where the determination that the evidence was illegally seized by state or local authorities is
made by a state trial court. The "silver platter" doctrine operates on the assumption that the illegality of the state seizure has been established. How it has
been established is immaterial.
Hence, even if it be assumed that the federal trial court was bound by the
findings and conclusions of the state court, to the effect that the seizure was illegal, [the instant court had earlier held alternatively that it was not] the evidence was still admissible in the federal proceedings upon application of the
"silver platter" doctrine.
Rios v. United States, 256 F.2d 173, 175, 176-77 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. granted,
359 U.S. 965 (1959) (Misc. No. 40).
Although the Ninth Circuit could hardly have been aware of this at the time
it wrote the Rios opinion, six days earlier the Eighth Circuit had upheld a conviction for violating the Federal Firearms Act based on silver platter evidence seized by
the police of Missouri, an exclusionary state, although "the arrest, search, and seizure
were found to have been illegal under Missouri law in a proceeding in the Missouri State Court and it is not contended for the government that they were legal
under the federal law." Costello v. United States, 255 F.2d 389, 395 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958). Apparently neither the court nor the litigants
attached any particular significance to this.
See also Serio v. United States, 203 F.2d 576 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
887 (1953), where defendant was convicted of unlawfully purchasing heroin in
violation of federal law although on the same facts he had been previously tried
and acquitted in a Louisiana state court for unlawfully possessing the same heroin.
Louisiana, however, admits illegally seized evidence. Presumably, therefore, he had
been acquitted on other grounds. The Fifth Circuit held that neither former jeopardy nor res judicata precluded the subsequent federal conviction. Id. at 578.
The Supreme Court did not grant certiorari on the double jeopardy point in
Rios. A federal prosecution against one already prosecuted by a State for the same
acts does not subject him to double jeopardy. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959), reaffirming United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). See also Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), holding it not a deprivation of due process to
convict a defendant in a state court on the same acts for which he had been previously tried and acquitted in a federal court.
268. See Parsons, State-Federal Crossfire in Search and Seizure and Self Incrimination, 42 Corvi.
L.Q. 346, 363, 368, 373 (1957).
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure apparently was designed to
create "a uniform body of rules of evidence to govern in criminaltrials In the Federal courts." Advisory Committee Notes to FED. R. CiuM. P. 26(a). Parsons sees
this as a "possible obstacle" to his proposal that federal courts bar "silver platter"
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is a more compelling reason: fifth amendment due process forbids
the use of such evidence in a federal prosecution. That is, I find
controlling the first holding in Wolf-an unreasonable search violates due process - a holding herein unimpeded by the considerations which led to the second holding in Wolf. Indeed, a holding
herein reinforced by these very considerations. For to admit the
evidence in this situation would be not only to disregard the value
but the considerations
judgments which led to the first Wolf holding
269
of federalism which led to the second.

evidence when the police of an exclusionary state are involved, but otherwise continue to admit it. Parsons, supra at 364-66. He concludes that his proposal is possible under the present rule 26 because it "was obviously not drafted with search
and seizure rules in mind which were supposedly covered by another rule [411"
and because the state policies involved in search and seizure are more serious and
more directly affect state citizens than do those involved in the traditional privileges.
Id. at 366.
I think the short answer is that if rule 26 is an obstacle to Parsons' proposal
it is also an obstacle to the whole "silver-platter" doctrine. For, as noted by Caller,
The Exclusion of Illegal State Evidence in Federal Courts, 49 J. Cnr. L., C. &
P.S. 455, 458 (1959), so long as that doctrine holds sway there is no "uniform"
treatment of illegally seized evidence in federal criminal trials. Presently, there is
one rule for federally-seized evidence, another for state-seized. Apparently, then,
in search and seizure cases the federal courts can take cognizance of distinct types
of fact situations other than those which bear on the legality or illegality of the
search itself, e.g., the jurisdiction from which the searching police hail Is this not
all that Parsons asks?
269. See however Rios v. United States, 256 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1958), cert.
granted, 359 U.S. 965 (1959) (Misc. No. 40) and language quoted note 267 supra,
and Elkins v. United States, 266 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1959), petition for cert. filed, 28
U.S.L. W=a 3008 (U.S. July 7, 1959) (No. 126), discussed at not 259 supra, where
not only had the state courts twice suppressed the evidence which later found its
way into the hands of federal authorities, but had gone so far as to enjoin state
officials from testifying about the illegal search and seizure at the federal trial. But
the federal trial court in turn issued a restraining order forbidding petitioners from
pursuing state contempt proceedings against the state officers who did testify. The
state order and operative portions of the federal order are set forth in apps. E and F,
respectively, of the Elkins petition for certiorariL Surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit
opinion does not allude to either order.
that the search by state officers is "unreasonable" under
I am assuming in th
both state and federal standards. Generally, this will be the case, as it appears to be
in Elkins. Indeed, it seems that in the absence of an applicable federal statute the
legality of an arrest without warrent by federal officers (and therefore the search
incident to it) is determined by the law of the state where it occurs. See United
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589-91 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
15 (1948). Clearly, state law controls where the validity of an arrest without warrant
by state police is at issue in a federal prosecution. See Miller v. United States, 357
U.S. 301, 305 (1958). Of course, state law must itself meet the minimal requirements
of the federal constitution. See Note 50 COLu.ti. L. REv. 364, 368 (1950). See e.g.,
Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 18-19, 36-45 (1957)
for an excellent discussion as to whether section 2 of the Uniform Arrest Act,
authorizing "detention" for two hours on suspicion, a proposal adopted in New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Delaware, squares with fourteenth amendment due
process.
A reading of the petition for certiorari and the government's memorandum in
opposition in the Rios case, discussed at note 167 supra, leaves me uncertain as to

1164

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1083

Of course, the Court need not reach the constitutional question.
It can readily arrive at the same result for essentially te same
reasons by exercising its supervisory powers
over the administration
2 70
of criminal justice in the federal courts.

The foregoing is said with the full realization that the lower federal courts have consistently gone the other way. Indeed, this is
my reason for dwelling on a point which seems rather obvious.
whether the government is contending simply that the federal trial court was not
bound by the state trial court's findings, but was free to determine for itself whether
the seizure was valid or invalid under state law; or whether the government Is
contending further that in federal prosecutions federal courts are free to determine
the legality of seizures by state police independently of applicable state standards.
I think the latter contention is precluded by the Di Re, Johnson and Miller cases
supra. The former contention raises issues reminiscent of the problems of ascertaining
state law created by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See, e.g., Fidelity
Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940) to the effect that in the Erie context a federal court is bound to follow the decision of a trial court of state wide
jurisdiction "in the absence of more convincing evidence of what the state law Is,"
regardless, it seems, of the soundness of the state decision. But see Clark, State
Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55
YALE L.J. 267, 291-95 (1946); Corbin, The Law of the Several States, 50 YALL L.J.
762, 775-76 (1941); Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Lae, 54
CoLUM. L. REv. 489, 510 (1954). See generally HART & WECCHSLmI, TIn- FEDERAL
CourTs Am THE FEDmL SYsrm 628-30 (1953).
The Rios case is further complicated by the fact that "the federal court findings
and conclusions were based upon a more extensive showing than was presented
in the state court" and the Court of Appeals was uncertain as to "what the state
court ruling would have been on the amplified record," 256 F.2d 173, 170 n.5
(1958).
There are other problems than those raised by requirements of the federal constitution. E.g., in California, unlike the rule in the federal courts and most state
courts, "evidence is inadmissible whether or not it was obtained in violation of
the particular defendant's constitutional rights." People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755,
761, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). Quaere, should the federal courts admit such evidence
when seized by the police of an exclusionary state which has so broadened the exclusionary rule?
The converse of the Rios situation raises more interesting questions. Is a federal
court in a habeas corpus proceeding or the Supreme Court on certiorari free to
look beyond state law to find "unreasonable" a state search which the courts of an
exclusionary state have found to be "reasonable"? When an exclusionary state
court upholds the legality of a state search, does this present a federal question
if the ruling purports to be an interpretation of a federal constitutional prohibition?
Does an erroneous ruling by an exclusionary state court that the search Is "reasonable" affirmatively sanction the illegal police conduct? The problems aro explored
in 69 Har'. L. Rev. 758-60 (1956). See also Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and Criminal Justice, 8 DE.PAUL L. REv. 213, 241 (1959).
270. See notes 175-84 supra and corresponding text.
271. Rios v. United States, supra note 269. See the discussion of the case In
notes 267 and 269 supra. The Rios opinion, 256 F.2d 175, 176 n.8 (1958), also
points to three other federal appellate cases sustaining convictions based on "silver
platter" evidence seized by police of exclusionary states: Jones v. United States,
217 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1954) (Missouri); United States v. Stirsman, 212 F.2d 900
(7th Cir. 1954) (Indiana); Parker v. United States, 183 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1950)
(Washington). But none of these opinions ever considers what significance, If any,
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C. A FurtherPracticalApproach: What "Silver Platter"?

(1) The "silver platter' rule in current ope:ation. The "silver
platter" phrase was coined in Lustig, decided the same day as Wolf,
ten years ago, and to date the latest Supreme Court case to con-

sider the problem. On finding evidence of counterfeitin, after "illegally rummaging through the bags and bureau drawers' in appellant's hotel room, city police sent word to Agent Greene of the
United States Secret Service, who "share[d] in the critical examination of the uncovered articles as the physical search proceeded." "2
For the majority of the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, this constituted the requisite federal participation:
The crux of that doctrine [Byars] is that a search is a search by a federal
official if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities
on a silver platter. The decisive factor in determining the applicability
of the Byars case is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the total
enterprise of securing and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned
means.273

The force of these words is greatly dimmed by the recollection
that but for federal agent Greene s one mistake- entering the hotel
room before the search was concluded - the Court would have held
that he did receive the evidence of counterfeiting on a "silver platter"- in the face of a record revealing considerable prior activity
on his part [cross-examination of Agent Greene]:. 4
attaches to the fact that the local police are from an exclusionary state. So far as
the opinions reveal, the point was not raised at all.
The Rios opinion could have cited many other recent cases, too. See, e.g., Costello
v. United States, 255 F.2d 389 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958) (Missouri);.Fredericks v. United States, 208 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1958), cert denied, 847
U.S. 1019 (1954) (Texas); Graham v. United States, 257 F.2d 724 (6th Cir. 1958)
(Tennessee); United States v. Braggs, 189 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1951) (Oklahoma);
United States v. Moses, 234 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1956) (Illinois). But in none of
these cases does the point seem to have been raised or considered.
If Oregon is classified as a Weeks state, as I think it should be, see note 259 supra,
then the Elkins case, discussed in notes 259, 269 supra, marks still another federal
conviction based on evidence illegally seized by the police of an exclusionary state.
Indeed, in Elkins a state court order enjoining state officers from testifying at the
federal trial was of no avail.
272. 338 U.S. at 79, 78.
273. Id. at 78-79.
274. Record, pp. 60, 67, 69-72, Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
Cf. Gaitan v. United States, 252 F.2d 256 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 937
(1958). Federal narcotic agents were called to defendant's apartment by city police
who had illegally searched the apartment. Before they arrived the investigation "was
all complete." Id. at 258. The federal officers visually inspected" but did not select
or go over the evidence. They then accompanied the police and defendants to city
police headquarters. The evidence was admitted. See also Euziere v. United States,
266 F.2d 88 (10th Cir. 1959), discussed at note 298 infra.
But cf. United States v. Silbert, 150 F. Supp. 456, 457 (D.Md. 1957) (suppressing
the evidence):
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Q. When did you first go to the Walt Whitman hotel on that day?
A. It was somewhere around two o'clock following a telephone call I
received.

Q. From whom?
A. First, from Detective Koerner's office, of the Camden Detective
Division, and next from . . . the manager of the Walt Whitman hotel who
told me his name Was Mr. Shires.
A. I saw Mr. Lustig.
Q. From 404, through the keyhole, the same keyhole that Mrs. Lindsay
[the chambermaid] used?
A. Yes, sir.

QW
When Mr. Shires called you from the hotel, what did he say?
A. He thought there was a violation in one of the rooms of the hotel
involving counterfeit money.
A. I was satisfied [after looking through the keyhole] that there was no
evidence of counterfeiting.
Q. In spite of the fact you had a call from Detective Arthur and had
spoken to Mr. Shires who had both stated to you that there seemed to be
some violation of the United States laws or something going on in that room
about counterfeiting, and you being fifteen minutes at the keyhole, you
were then satisfied there was nothing wrong about what was going on in
room 402? . . .
A. That is right.

QD
Did you remain at the detective bureau [after returning from the
hotel] ?
A. Idid.
Q. Did you have any conversation with Captain Koerner?
A. I did. I told him I had been over and looked through the keyhole for
fifteen minutes, and I didn't see any evidence of counterfeiting. [Captain
Koerner had testified earlier (Record, p. 21) that Agent Greene told him
he "had not seen anything, but his information led him to believe there
was something going on in that room."]
Q. Do you know whether or not Captain Koerner and Detective Murphy
went to the hotel after that?
The evidence shows that in November, 1955, a meeting was arranged between
representatives of the Baltimore City Police Department and of the Intelligence
Division, Internal Revenue Service, to work out some arrangement to avoid
the confusion which frequently arises when state and federal officers work on the
same case, and to determine what should be done with automobiles involved in
gambling, and with money confiscated by the police in gambling raids. It was
agreed that whenever the police found a violation over which Internal Revenue
would have jurisdiction, the police would notify the federal agents of that violation .... The Assistant Chief of the Intelligence Division testified: "The agreement was that unless there was some unusual reason for calling us in to participate in a particular raid or perhaps there was some technicality which would
constitute a local violation that ordinarily they would call us after the raid and
we would then go down and examine the evidence which they had acquired."
The agreement has been carried out generally, and particularly in the raid
which gave rise to this case.
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A. I know they left for that purpose stating they were going there.
Q. Did you get a 'phone call later on?
A. I did ...around five o'clock.

QYou went to room 402?
A. Yes.

Qi Were you then satisfied that something was then going on concerning counterfeiting?
A. I was.
Q. You didn't discuss with Captain Koerner anything about making an
entrance or going into room 402 to see whether anything would be found
there?
A. No, sir.
Q. You weren't interested officially?
A. Officially, I wasn't interested.
Q. But, nevertheless, you remained at detective headquarters from half
past two to five o'clock [on a Sunday], unofficially?
A. I was curious to see what they would find.
Yet, until he re-entered the hotel, the Court tells us, Greene did
not have "a hand" in the search or "the actuality of a share . . .
in the total enterprise":
On the basis of what was before him, the trial judge admitted the evidence
because he did not "see any connivance or arrangement on the part of the
Federal officers to have an illegal search made to get evidence they could
not secure under the Federal law." We therefore accept as a fact that Greene
did not request the search, that, beyond indicating to the local police that
there was something wrong, he was not the moving force of the search,
was not undertaken by the police to help enforcement
and that the search
m 5
of a federal law.

It mattered not that Agent Greene's testimony was replete with
opportunities for federal-state complicity, if not circumstantial evidence of such complicity;2 76 the evidence would have been received in the federal courts but for the fact that at the eleventh
hour, his "curiosity" finally got the best of him. Need we go further
than the very case which coined the phrase to glean the practical
weaknesses in the "silver platter" rule?
If other cases are needed, there is an ample supply of recent
ones.

Grimes v.United States277 upheld a conviction for possessing and
transporting non-tax paid whiskey in violation of federal law on
"silver platter" evidence. Two days after defendant had been
275. 338 U.S. at 77-78.
276. Perhaps it should be pointed out, too, that the Sergeant of Detectives who participated in the raid and who called Agent Greene had "mown him for a number of
years," Record, p. 42, and that Agent Greene indicated that on numerous prior occasions he had "been on raids where the counterfeiters were arrested," Record, p. 30.
277. 234 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1956) (per curiam).
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spotted by a city policeman and a state revenue agent as the driver
of a fleeing vehicle from which cans of non-tax paid whiskey had
been thrown, he was illegally arrested by these very state officers,
jailed "on a charge of loitering," and, later the same day, turned
over to federal authorities."' Defendant was more fortunate than
most of his brethren. He was able to establish that a card from city
police department records contained notations with reference to
him: "Hold for investigation"; "Hold for I. W. Corbitt, federal
agent." 270

But this was not quite enough. The Fifth Circuit sustained the trial
court's refusal to allow the officer on duty when defendant was
jailed to be brought in to court in order to ascertain who made these
notations and when. Such evidence, it ruled, could not affect the
nature of the search since the testimony of the arresting officers and
Agent Corbitt "showed that federal authorities had nothing to
do with the search."280
The government's story in Andersen v. United States281 was that
city police, after coming upon and gathering up evidence of counterfeiting in appellant's office, phoned the FBI and "asked them to
step over to the office . . . to inquire of them how to contact the
nearest Secret Service Agent." 8 2 Federal agents did come over,
staying "about four or five minutes," during which time they revealed they had no authority in the case. 83 It seems they never did
disclose how the nearest secret service agent could be contacted
after all, but only indicated that they would attempt to obtain the
phone number of such an agent. After leaving appellant's office,
the FBI called back to tell te city police they had obtained the
telephone number.284
Although federal authorities had visited the scene and twice engaged in phone conversations with local authorities before the incriminating evidence was removed from appellants office, the Ninth
Circuit held that even if the evidence was illegally acquired it was
admissible in the federal courts because it was "deposited upon a
'silver platter.' "285 Charges of complicity were brushed aside as unwarranted attempts to "blow up acts of ordinary courtesy among
278. Although the court did not discuss the point, it seems defendant's conduct
constituted a violation of GA. CODE ANN. § 58-201 (1935), prohibiting the transporta.
tion or possession of intoxicating liquors.
279. 234 F.2d at 572.
280. Id. at 573.
281. 237 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1956). Defendant was not in his office when the officers
entered it, but he came in a few minutes later.
282. Id. at 121.
283. ibid.
284. Ibid.
285. Id. at 124.
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peace officers representing different jurisdictions of government." 'Why the FBI agents could not tell the city police over the phone
how to contact the nearest secret service agent- especially when
they did not give this iiformation during their visit with the city
police anyhow-was not considered by the court. Nor why they
could not tell the city police over the phone that they had no authority in counterfeiting cases.
Even fewer facts are disclosed by the record in Gallegos v. United
States.287 According to the government, the sheriff received an
"anonymous tip" that three men unlawfully in possession of narcotics
would be driving a certain automobile through his area. Road
blocks were immediately established (if the sheriff does this -no
questions asked-whenever an unidentified caller phones in a tip
he must be kept quite busy), and the car in question stopped and
searched- admittedly illegally.288 The narcotics thereby found were
allowed to be used in a federal prosecution since there was no evidence of any kind of direct or indirect participation by federal officers
in the arrest or search of the defendants. The record is entirely silent as to
tip. The prosecution, therefore, falls within the
the source of the telephone
89
"silver platter" category.

This much may be said for Gallegos. To the extent that the opinion suggests the evidence would have been excluded if the "tipster"
had been identified as a federal agent, the Tenth Circuit has made
some progress. For in the earlier case of Sloane v. United States," O
the same court found no circumvention of the fourth amendmentalthough the case came "very close to the line" -when state officers
raided a still on the basis of information admittedly passed on to
them by a federal prohibition agent.-91 "By passing on the information," the federal agent "may have provoked the action of the state
officers, but [so far as the record shows] he neither ordered nor directed the search." 292 Since the sheriff who conducted the raid was
go, or whether to go or not," he did so "on his
not told "when to
93
own initiative."

286. Id. at 123.
287. 237 F.2d 694 (10th Cir. 1956).
288. Id. at 696.
289. Id. at 697.
290. 47 F.2d 889 (10th Cir. 1931).
291. Id. at 890.
292. Ibid.
293. Ibid. It would not be too surprising if the Tenth Circuit were to decide a
Sloane-type case the same way today. That is, when we consider the very extensive
pre-search federal activity held not to constitute the requisite federal participation in
the recent case of Euziere v. United States, 266 F.2d 88 (10th Cir. 1959). The
government's own testimony established the following
City police contacted an FBI agent to ascertain if defendant was wanted by that
Agency. The federal agent disclosed that defendant had been the subject of a white
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If the Tenth Circuit has not had occasion to expressly reconsider
the validity of the Sloane case in light of the Lustig "silver platter"
formula, the Fifth Circuit has- and has found it very much alive.
Thus, in the recent case of Shurman v. United States, that court
observed:
[Tlhe only facts [I] shown by the evidence which tend to show cooperation between state and federal enforcement agencies were the passing
on of the information from Findley [a federal narcotics agent, working
under-cover, who, as a "good customer" of appellants, had learned from
them that they were going to Mexico to replenish their marijuana supply]
to Taylor [a state officer] that he believed a car with a certain license
number would be coming down a certain highway containing narcotics;
the two telephone conversations thereafter [between the federal agent and
the state officer] in which the car was mentioned; the fact that a federal
officer made a second search some four hours after the search by the
state officer [it was admitted that appellants were arrested and their car
searched "solely on the basis" of the federal agent's information]; the
fact that the state and federal officers frequently exchanged information
[it was admitted that federal narcotics agents and state police "kept constantly in touch," but it was denied that they "worked together ]; the
turning over of the case to federal authorities after the search and the
adoption of the case by them.
To find that these matters do establish such a degree of cooperation as to
bar the evidence illegally seized by state police, would be to infer an attempt by federal authorities to do indirectly what the Fourth Amendment
forbids them to do, from facts which on their face indicate a laudable comity
in law enforcement. Without some showing of a tacit or expressed understanding, difficult though it may be to find proof thereof, we would be unwilling to hold that giving of information which results in an illegal search,
constitutes an attempt to procure evidence illegally.
[Tlhe mere giving of the information [that a specified car was carrying
narcotics] we do not regard as requesting any action whatsoever, in
the absence of an understanding, voiced or tacit, to that effect; much
less do we consider it an instigation of an unlawful search. 2 4

To support its conclusion in Shurman, the Fifth Circuit relied on
the Third Circuit's opinion in the Lustig case, which, in turn, had
slave traffic investigation and consequently the Agency had a photograph of him and
his girl. Apparently the picture was then shown to city police.

When defendant's car was located at a motel, the city detective and the federal
agent went to the scene. The federal agent asked the motel clerk whether defendant
had any women in his cabin, but was advised in the negative. After walking part of
the way toward defendant's cabin, the federal agent decided he "had no jurisdiction In
the matter," id. at 90, and went back to the motel office, where ho remained. The
city police went ahead. An admittedly illegal search led to the seizure of narcotics
in defendant's cabin. At this point, the federal agent, carrying defendant's picture,
came over to the cabin and interrogated defendant about the old white slave and
another possible federal violation. Shortly thereafter, a federal narcotic agent arrived. Later that evening federal narcotic charges were filed against defendant.
294. 219 F.2d 282, 286-87, 288 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 921 (1955).
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relied on Sloane. "The reversal of Lustig's conviction has not weakened the authority of the Sloane case," commented the Fifth Circuit,
because "the case was reversed on a different ground" 9-5-as indeed it was.
(2) The approach that failed. The begrudging manner in which
recent federal cases have resolved the issue of federal participation
in an illegal state search may seem surprising, considering the
strong, sweeping language in Byars and Lustig. But not when one
recalls the ultimate fate of Gambino v. United States.-""
Gambino excluded state-seized intoxicating liquor from the federal courts despite an affidavit by a New York state trooper that
"there were no federal officers present, and that we were not working in conjunction with federal officers."- 97 A unanimous court noted
that
facts of which we take judicial notice... make it clear that the state
troopers believed they were required by law to aid in enforcing the National Prohibition Act; and that they made this arrest, search and seizure,
in the performance of that supposed duty, solely for the purpose of aiding
in the federal prosecution....
It is true that the troopers were not shown to have acted under the directions of the federal officials in making the arrest and seizure. But the rights
guaranteed by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments may be invaded as effectively by such cooperation,as by the state officers' acting under direction
of the federal officials. 298

The initial reaction of many lower federal courts was to go beyond the facts of Gambino and, even where a federal crime had a
state counterpart, to find the requisite federal-state "cooperation"
on the basis of a general understanding and practice that where
the offense is considered of sufficient importance, e.g., if the amount
of prohibited liquor involved is large, the evidence is turned over
to federal authorities for use in federal prosecutions. -9 Such a
295. Id. at 287. Although the Fifth Circuit's statement of the Lustig case is somewhat misleading, it is true that the secret service agent's questioning of the chambermaid whose suspicions had been aroused, his looking through the key-hole of Lustig's
room and his reporting to the city police that he had seen no evidence of counterfeiting
but was confident that "something was going on," would not have rendered the
fruits of the subsequent state search inadmissible in the federal courts.

296. 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
297. Id. at 316.
298. Id. at 315-16. (Emphasis added.)

299. Fowler v. United States, 62 F.2d 656-57 (7th Cir. 1932):
It had for many years been the general understanding and practice between

the local police and the federal prohibition officers that when the [Indianapolis]
police squad made seizures of liquor or arrests, they would submit the cases to
the [federal] prohibition department, which had the first option of prosecuting
such of them as it desired. The practice had been that if the seizure of liquor was
small the state would take the case, and if it was large the federal authorities
would take it....
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practice was evidently wide-spread in the prohibition era.8° For a
while, then, it looked as if there had been a significant break-through
in the difficulties of proof raised by the "silver platter" cases.

As a recent case has pointed out,5 01 "Sutherland v. United States

...marks the high point in our courts' willingness to enforce federal responsibility for the illegal acts of state officials." Judge Parker's
Sutherland opinion reads in part:
It is stipulated in the record "that state officers generally understood that
where they have made a seizure of illicit liquor they are at liberty to consult
with the federal officers with a view to determining whether or not the federal officers adopt the case and institute a federal prosecution against the
particular offender; that they frequently do pursue this course and that
frequently such cases are adopted."
[WMle think that, where the state and federal officers have an understanding that the latter may prosecute in the federal courts offenses which
the former discover in the course of their operations, and where the
federal officers adopt a prosecution originated by state officers as the result
of a search made by them, the same rule as to the admissibility of evidence
obtained in the course of the search should be applied as if it were made
by the federal officers themselves or under their direction. Gambino . . .
[W]e do not think that [the facts in Gambino are] sufficient to distinguish
that case from this, where there was general cooperation between state and
federal officers and where the federal officers in fact adopted the prosecution which the state officers had begun as a result of their search. It is
the fact that there was such cooperation and adoption and not the fact
[Tie federal taking over of the prosecution in accordance with such longexisting understanding and practice can be deemed a ratification by the federal
authority of the means whereby the contemplated searches and seizures were
undertaken and made. Through such understanding and practice the prohibition
authorities said in effect to the police squad, "The case will be ours ifthe yield
proves large, and yours if it is small," suggesting the mighty hunter whose aim
was so true that he would "hit it if it's a deer and miss it if it's a calf."
Lowrey v. United States, 128 F.2d 477, 478-79 (8th Cir. 1942):
[A11U of the officers, state and federal, agreed that it was a long continued
and invariably followed practice in the county where the arrest was made [Hot
Springs, Ark.] that cases of this character should be tendered to the federal
officers for prosecution under the federal law if in their judgment the amount
of liquor involved was sufficient to justify a federal prosecution ...
This practice was so well understood by the officers that an agreement among
them prior to any particular arrest was wholly unnecessary. One of the state
officers gave as the reason for it the fact that penalties under the state laws were
not severe enough to deter violators. The statement supports the conclusion to
which all the evidence points, that is, the practice of the state officers to deliver
the accused to the federal officers in conformity to their ideas of effective law
enforcement, a practice in which the federal officers, with full understanding,
gave their willing cooperation.
300. Ibid. See al the text discussion of the Sutherland and Kitt cases, dealing
with the practice in Clintwood, Va., and Hopewell, Va., respectively, at notes 302
and 308 infra.
301. United States v. Moses, 234 F.2d 124, 126 (7th Cir. 1956).
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that the search was made solely in behalf
of the United States which in our
3 02
opinion is the determining factor ....

A counter-trend, however, soon manifested itself in Kitt v. United
States,30 3 where a conviction based on "silver platter" evidence
seized by officers of the same state as in Sutherlandwas affirmed in
the face of virtually the identical stipulation which had led to reversal in Sutherland. Kitt is a fascinating exercise in "distinguishing" away bothersome precedents. "All the stipulation here provides," states Kitt, "is that the State officers understood that they
were at liberty to refer such [prohibition] cases to the federal officers"; but in Sutherland "there was a clear general cooperation,
and also a clear general understanding." 30 4 "The stipulation here,"
continues Kitt "provides only for an unilateral understanding on the
part of the State officers [literally this is true, but it is no less true
of the Sutherland stipulation], not for a bilateral, mutual understanding common to the officers of both the State and the United
States."3 0 5
It may well be, as one case suggests, s0 that the counter-trend
stems in good measure from the unwillingness of federal judges to
show the same tenderness for the procedural rights of say, dope
peddlers and counterfeiters, than for prohibition violators. In any
event, the cases which followed Kitt were still less concerned about
the problems of proof confronting the "silver platter" defendant,
albeit a good deal more forthright in their views on Sutherland-type
precedents.
In the Sutherland day, the record in United States v. Scotti 0 T
would easily have established the requisite federal participation:
[T]he record shows that in a little over two years city officers turned over
to federal officers at least twenty marihuana cases upon which complaints
were filed.... On the other hand, in a little more than four years (including the two-year period in question) city officers only filed a total of
eight marihuana cases in the state court.

One city officer testified that, while he had no understanding or agreement with federal officers, the practice at the city police station was to call

the federal narcotic agents after arrests by the officers, in "big" cases, for
prosecution in the federal court. Two others testified that sometimes they
302. 92 F.2d 305, 307-08 (4th Cir. 1937).
303. 132 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1942).
304. Id. at 922. (Emphasis in originaL)
805. ibid.
306. See United States v. Moses, 234 F.2d 124, 126 (7th Cir. 1956).
307. 102 F. Supp. 747 (S.D. Tem. 1950), affirmed on "the able analysis . .. in the
opinion of the learned district judge," 193 F.2d 644, 645 (5th Cir. 1952). See also
Helton v. United States, 221 F.2d 388, 340 (5th Cir. 1955). The Scotti district court
opinion is indeed the outstanding presentation of the anti-Sutherlandposition.

At an earlier time, the Fifth Circuit seemed to approve of the Sutherlandapproach.
See Ward v. United States, 96 F.2d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 1938).
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felt that the minimum two-year punishment (under state law) was too severe in a particular case and, in those cases, the federal officers were asked
to take the case because of the greater latitude of permissible punishment ....
[A federal narcotics agent testified] that he had no agreement but that he
had told the local officers to call him at any time and that he would look over
any cases they might submit and then determine whether he would file
federal charges ...
I find, therefore, that there was a practice on the part of the Corpus
Christi city officers to call the federal narcotic officers frequently, (but not
always) when people arrested by the City officers were found to be in possession of marihuana; and that the federal officers
frequently, but not
308
always, "adopted" the cases for federal prosecution.

But the evidence was admitted:
What constitutes "participation?" As pointed out in Byars v. United
States, supra, the federal agent responded to the invitation, and actively
"participated" in the search and seizure. The "participation" doctrine was
extended to "co-operation" in Gambino.
[After summarizing the decision in Flagg v. United States, 233 F.2d 481
(2d) Cir. 1916)] lilt appears that the "participation" in that case [Fkgg]
was active, and instigatedby federal officers who thus became principals to
the unlawful search and seizure ...
It is to be noted that [in Lustig] the Court did not base its opinion
(that the evidence was unlawfully secured) upon . . . prior

co-opera-

tion" but rather upon the active "participation" of the agent in the search
before it was finished.
The Supreme Court started out with "participation" in the Byars case;
but there it was active "participation," with the federal officer present.
"Co-operation" - a much broader term - crept into the opinion in the
Gambino case. . . . It is upon this one expression about 'co-operation"
that the various lower courts have seized to justify extension of participation
to a pattern- overlooking that the basis for the Court's decision in the
Gambino case was that the state troopers were acting, not to enforce state
law, but solely for the purpose of aidingin enforcement of federal law.800

Continuing the current trend, two recent Seventh Circuit cases have
taken the position that, short of establishing actual initiation or
direct federal participation in the unreasonable state search, the
defendant must prove an agreement or established practice "whereby unlawful searches and seizures were to be made by the police

officers and the evidence thus obtained turned over to federal officers" 310 or "that not only the practice of exchange of prisoners and
308. 102 F. Supp. at 749.
309. Id. at 750, 750 n.4, 752-53. (Emphasis in original.) See the languago in the
Flagg case at note 323 infra.
310. United States v. Haywood, 208 F.2d 156, 157 (7th Cir. 1953). (Emphasis

added.)
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evidence exist, but that the practice led to, or at least encouraged,
the unreasonable search and seizure by state officers." 31 '
If Sutherlandmarks the high point, then surely Shurman v. United
States3 " marks the low point in the federal courts' willingness to
enforce federal responsibility for the illegal acts of state officials.
In Shurman, it will be recalled, 31 3 the fact that a federal undercover
agent informed state authorities when and where two narcotic violators could be picked up, carrying a fresh supply of marijuana, did
not suffice to exclude the illegally seized evidence. The facts merely
illustrated a "laudable comity in law enforcement":
Without some showing of a tacit or expressed understanding, difficult
though it may be to find proof thereof, we would be unwilling to hold that
giving of information which results3 in
an illegal search, constitutes an at14
tempt to procure evidence illegally.

It is fairly clear that in most circuits a general understanding or
practice no longer serves as a substitute for proof of federal participation in the particular state search. Can it be that Shurman requires
proof of a general understanding in addition to actual initiation or
direct participation by federal authorities in the particular search?
311. United States v. Moses, 234 F.2d 124, 127 (7th Cir. 1956). (Emphasis added.)
See also Parker v. United States, 183 F.2d 268, 270 (9th Cir. 1950):
While Parker insists that there was complicity between the Seattle police officers and the federal officers of the Narcotic Bureau there is an utter failure of
proof on this point. At best the defendant can point only to a pattern, established,
as must be conceded, by custom, under which incriminating evidence which will
support a federal charge often is turned over by State or city officers to federal
officials.
While there has been a decided counter-trend since the Kitt case, it has not been
a uniform one. Although there was ample proof of actual federal participation in the
state search in United States v. Butler, 156 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1946), see note 323
infra, the Tenth Circuit explicitly approved the Sutherland approach in reversing the
conviction. 156 F.2d at 898. More recently, the Tenth Circuit has continued to pay
lip-service at least to Sutherlandwhile greeting claims of federal participation in illegal
state searches with increasing coolness. Gilbert v. United States, 163 F.2d 325
(1947) (evidence failed to show existence of general understanding and common
practice in liquor case); United States v. Bmggs, 189 F.2d 367 (1951)
(forfeiture proceeding) (finding of tacit agreement between local officers and Federal
Alcohol Tax Unit that where there was unlawful search, case would be turned over
to Tax Unit held to be without evidentiary support and not subject to judicial notice,
as trial judge believed); Gallegos v. United States, 237 F.2d 694 (1956)
(discussed in text at notes 287-89 supra); Gaitan v. United States, 252 F.2d 256,
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 937 (1958) (discussed in note 274 supra); Euziere v.
United States, 266 F.2d 88 (1959) (discussed in note 293 supra).
See also United States v. Irwin, 86 F. Supp. 362 (W.D. Ark. 1949), reversing a
"silver platter" conviction solely on the grounds that "there has existed, and does now
exist, a general course of cooperation between Federal officers and State officers
whereby the former adopt for federal prosecution liquor cases of a substantial nature.
. "Id. at 364. But the case has never been cited since.
312. 219 F.2d 282 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 921 (1955).
313. See text supra, note 294.
314. 219 F.2d at 287.
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If its broad implications did not take deep root, did not Gambino
at least overcome the difficulties of proof in those situations where
a federal crime has no state counterpart? It is doubtful that it even
accomplished this much. For example, no sooner was Gambino on
the books, than the New York state troopers, who had been slapped
down in that very case, became either "smart" or just plain "lucky."
In United States v. Jankowski,31 a Second Circuit case decided
a year after Gambino, the government's testimony was to the effect
that New York state troopers had stopped a car whose headlights
appeared defective (although after the car was stopped they found
they were not), that they opened the door of the car to inform the
occupants the lights were defective (although admittedly they did
not need to do so in order to speak to appellant for the driver had
already lowered the window), that they saw a blanket which appeared to be state property (although no arrest was ever made on
this ground), that appellants were then ordered out of the car whereupon whiskey was discovered. 10
The defendants had a drastically different version, 817 but, said the
court, the state trooper who testified "is not shown to have had any
interest in misrepresenting the facts, whereas the interest of the
defendants was patent." 318 The state-seized evidence was admissible
in the federal courts inasmuch as "the avowed purpose for stopping
the car and opening the door was to enforce state regulations, and
the discovery of the whiskey was incidental."310
Marsh v. United States,3 20 decided by the Second Circuit the
same year, marked another occasion where New York troopers
happened to stumble upon evidence of prohibition violations. Since,
according to the government's version of the event, state troopers
had noticed whisky bottles inside appellants' car only after having
pursued and stopped them for driving against a traffic signal, the
state-seized evidence was again allowed to be used in the federal
courts.3 2 ' At least this time, affirming L. Hand, J., swallowed hard:
[We must confess to considerable doubt whether, had the matter been before us in the first instance, we should have come to the same conclusion.
315. 28 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1928).
316. Id. at 800-01.
317. A co-defendant testified, id. at 801, that [T]he blanket was discovered only after the troopers broke into the back end
of the car; also that 12 or 14 cars were stopped and searched immediately after
defendants' car was stopped; that every car that came along was stopped and
that defendants were detained in the road, after the search, so that the troopers
could stop those other cars, [Officer] Gibbons saying that: "It would not be long;
we will get nine or ten loads, and we will go back to Jamestown together."
318. Id. at 802.
319. Ibid.
320. 29 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 849 (1929).
321. Id. at 172-73.
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The circumstances made the trooper's story somewhat doubtful, and an easy
complaisance in any plausible tale may deprive defendants of their constitutional rights. This caution we are not, however, ourselves in a position
to exercise, because, except in plain cases, we cannot tell from the cold
record where the truth lies. For the future we take this occasion to press
upon the District Judges that they search the testimony in such cases with
the protection of defendants must in most cases
care, remembering that
3 22
rest finally with them.

(8) The uncharted scope of federal-state collaborationin illegal

searches. Such cases as Jankowski and Shurman to the contrary notwithstanding, the federal courts do not always resolve conflicting

claims as to federal-state collaboration in favor of the government.
On rare occasions the court does gag at the government's version

of the search and seizure as one which "makes too severe a demand
\;pon the imagination." 3 23 That at some point the court will find
government testimony "impossible to believe," however, is scarcely
comforting. If anything, these few cases are disturbing. For they
only serve to illustrate that the end may justify the perjury if it
justifies the police misconduct.324 They only raise further questions
Id. at 173.
323. Flagg v. United States, 233 Fed. 481, 483 (2d Cir. 1916):
Some conclusions may be left to presumption, and it is impossible to believe, in
the face of these facts, that the United States, acting through its accredited agents,
was not responsible for the arrest of the defendant and the seizure of his property.
To attribute such an elaborate and carefully prepared proceeding as was planned
to convict the defendant, to a few local patrolmen or to some unknown parties,
in the face of the fact that the property was immediately carted to the federal
courthouse and remained there till the federal officials had obtained all the information desired, makes too severe a demand upon the imagination.
See also United States v. Butler, 156 F.2d 897, 898-99 (10th Cir. 1946):
Here, there was evidence that while riding in the automobile, Butler and Craig,
in the presence of the police officers, violated certain traffic ordinances of the
city; that the officers undertook to stop them; that they fled and the officers pursued them; that in their flight, they violated other traffic ordinances; that the
flight and pursuit extended to a point approximately fifteen miles beyond the
city limits; and that the officers there shot and punctured one of the tires on the
fleeing automobile and stopped it. There was evidence that the officers knew
Butler ... was a bootlegger ... and that from its appearance and the respective speeds at which lthe automobile] went up and own the bills, the officers suspected or believed that it was heavily loaded with liquor. There was
further evidence that the city, county, state, and federal officers cooperated in
connection with the enforcement of the laws relating to liquor.... The city
released Butler and Craig to the United States, and no complaint was filed or
prosecution had either in the police court or the state court. While the police
officers testified that they pursued and arrested Butler and Craig for the violation
of city ordinances, the court expressly found in effect that in following the automobile, in stopping it, in searching it, and in seizing the whiskey, the officers
suspected that it contained liquor upon which the federal tax had not been paid,
and that they were acting solely for the purpose of aiding in the enforcement of
federal law. The evidence and the inferences which the court was warranted in
drawing from it support the finding.
824. This point has been forcefully made in regard to confessions: "[A]n officer who
is willing to use methods which he knows are unlawful is frequently (by no means
s22.
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about the validity of the many somewhat plausible "silver platter"
stories told elsewhere.
Since the days of the "jolly little prohibition game," 321 federal

authorities have been helping themselves to the servings on the
"silver platter" with some relish. The thirty-five "silver platter" cases
always) willing to deny the wrong under oath." McComiucx, EVIDENCE 233 (1954).
"Officers who have obtained a confession by force and who offer the confession in
evidence are virtually bound to deny that force was used." NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS
FORCEM-NT 189 (1931)
(Wickersham Report).

IN

LAW EN-

At this point in the Wickersham Report, there is less concern about "a temptation
to perjury by the police" as such, and more concern about the prosecution-hampering
juror suspicion "the third degree feeds," more concern about "a disposition on the
part of jurors (who know that the third degree exists and who do not credit the denials) to disbelieve police testimony" whenever the coerced confession issue arises.
Whatever the extent of juror skepticism in regard to confessions - and the many reversed convictions in this area indicate that it is not juror suspicion which very substantially hampers the prosecution - there seems to be much less general awareness
of and agitation over federal-state complicity in regard to search and seizure.
Ernest Hopkins devotes a whole chapter to "police perjury" in Oun LAWLESS POLCE 278-87 (1931). The following excerpts are a fair sampling of his conclusions
(278-82):
A criminal trial is the most dramatic thing in the world; even the ordinary
spectator cannot help "taking sides." The police are human and, forgetting their
duty, they, too, take sides. This leads to perjury and the subornation of perjury
in the exact degree that zeal of advocacy replaces a rigid sense of honor. A little
shading here, a twist there, a suppression of one sort of fact and a corresponding
exaggeration of another - and the side which the policeman favors, wins ...
The "duel" theory of the trial suggests this; there is a defense attorney, let
him bring out the qualifying facts if he can. So policemen who have testified
clearly and concretely for the prosecution, suffer pitiful lapses of memory when
the defense seeks to develop additional facts. And yet the policeman is not,
by law, an agent of the prosecution; he is a finder of facts and a captor of suspected persons for the courts. Failure to tell "the whole truth" is a type of routine
perjury.
One further step, and we have the routine subornation of perjury. Outright
subornation- the bribing or blackmailing of witnesses into testifying falsely is as rare as routine subornation is frequent. I refer to the process by which the
stories of witnesses are gone over, often with repeated and severe grilling, and
"built up" to suit the case of the prosecution. Both detectives and prosecuting
attorneys participate in this, which is virtually the third-degreeing of witnesses.
Here is a very common evil that is even less appreciated by the public than the
third-degreeing of arrested persons.
The most important type of police perjury, however, depends directly upon the
other lawless acts which I have described, upon the false arrest, brutality upon
arrest, illegal detention, and the occurrences in secret pre-trial inquisition, the
third degree itself. These acts, because they were unlawful, must be concealed
from the view of the public and of the courts. Police perjury in protection of
what has occurred is the necessary completing link in the chain of outlaw practices of law enforcement.
325. Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 MICH. L. REv. 169, 172 n.9 (1955),
so describes the practice whereby state officers, having seized evidence unusuable In
the state courts, turned it over to federal police for use in the federal courts and vice
versa.
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which have reached the federal courts of appeal in the last ten
years 326 indicate that, at the very least, the supply has not diminished in recent times. To what extent the federal authorities themselves may have ordered, or helped prepare, these "silver platter"
servings is something else again. And something quite difficult to
ascertain.
"Off the record" talks with several former federal law enforcement officers have convinced me that on a significant number of
occasions; (a) pressure to "get the job done" causes federal agents
to arrange for, shall we say, "'silver platter raids"; (b) the desire to
salvage evidence obtained in the course of a joint federal-state
raid, which, in retrospect; appears to be illegally obtained, causes
officers to reconstruct a "silver platter" raid. 2
These "off the record" talks, of course, are hardly a substitute for
a systematic field study of the problem. But they are corroborated
in no small measure, I believe, by the cases themselves, and by the
few statements which appear "on the record."
The statement most on point that I have come across is one by
Thomas E. Dewey, some twenty years ago, to the effect that "in
dozens of cases" in his "own experience as a Federal prosecutor"
he "had to rely on the evidence procured by the unhampered police
of the State of New York." 3 28 Worth thinking about, too, is a recent
statement to a congressional subcommittee by Assistant Attorney
General Warren Olney suggesting that one of the reasons why
narcotic caseslost or dismissed because of illegal searches do not seem to be numerous
may be due to the fact that frequently Federal and local officers work in
close cooperation, and the cases,when completed, are presented in the State
or Federal court, depending on the nature of the violation, the manner in
was acquired, and the extent of the penalties that can
which the evidence
3 29
be imposed.

Not squarely on point, but quite indicative, I submit, of the "all's
fair in love, war and law enforcement" climate which breeds federal-state collaboration in illegal searches is the recent testimony by
a San Francisco district attorney thatthe district attorney's office has been used very liberally by the Federal
326. See note 201 supra.
327. I should add that what information I have indicates that rarely, if ever, is
this activity explicitly approved by the federal agents' superiors.
328. 1 NEw Yox CoNsurrr oNAL CoNvENToN, REVISED REconr 372 (1938).
This statement has often been quoted. See Caller, The Exclusion of Illegal State Evidence in Federal Courts, 49 J. Cami. L.C. & P.S. 455, 457 n.15 (1959); Notes, 57
COLum. L. R v. 1159, 1170 n.107 (1957); 13 Wyo. L.J. 166, 171 (1959); 58 YAX

L. J. 144, 159 n.69 (1948).
329. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Traffic in, and Control of, Narcotics,
Barbiturates and Amphetamines of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1190, 1197 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
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agents for their cases which might not necessarily stand the legal test
required in a Federal court.
[Prior to Cahan] we had the so-called non-exclusory [sic] rule here
whereby we could use any evidence no matter how it was obtained.88 0

And the corroboration by his federal counterpart to the effect
thatthe practice was for many years to divert Federal cases, that is, cases
which were made as a result of Federal investigation, into the State courts
if there were any apparent weaknesses from the evidentiary standpoint.8 8'

It is now unclear whether evidence illegally seized by federal
agents may still be used in the California state courts, 8 2 but the
Ninth Circuit has made it quite clear that evidence illegally seized
by California police will still be received in the federal courts. 8 8

Considering their past use of the federal system to circumvent the
protection against unreasonable search and seizure, it is most unlikely that state and federal law enforcement officials in California

have overlooked the possibilities opened up by the Ninth Circuit's
attitude. 4
I think it fair to say that the "on the record" statements above
suggest that the decided cases may represent only a small fraction

of the federal-state collaboration which in fact takes place. A point
I shall press, perhaps belabor, in the next section is that the temptation to and opportunity for engaging in such activity is very substantial indeed.
(4) The not-so-separatefederal and state sovereignties.The silver

platter doctrine is based largely on some metaphysics about separate and distinct federal and state law enforcement. What are the

modem realities?
330. See note 237 supra.
331. Ibid.
332. People v. Johnson, 153 Cal. App. 2d 870, 315 P.2d 468 (1957), admitted ovidence obtained illegally by a private individual, ruling that the Cahan rule applies
only to "governmental action," without clearly indicating whether this Includes
federal government action as well as state. In Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d
269, 294 P.2d 23 (1956), dealing with a joint raid by federal narcotics agents and
city police, Justice Carter concurred in the result (the granting of a writ of prohibition
to prevent a trial) on the ground that in light of the Rea decision, discussed at notes
193-99 supra, "evidence illegally obtainedby federal agents would not be admissiblo
in a state court notwithstanding the [exclusionary] rule announced by this court."
Id. at 273, 294 P.2d at 26. Exclusionary state courts are split on the Issue of admitting evidence illegally seized by federal officers. See note 199 supra.
It is interesting to note that underlying the protestations by law enforcement officials against the Cahan rule is the assumption that evidence illegally obtained by
federal authorities is no longer admissible in the California state courts. See note 237

supra.
333. See note 271 supra and accompaning text.
334. The possibilities, of course, may be abruptly closed by the United States
Supreme Court. See note 10 supra.
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The importance of the question is by no means limited to the
search and seizure field. Nor are the cases and other materials which
suggest the answer.
Two recent self-incrimination cases are in point In one, Knapp v.
Schweitzer, 35 the petitioner, though granted immunity from state
prosecution, persisted in his refusal to answer certain questions put
to him by a state grand jury on the ground that he might expose
himself to federal prosecution for violation of a federal statute. He
pointed to the fact that the local federal prosecutor had "made
public announcement of his intention to cooperate" with his state
counterpart "in the prosecution of criminal cases in the field of the
subject matter out of which petitioner's commitment arose."so But
to no avail. In sustaining petitioner's contempt conviction, the Court
observed:
Of course the Federal Government may not take advantage of this recognition of the States' autonomy in order to evade the Bill of Rights. If a
federal officer should be a party to the compulsion of testimony by state
agencies, the protection of the Fifth Amendment would come into play.
Such testimony is barred in a federal prosecution, see Byars...
Whether, in a case of such collaboration between state and federal officers,
the defendant could successfully assert his privilege in the state proceeding, we need not now decide, for the record before us is barren of evidence
that the State was used as an instrument of federal prosecution or investigation. Petitioner's assertion that a federal prosecuting attorney announced
his intention of cooperating with state officials inthe prosecution of cases in a
general field of criminal law presents337
a situation devoid of legal significance
as a joint state and federal endeavor.

What does amount to the requisite "collaboration"? The facts
in the more recent case of Mills v. Louisiana331 seem to furnish a
striking example. Indeed, the parties stipulatedThat there has existed, and now exists [at the time of the State proceeding,] cooperation and collaboration between the District Attorney for the
Parish of Orleans and the United States Attorney for the Eastern District
of Louisiana and the Internal Revenue Service of the United States of
America and its investigators, as well as with the Police Bureau of Investigation of the City of New Orleans in reference to members of the New
Orleans Police Department regarding public bribery and income tax evasion and that the Honorable Leon D. Hubert, Jr., District Attorney for the
Parish of Orleans, has held conferences with the United States Attorney for
the Eastern District of Louisiana regarding public bribery on the part of
certain members of the New Orleans Police Department and income tax
evasion, felonies under
the law of the United States of America and the
339
State of Louisiana."
335. 357 U.S. 371 (1958). See generally, Note, 68 Yale L.J. 3229 (1958).
336. 357 U.S. at 373.
337. Id. at 380 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)

338. 360 U.S. 230 (1959).
339. Id. at 232. As pointed out by the Chief Justice in a dissent joined by Justices
Black and Douglas (who also wrote a separate dissent).
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Nevertheless, the Court afrmed the state contempt convictions
per curiam on the authority of Knapp v. Schweitzer. Does the "collaboration" caveat in Knapp
"keep the word of promise to the ear
3 40
and break it to the hope"?

Bartkus v. Illinois,41 1 a recent double jeopardy case is worth considering too. Petitioner was tried and acquitted in a federal district
court of robbing a federally insured bank. Less than three weeks
later he was indicted by the State of Illinois for violating a state
robbery statute and subsequently convicted on substantially the
same evidence presented at the federal trial. It is difficult to challenge the conclusion drawn by Mr. Justice Brennan in his powerful
dissenting opinion that "the extent of participation of the federal
authorities here constituted this state prosecution actually a second
federal prosecution of Bartkus."3 42 Yet, the majority took the news
As the Chief Justice's dissent also points out, id. at 231-32, the parties had stipulated further, that during the pendency of the state grand jury investigation (in the
course of which petitioners, evidently suspected of engaging in lotteries and giving
bribes, refused to answer questions, for which they were held in contempt), "'the
Intelligence Division, Internal Revenue Service of the United States, the United
States Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana and the United States Grand
Jury [had] been for several months and [were then] engaged in investigating some
of the members of the New Orleans Police Department for income tax evasion, " that
these investigations were "well publicized," that "at the time of the instant proceedings, a number of federal income tax indictments had been returned against
police officers," and that each of the petitioners, as requested, had executed waivers
of the statute of limitations on their federal tax liabilities for most of the years in
question.
340. To borrow a phrase from Judge Cardozo, What Medicine Can Do For Lato, in
LAw AND LTERATuRE 109 (1931).
341. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
342. Id. at 165-66; joined in by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas. Mr.
Justice Black filed a separate dissent which was also joined in by the Chief Justice
and Mr. Justice Douglas.
Mr. Justice Brennan points out, id., at 165, 167:
It is clear that federal officers solicited the state indictment, arranged to assure
the attendance of key witnesses, unearthed additional evidence to discredit
Bartkus and one of his alibi witnesses, and in general prepared and guided the
state prosecution. Thus the State's Attorney stated at the state trial: "I am
particularly glad to see a case where the federal authorities came to see the
state's attorney." And Illinois conceded with commendable candor on the oral
argument in this Court "that the federal officers did instigate and guide this
state prosecution" and "actually prepared this case." Indeed, the State argued
the case on the basis that the record showed as a matter of "fair inference" that
the case was one in which "federal officers bring to the attention of the state
prosecuting authority the commission of an act and furnish and provide him with
evidence of defendant's guilt."
Pursel's testimony at the state trial, that Bartkus had told him he participated in
the robbery, was obviously very damaging. Yet, indicative of the attitude of the
federal officials
that this was actually a federal prosecution, the FBI agent
arranged no interview between Pursel and any state authority. The first time that
Pursel had any contact whatsoever with a state official connected with the case
was the morning that he testified. And as in the case of [the two self-confessed
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federal participation in the state prosecution quite calmly.
If this case "does not support the claim that the State of Illinois
in bringing its prosecution was merely a tool of the federal authorities" 343 what case ever will? I do not think the majority really meets
Mr. Justice Brennan's contention that Given the fact that there must always be state officials involved in a state

prosecution, I cannot see how there can be more complete federal participation in a state prosecution that there was in this case.... If this state
conviction is not overturned, then, as a practical matter, there will be no
restraints on the use of state machinery by federal officers to bring what is
in effect a second federal prosecution.3s

The problem of federal participation in state law enforcement
arises in still another area of criminal procedure, prolonged precommitment detention. Indeed, the problem is as old as McNabb
itself, as is evidenced by the companion case of Anderson v. United
States, 45 decided the same day.
The eight Anderson petitioners, strikers suspected of participating
in a dynamiting, were taken into custody by state authorities and
held by them for six days before they were arrested by federal
officers and brought before a United States Commissioner. During
this six-day period they saw neither friends, relatives, nor counsel.
But they did see federal agents-who questioned them intermittently and finally secured incriminating statements from six of them.
A good argument could be made that the fact that the federal
officers so exploited the plight of the state-held suspects constituted
illegal conduct on their part. At the very least, their interrogation
of the suspects during this period would seem to constitute sufficient federal "participation" in the state misconduct. But the Court
rested the reversal of petitioners' convictions on "a working arrangement between the federal officers and the [county] sheriff
.. . which made possible the abuses revealed by this record," 34 0citing the Gambino and Byars search and seizure cases as authority for
the view that "the fact that the federal officers themselves were
not formally guilty of illegal conduct does not affect the admissibility of the evidence which they
secured improperly through col3 47
laboration with state officers."
participants in the robbery for which Bartkus was prosecuted], Pursel's
sentencing was postponed until after he testified against Bartkus at the state
trial.
34. Id. at 123 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
344. Id. at 168.
345. 318 U.S. 350 (1943) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). See generally Note, 42
Mwx. L. REV. 121, 125-27, 129-34 (1957).
346. 318 U.S. at 356. For some of the details of the "working arrangement," see
note 356 infra.
347. ibid.
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Presumably, then, federal interrogation of state-held suspects
does not, in and of itself, bring the McNabb rule into play. The
Fifth Circuit has so held on a number of occasions."' 8 One of these
cases, Papworth v. United States,34 is a remarkable demonstration
of how much federal participation can be regarded as not enough.
Indeed, I venture to say that the Papworth case would make a delightful comic opera:
An informer told the FBI that defendant and two others had
conspired to rob an air force base banking facility and would hold
a "rehearsal" or "dry run" over the escape route on a given afternoon.
The FBI informed city police, the county sheriff and state rangers
of all they knew. They then "held several conferences at which it
was repeatedly stated by the FBI agents that the United States
Attorney would not authorize an arrest and that they had no power
to make an arrest, but that both city and state police officers stated
they could and would make an arrest at the time of the rehearsal." "'
At the appointed time, city and state officials followed the two
other conspirators, killing them in a gunfight when a chase ensued.
Federal agents followed defendant to his home, told hfm he was
not under arrest, but "asked him to talk to them in their car which
he did." Some fifteen to thirty minutes of "inconclusive" talking
later, city police officers arrived and arrested defendant - for "investigation."
Federal agents then "requested police permisison to interview"
defendant, which was granted. During the third "interview," which
lasted about four-and-one-half hours, defendant made an incriminating oral statement.
After public announcement by the police of defendant's admission, the following morning, while still being detained illegally,
Papworth made a "voluntary" statement to reporters, a statement
which was broadcast locally and was played off to the jury at the

trial.
Actual custody was then turned over to federal agents, who
promptly brought him before a United States Commissioner. The
court agreed that "the admission made by Papworth while being
held under circumstances that would have been illegal under federal rules was truly the basis of the charge against him," 81"but
affirmed the conviction:
348. Papworth v. United States, 256 F.2d 125 (1958); Home v. United States,
246 F.2d 83 (alternative holding), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 878 (1957); Brown
v. United States, 228 F.2d 286 (1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 986 (1956); White v.
United States, 200 F.2d 509 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 999 (1953).
349. 256 F.2d 125 (1958).
350. Id. at 126.
351. Id. at 128.
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We think there is adequate support for the trial court's finding that the
arrest was by the state officers without inducement by the FBI agents,
and that therefore the detention was state and not federal detention. There
was thus no requirement, since there was no opportunity, for the federal
agents to take Papworth before the United States Commissioner until the
state officers made him available for the purpose.3 52
A recent federal district case, United States v. Tupper,35 3 threw
out incriminating statements elicited by federal agents while the
suspects were being illegally detained by state authorities, finding
the requisite "working arrangement" between Kansas City, Missouri,
and federal police. A Seventh Circuit detention case, United States
3 54
by way of dictum, pointed to similar collaboration bev. Harris,
tween Chicago and federal police. These cases cut further into the
"separate sovereignties" concept and suggest that further consideration of the Anderson problem by the Supreme Court is warranted.

While this Article was in galley-proof, the Second Circuit handed
down a decision which may well precipitate reconsideration of

Anderson. In United States v. Coppola,355 it excluded a confession
obtained by federal officers during illegal state detention although
it did not appear that the state police had acted at the request of
federal officers. The court took the position that-"The only 'work-

ing arrangement' spelled out by the facts of that case [Anderson]
is the one we have here-such cooperation between federal and
local police as permitted the former to interrogate the latter's pris-

oner during their detention by the latter."35 '
352. 318 U.S. at 356.
353. 168 F. Supp. 907 (W.D.Mo. 1958).
[T]he Kansas City Police Officers cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation as much as possible and always call suspects of federal criminal violations to the attention of the FBL If a suspect is arrested and a federal offense is
disclosed, it is called to the attention of the member of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation who is generally present at Police Headquarters every weekday
morning, attending the show-up. It is not the general practice of the Kansas
City, Missouri, Police Department to file a lesser state charge against an arrested
suspect when he is also suspected of commiting a greater, federal offense.
Id. at 908.
354. 211 F.2d 656, 660 (1954).
355. 28 U.S.L. W=sx 2038 (2d Cir. July 20, 1959).
356. Ibid. Although I regard the Coppola approach a salutary one, I find its reliance on the Anderson "facts" misplaced. It is true that the Anderson opinion does not
spell out the details of the "working arrangement," but the record certainly does.
The government's own testimony discloses inter alia:
More than a week before petitioners were arrested, two federal agents arrived on
the scene to investigate the dynamiting [Record, pp. 165-68], immediately contacted
the local sheriff, and proceeded to investigate the case "constantly associated" with
him [R. 332]. The chief deputy sheriff was "around among them [F.B.L agents] all
the time" and "talked with them" before any arrests were made [R. 268].
One federal agent told the sheriff he wanted to talk to various suspects and could
not do so unless they were in custody, whereupon the sheriff took them into custody
"on his own accord" [R. 333]. A day after defendants and others were taken into
custody by state officers, and five days before they were arrested by federal officers,
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Henderson v. United Statese35 7 is some indication that the problem
of ascertaining federal-state collaboration looms in the field of
entrapment, too. After a series of conferences among state officials,
including one meeting which admittedly took place with a federal
alcohol-tax agent, 5 8 a state deputy sheriff used his position to persuade defendant to produce 'moonshine." In marked contrast to
its position in the search and seizure and illegal detention cases,"'
the Fifth Circuit, without bothering to rely on possible federal-state
collaboration, reversed on broad grounds:
While state officers are not agents of the United States, yet under the cooperative conception of the federal system, they bear to the Government a much
closer relationship than strangers.
The just rule seems to us to be that, when a state officer has induced a
person otherwise innocent to commit a crime in order to punish him therefor, the United States cannot take over the task of punishment by prosecuting for the federal offense without allowing the defense of entrapment, the
same as if the inducement had been by a federal officer. The moral wrong
in each instance is equally grave, and each is equally outside of and contrary to the spirit of the statute defining the federal offense. 00

The issue, however, is far from settled."0"
Do not such cases as Mills, Bartkus, Papworth, Tupper and Henderson, and the many search and seizure cases discussed in the preceding subsection, strongly suggest that much of the "separate sovereignties" talk is just so much metaphysical nonsense?
It is true that drawing broad conclusions from the facts disclosed
in reported decisions is a treacherous business. Courts intervene
only sporadically and often only the more flagrant abuses come to
their attention. The impressions gathered from reading decided
cases, then, may well be misleading. I do not think this can be said
on this occasion, however.
Indeed, I think the cases themselves amply refute the possibility
that they constitute isolated instances. For the pattern of federalstate cooperation they manifest is strong and unmistakable.8 2
eight federal agents and the local sheriff and his deputy attended an "organizational
meeting" during which time "we went over a list of individuals that wo thought
might possibly be implicated." [R. 170.]
357.
358.
359.
360.

237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956).
See Brief for Appellee, p. 5, cited in 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1302 (1957).
See discussion at notes 294, 307-09 and 348-52 supra.
237 F.2d at 176.
361. Compare 57 CoLum. L. REv. 432, 433--34 (1957), with Note, 42 MINN. L.
REv. 121, 127-29, 132-34 (1957), and 70 Hxnv. L. REv. 1302, 1304-06 (1957).
362. Among those cases already discussed, reconsider particularly Silbort, note
274; Euziere, note 293; Shurman, text at note 294; Scotti, text at note 308; Papworth,
text at notes 349-52; Tupper, note 353.
See also Graham v. United States, 257 F.2d 724, 728 (6th Cir. 1958) (admitting
the evidence) (fact that assistant attorney general of state gave federal agent in area
a tablet taken from person of defendant which upon analysis proved to be morphine,
which information was given to state official, did not establish requisite collaboration
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However, we need not-and we should not-rest on the cases
alone. There is a plethora of other material which underscores the
modem realities wrought by much overlapping federal-state crime
legislation, undermanned federal enforcement staffs, and extensive
3
feq'a -training programs and service functions for local police. 0
because this was "customary in all cases of samples received from police officers");
United States v. Stirsman, 212 F.2d 900, 902 (admitting the evidence) (7th Cir.
1954) (city detective assigned to stolen automobile detail admitted on cross examination "that in any case involving a car that is transported from one state to another,
he works with the federal authorities," but stated, on redirect, that at the time he
apprehended defendant he "was not working in any degree with regard to this specific
case with the federal authorities").
363.
The area where federal and state crimes overlap is large. It covers much of the
more common criminal activity including inter alla possession and sale of narcotics,
some types of embezzlement, sending threatening or extorting communications in
interstate commerce or the mails, interstate fleeing from justice, various sorts of
fraud, transportation of liquor into dry states, interstate transportation or mailing
of lottery tickets or obscene matter, racketeering affecting interstate commerce,
transportation in interstate commerce of stolen goods or vehicles or falsely made
or forged securities, sale or receipt of these items and interstate white slave traffic.
Parsons, State-Federal Crossfire in Search and Seizure and Self-Incrimination, 42
L.Q. 346, 348-49 (1957).
CoRaN.
From the very beginning of our national life, state and federal systems of law
enforcement have been brought into frequent contact.... But the most significant developments occurred in the present century in the form of congressional
enactments. Thus, in rapid succession, Congress adopted such laws as the Mann
Act, the Harrison Act, the Dyer Act, the Lindberg Law, the Fugitives from Justice Act, and many others. This legislation, in the most direct and significant fashion, introduced federal personnel and federal power into the area of even routine
law-enforcement. . .. And there have been other sorts of federal influence in
the field. The importance of training programs for state police officers, conducted
by such agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Narcotics
Bureau, and the service functions of federal agencies, such as the maintenance
of fingerprint files and scientific aids to detection available to state law enforcement, should not be underestimated. The net result of these federal activities
has been to render wholly inadequate the traditional concept of rigid separation of federal and state powers in criminal law enforcement.
Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8
DE PAm. L. REv. 213-14 (1959).
The Federal Gambling Tax, 65 Stat. 529 (1951), 26 U.S.C. § 3285 et.seq. (1952),
requiring every person accepting wagers to register his name and places of residence
and business, furnishes an interesting example of overlapping federal-state crime
legislation. While a heavy fine is provided for failure to pay either the wagering tax
or to purchase the tax stamp and wilful violations are punishable by imprisonment up
to five years, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3294, 2707, gambling is illegal in almost all states. Some
comic relief was provided when stamp collectors who eagerly purchased the special
issue the first day it became available soon found themselves aceosted by local police
because Treasury Department records revealed they possessed the gambling stamps.
See Chenoweth, A Judicial Balance Sheet for the FederalGambling Tax, 53 Nw. U.L.
RBv. 457, 459 & n.21 (1958).
At least until the recent decision of the Internal Revenue Bureau, as disclosed by
Assistant Commissioner Clifford Stowe, to "better develop cases of our own rather
than relying on cases developed by local police," Hearings Before the Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Appropriations,85th Cong., 2d Sess. 466 (1958) (Treas.Post Office Appropriations for 1959), city and state police have been an important
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For decades now, it has been apparent, for example, that the
Secret Service Division-one of whose agents lurked so ominously
in the Lustig casedepends materially on the cooperation of police departments and other
local law-enforcement agencies in the apprehension of criminals, raids on
counterfeiting plants, protection of the President, and enforcement work
of an emergency nature. In a number of cities, especially the larger ones,
police detectives are said to be in daily attendance at the district offices
of the Secret Service; and, in some, police officers are detailed to give their
entire time to the work of this federal agency under the supervision of the
Secret Service operatives in charge. This cooperation is not the result of
any formal agreement, and it does not consist of an elaborate and continuous exchange of services, as is largely the case with the Bureau of Investigation. It is a kind of relationship that cannot be statistically measured and
it is not advertised; but it is said to be accorded to Secret Service agents
everywhere whenever requested. The Division could not function as effectively as it does without the full cooperation of state and local agencies;
and its officials believe that it would require a field personnel ten times as
great as the present Secret Service force if it were to operate without the
assistance rendered by local agencies.30 4

Consider, too, the recent observations of the Director of the FBI:
The great majority of law enforcement officers are presently so efficiently
equipped and operated that any officer can get immediate assistance merely
by turning to his . . . telephone or radio transmitter. These same methods

can just as easily be applied to the exchange of necessary information ...
While the FBI is requesting and receiving daily assistance from local law
enforcement in conducting raids and apprehensions, as well as in the many
other problems incident to our mutual work, it strives to co-operate in return
3 65
through its central services.

Perhaps the best illustration of the extent to which the traditional

concept of rigidly separate federal and state law enforcement has
broken down may be found in the narcotics field, the setting of so
many a search and seizure case:
Most of the States have the Uniform State Narcotic Law. All of them
have some sort of narcotic laws. Many communities have special narcotic
ordinances. The great interest and wide support given by local police in
campaigns to stamp out the narcotic evil has contributed much to the
Federal control pattern. Cooperation between Federal narcotic officers
and the local police in the enforcement of the narcotic laws has been about
as close to perfection as human frailty will permit. Every day from St. Paul
source of federal prosecutions under the Federal Gambling Tax. See Chonoweth,
supra, at 460, 473. At the other end, at least two cities have passed ordinances making possession of the federal tax stamp unlawful and the courts of at least two states
have sustained statutes providing that possession of a tax stamp is prima faclo evidence of violation of state gambling laws. Id. at 465-68; Comment, 8 DE PAUL L. REV.
362, 364--66 (1959).
364.

MILLSPAUGH,

CRIME

CONTROL

BY
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NATIONAL

(1937).
365. Hoover, The Basis of Sound Law Enforce'ment, 291

GOvERNMFNT,

ANNALS

118-19

39, 42, 44 (1954).
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to New Orleans, from Los Angeles to New York, narcotic agents are engaged in cooperative ventures with one police agency or another. It is a
fine testimonial to the feeling of mutual confidence which exists with other
law enforcement officers and prosecutors that few narcotic cases of consequence are developed in the United States without the active participation
of the Bureau of Narcotics.3 68
These comments by Commissioner Anslinger are hardly surprising, coming, as they do, after his earlier testimony that considering
the herculean tasks confronting his men, the entire federal narcotic

bureau is but "a piece of blotting paper to mop up the ocean."3 17
The 1951 and 1955-1956 congressional hearings on traffc in, and
control of, narcotics are rich with specific examples of hand-in-hand
federal-state law enforcement. Thus, one federal narcotic agent
told of three cases.
In oneWe had one detective sergeant, from the Detroit city narcotics squad, assigned to us. He was working with us, reporting to our office. Later in the
case, we used another city officer... 38

In the secondOn the first week end, we used about 8 agents of the Bureau of Narcotics
and Commissioner Boos of the Detroit Police Department furnished us vith
about 12 city officers of the city narcotics squad, and we made this roundup on Friday night, all day Saturday, Saturday night, and Sunday. We were
able to arrest about fifty-some over the weekend. . . . Fifty have been sentenced in the Detroit Federal ourts..... We do not have sufficient staff

to begin to cope with the problem. We do have in Detroit the very active
cooperation of the city police department that maintains a large narcotics
squad. Were it not for them, this thing would have gotten a great deal
further out of hand than it did, and we would not have been able to accomplish this roundup 3 69

On a third occasion, "in a major case"[ilt was necessary for us to go to the county attorney's office and get $5,000
to make a purchase from . .. [two major peddlers] for lack of funds in our
office. . . . They were two of the largest national peddlers in this country.
And we prosecuted those cases in the State court, because we had received
the money from the district attorney, Hogan. There was cooperation on the
part of the New York police and the district attorney's office. Those men
worked with us night and day on that case.370
366. ANsLrNGER & To-mPrTs, THE TRArIc iN NArCOncs 169 (1953). To the
same effect is Commissioner Anslinger's statement that "in our work, we have placed
great reliance and value on the cooperative assistance of local police officials." Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Traffic in, and Control of, Narcotfcs, Barbiturates,
and Amphetamines of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
1384 (1956) (hereinafter called 1956 Narcotic Hearings).
367. HearingsBefore the Specia Senate Committee to Investigate Organized Crime
in Interstate Commerce, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 14, at 430 (1951) (narcotics)
(hereinafter called 1951 Narcotic Hearings).
368: Testimony of Ross B. Ellis, 1951 Narcotic Hearings at 413.
369. Id. at 417-18.
370. Id. at 419.
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The Chicago Commissioner of Police noted:
Now, the United States Bureau of Narcotics and the Narcotic Bureau
of the Chicago Police Department have worked in close cooperation on
many investigations, arrests, and prosecutions and in particular cases involving major violators. Whenever practical this department has turned
over certain cases to the Federal Bureau for prosecution in its courts.8 71

Similarly, the Illinois-Indiana-Wisconsin District Supervisor of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics said of Lieutenant Healy's Chicago
Narcotics Bureau:
They have a large staff of men who operate in the field of narcotics
investigations. The cooperation between his organization and the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics has been 100 percent.
We worked on most cases together and if he runs into an interstate
trafficker, before he even investigates he will call our office and we will
figure out ways and means in which to build up a better and stronger
372
case against the alleged violator.

And the State's Attorney of Cook County observed:
Each case where both State and Federal agencies are involved becomes
a matter for individual consideration as to who should act first. . . . Federal and State authorities are in full cooperation. There has been much
interchange and interaction in the cause of justice, and the courts to be
used have been determined after consultation. 73

And so it goes. .... "I

"A new system of cooperative federalism has appeared" in criminal-law enforcement, Professor Francis Allen recently commented,
"the full significance of which has not been grasped by the public at
large. .
." 37 Nor, he might have added so long as the likes of
the "silver platter" doctrine are on the books -

by the federal courts

in particular.
371. Testimony of Timothy J. O'Connor, 1956 Narcotic Hearings at 976. To the
same effect is the report of Lt. Joseph Healy of the Chicago Narcotic Bureau, id. at
966.
372. Testimony of Albert E. Aman, id., at 1065.
373. Testimony of John Gutknecht, id., at 948.
374. See also e.g., testimony of Allyn B. Crisler, Washington-Orogon-IdahoMontana District Supervisor, id. at 888 ("What success we have achieved in reducing
the illicit traffic in this district is due to the excellent cooperation received from United
States attorneys, Federal courts and all law-enforcement agencies. We work very
closely with police department narcotic squads."); testimony of J. H. Page, Supervising Customs Agent, id. at 612 ("Instances in which the narcotics squad has operated in close cooperation with local and Federal authorities making narcotics Investigations are demonstrated in a case in which the squad cooperated closely with agents
of the New York district of the Bureau of Narcotics and with the Now York City
Police Department Narcotics Squad. This investigation has resulted in the seizuro
of 46 ounces of cocaine and over 100 pounds of marihuana in the United States.");
testimony of Commisisoner Anslinger, id. at 122 ("All through New Jersey where wo
have any problem - sometimes in Atlantic City or in Newark we might run into some
trafficking-the Federal, State police, and local police and sheriffs all work as a
team.").
375. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of CriminalJustica,
8 DE PAUL L. Rzv. 213, 214-15 (1959).
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(5) Does McNabb point the way? The problems of proof raised by
the "silver platter" doctrine are quite substantial. But major difficulties of proof are encountered in other areas of criminal procedure,
too, notably the law of confessions. In Aslwraft v. Tennessee,378 for
example, Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority, observed:
As to what happened in the fifth-floor jail room during the thirty-six hour
.secret examination the testimony follows the usual pattern and is in hopeless conflict. . . .
As to whether Asheraft actually confessed, there is a similar conflict of

testimony....
Such disputes, we may
say, are an inescapable consequence of secret
3 77
inquisitorial practices

Since what happened when the accused was alone with the police
typically becomes an issue of his word against theirs, to find where
the truth lies in such circumstances has been viewed as "often . . .
a difficult, if not impossible task" 37 8 and the safeguards upon which
rest the traditional confessions rule branded "illusory." 379
What, then, is to be said about the safeguards upon which the
"silver platter" doctrine depends, when the accused quite possibly
does not even suspect pre-raid, federal-state activities, or, if he does,
quite likely was not even present when federal and local police
met or otherwise communicated with each other? When the accused, therefore, often does not have so much as "his word against
theirs"? Or in the unlikely event that he does, cannot so much
as point to marks or bruises to substantiate his version? 380
376. 322 U.S. -143(1944).
377. Id. at 149-152.

378.

DouGLAS, TnE RIrc'r OF THE PEoPr
155 (1958).
379. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:1,55 YAtE L.J. 694,

708 (1946).
380. This is not to say that the victim of a coerced confession who is able to establish that he has sustained injuries necessarily prevails on the fact question. See e.g.,
the discussion of the Wacat case in A2ucA- C .nL
Lmmrrms Umox,Iwois Drvsioi, SEcRET DETENTIoN BY Tm CmcAco PoucE 16-17 (1959):
[S]ix days after the original arrest, the five detectives assigned to interrogate
valkt had what they wanted: a signed confession of burglary. Then, and only
then, did the police take Wakat to court and charge him with a crime. Basing
their case on the confession, the police obtained a conviction. NValat was sent
to prison to serve a 10-20 year sentence.
Seven years later, the nlinois Supreme Court ordered NVal-aes release. [People v. Wakat, 415 IML 610, 114 N.E.2d 706 (1953). He had at last managed
to prove that his confession had been extorted from him by a series of violent
beatings administered by police during his secret detention....
On May 31, 1957, a jury in the Federal court of Judge Walter J. LaBuy awarded
Wakat $15,000 for the violation of his constitutional rights. [Wakat v. Harlib,
253 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1958)]...
Leslie Wakat's success in proving that police brutality had forced his confession was due to proof of certain key circumstances. Among them was the
fact that at the conclusion of his secret "interrogation," Wakat was suffering
from broken bones in his right hand, multiple bruises on his chest, arms, buttocks, shins and A--ders, and from injuries to his left leg and knee so serious
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Assume that the requisite federal participation did in fact occur
in a particular case, but that the government denies it? Is it an
exaggeration to say that frequently, if not typically, about all the
accused can do under the circumstances is pray that the officers'
testimony turns out to be inherently unbelievable or disturbingly
inconsistent?
What is called for is the same measure of vigor and alertness
which the Court has exhibited in coping
with the evidentiary prob38
lems raised by the law of confessions. '

In the federal courts, this, I think, is the main thrust of the
much-maligned and much-misunderstood (purposely or otherwise)
McNabb-Mallory rule, which excludes all statements elicited during
prolonged pre-commitment detention, whether they appear to be
voluntary or not.38 2 Conflicts over the nature of the secret interro-

as to require eight months treatment. The police account of the manner In
which Wakat had sustained his injuries ("He grabbed for my revolver and
we both tangled and fell down the stairs about 25 or 30 feet") was demonstrated to be false. According to expert medical testimony, certain of his injuries could not possibly have occurred in the manner claimed by the police.
Cf. HopxINs, 0u LAWLEss POLicE 284 (1931):
The police must be ready to support the confession in case of serious challenge of its validity. Perhaps the suspect's face or body shows marks; perhaps
a doctor will testify; perhaps long incommunicado, readily established, may lend
color to the defendant's tale of maltreatment. So the confession may be repudiated, and counter-rebuttal becomes necessary. In this juncture, the police
seldom hesitate.
"The defendant fell downstairs while we were bringing him down for questioning." This has been used again and again, a caustic judge once having
commented that the police never seemed to fall down those same stairs. "The
defendant became disorderly in his cell, and his cell-mates beat him up." That
is sometimes corroborated by cell-mates, themselves defendants. "The defendant rolled off a bench in his cell and bruised himself on the concrete floor."
The benches are only a few inches high. A man in Detroit died from such a fall
in November 1930. "The defendant banged his head on the cell-door as we
were taking him out." This saw service in Chicago.
381. In confession cases coming up from the state courts there has been an
"expansion of constitutional doctrine":
Apparently in part to relieve the defendant of some of the difficalties in
the proof of police abuse, the Court seems to have taken the view that prolonged secret interrogation, in effect, raises a presumption of over-reaching on
the part of the law-enforcement officers.
Second, the recent confession cases in the Supreme Court reveal a suspicion
on the part of the prevailing justices of interrogatory procedures requiring
the secret custody of the suspect, often in violation of speedy-arraignment
statutes, as providing the opportunity and temptation for police abuse, whether
or not such occurs in any particular case. ...
Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45
ILL. L. REV. 1, 28, 29 (1950).
382. According to Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 CEO. L.J. 1, 32--33 (1958) the "real roots of the McNabb rule"
lie in the preservation of an untainted administration of justice, in the Court's
desire to avoid "contamination by plunging into the cesspool itself." They contend
that while "at first blush" the McNabb rule "is seen as an outgrowth of the Court's

WOLF AND LUSTIG

1193

awareness that the barrier against receipt of coerced confessions is one easily
vaulted .. .if the danger of coercion were in the forefront of the Court's mind
. .. that danger could have been taken into account by a rebuttable, rather than a
conclusive presumption of involuntariness." Id. at 28-29.
But could full account thus be taken of the danger?
The precise status of the federal cases on the allocation of responsibility between
judge and jury in ascertaining the voluntariness of a confession is in doubt. Frequently cited is the language in Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 624 (1896),
that where there is a conflict of evidence the question "may be left to the jury
with the direction that they should reject the confession if unn the whole evidence they are satisfied it was not the voluntary act of the defendant." But the
federal courts have split over whether such procedure is permissible or required.
See Annot., 170 A.L.R. 567, 599-601 (1947). In any event, the prevailing practice
is to have the jury resolve such conflicts. See, e.g., Tyler v. United States, 193
F.2d 24, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 908 (1952); Iva I. Kuko
Toquiri D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 356 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 935 (1952); Williams v. United States, 189 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir.
1951); United States v. Ruh, 55 F. Supp. 641, 645 (D.Wyo. 1944). Cf. Home v.
United States, 246 F.2d 83, 85 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 878 (1957),
ruling that where there was "ample evidence to authorize admissibility" the trial
judge "properly charged the jury that it should consider the evidence tendin
to show that the confessions were not voluntary in passing on their credibility'.
But as Professor Meltzer points out, "a confession although involuntary, may be extremely credible, for example, when its disclosures are confirmed by independent
evidence" and "conversely, a confession, although voluntary, may not be credible,
for example, when it is the product of hallucination." Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. CmL L.
REv. 317, 320 (1954).
It is unlikely that the trial judge will finally resolve the issue of voluntariness
himself. See, e.g., United States v. Ruhi, supra, 55 F. Supp. at 645:
I think that it is .. .a matter of some hazard for a trial court to rule upon
it [the voluntariness of a confession] as a matter of law and not present it
as a question of fact to the jury, so I shall rule that the confession is admitted
as evidence in the trial, with such surrounding circumstances as both the Government and the defendant wish to present to the jury concerning it.
Indeed, it is by no means clear that the trial judge can finally resolve the
issue against the defendant, Meltzer, supra at 321-2. "Since trial courts, out of an
abundance of caution, often submit the issue to the jury even though there is no
substantial evidence of involuntariness, judicial announcements that submission is
unnecessary under such circumstances are often dicta." Id. at 321-22 n.23.
What, then, would a defendant gain by a rebuttable presumption of coercion?
Rarely will this earn him a final favorable ruling by the trial judge, since almost
always the prosecution will present substantial counterproof. A permissive presumption would enable him to "get to the jury" without specific evidence of coercion, but rarely, if ever, does he fail to get there now. A mandatory presumption,
i.e., one which requires the jury to find in his favor absent contrary proof, will
accomplish little more as a practical matter, since, as pointed out above, almost
always there will be substantial proof to the contrary. See generally McCoihuaux,
EviDsacE 639-41, 649--50 (1954).

"Getting to the jury" is a small comfort to the defendant who claims his confession was coerced. See, e.g., the cases discussed at note 23 supra.
Even in confession cases coming up from the state courts, the Court has not
always been content to rest on rebuttable presumptions of coercion. The prosecutions evidence in Asheraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), was sufficient to
overcome the strongest presumption of coercion, but the Court deemed the circumstances "inherently coercive." See the discussion in note 23 supra. See also the discussion, at note 50 supra, of the most recent Supreme Court confession case, Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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gation are by-passed; "temptation" to and "opportunity" for obtaining coerced confessions are minimized:
[Prompt commitment] checks resort to those reprehensible practices
known as the "third degree....
It aims to avoid all the evil implica88
tions of secret interrogation of persons accused of crime.3
What happens behind doors that are opened and closed at the sole
discretion of the police is a black chapter in every country. . . . In the
McNabb case we tried to rid the federal system of those breeding grounds
for coerced confessions .... 384
[The McNabb] experiment has been made in an attempt to abolish the
opportunities for coercion which prolonged detention without a hearing
is said to enhance .... 385
[S]uch unwarranted detention led to tempting utilization of intensive
interrogation, easily gliding into the evils of "the third degree."
The arrested person . . . is not to be taken to police headquarters in
order to carry out a process of inquiry that lends itself, even if not so designed, to eliciting damaging statements . . .
[T]he delay must not be of a nature to give opportunity for the extraction of a confession.8 86

The begrudging reception currently accorded claims of federal-

state collaboration in illegal searches, a reception all the more omi-

nous inthe face of modem hand-in-band federal and state law enforcement, demonstrates that there is much to be said for McNabbtype treatment in this area, too. It demonstrates that the "silver

platter" doctrine (a) raises evidentiary problems, and (b) furnishes
temptation to and opportunity for collusion, of the same magnitude

as the87 dangers in prolonged detention which evoked the McNabb
rule.

Perhaps a more fundamental objection to the analysis of Professors Hogan and
Snee is that a rebuttable presumption of coercion would scarcely remove, If it
would even substantially diminish, the temptation to elicit coerced confessions during
prolonged detention.
Hogan and Snee would have done well to rely on two recent cases which exclude nonconfessional evidence as products of illegal detention, Bynum v. United
States, 262 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (excluding fingerprints taken during this
period); United States v. Klapholz, 280 F.2d 494 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
924 (1956) (excluding contraband property obtained through access to persons
while illegally detained). These cases do support Hogan's and Snee's analysis, but
it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will approve them. For the view
that the nature and function of the McNabb rule does not justify its extension to
nonconfessional evidence see Note, 66 YAxx L.J. 270 (1956).
383. McNabb v. United States, 818 U.S. 382, 344 (1943).
384. United States v. Carnigan, 342 U.S. 36, 46 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting
on another point).
385. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 476 (1953).
386. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453, 454, 455 (1957).
387. To some extent, but to a lesser extent, these evidentiary problems are also
raised by the decision in Burdeau v. McDowall, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), that the
United States may retain for use in federal prosecutions evidence wrongfully seized
by private individuals. E.g., as Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., noted, The Progress
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Hence the proposal that on practical grounds alone the "silver
platter" exception should be wiped out.
Even if the McNabb line of cases were not on the books, I think
this would be far from a revolutionary approach. After all, the intensity of federal-state cooperation in law enforcement is such
today that if the liberal approach of the 1930's still prevailed s ss the
"silver platter" rule would retain little significance. In most types
of cases, notably those dealing with narcotic violations, the requisite federal participation would invariably be found on the basis of
general understandings and practices.
The "silver platter" rule has been productive of much controversy. Controversy both over the requisite degree of federal participation generally, and the degree actually involved in the particular case. Under such circumstances, when the rule itself is
debatable there is something to be said for an alternative which
presents little or no opportunity for dispute in its application.sn
But there is much more to be said for dispensing with the "silver
platter" rule than economy of time and energy. Where formerly
federal agents might condone, if not invite, lawless methods by state
officers worldng with them, 390 there would now be a strong incentive to discourage such misconduct. "Of course, cooperation between federal and state authorities in criminal law enforcement
is to be desired and encouraged, for cooperative federalism ...
can indeed profit the Nation and the States,""' but where formerly
federal agents were sorely tempted to exploit this close cooperation to circumvent the rules, such a state of affairs would now be a
force for, not against, individual liberties. 12
of the Law 1919-1922, 35 HAIv. L. REv. 673, 703 & n.277 (1922), the Department
of Justice was criticized for having placed "undue reliance on co-operation with
corporations' secret services" in the Steel Strike of 1919. While the magnitude of
the problem of private-federal collaboration is evidently much smaller than that
of state-federal collaboration, it could become quite substantial with the emergence
of a large, aggressive private organization along the order of the American Protective League of World War I or the Anti-Saloon League of prohibition days. See
generally Black, Burdeau v. McDowall-A Judicial Milepost on the Road to Absolutism, 12 B.U.L. REv. 32 (1932).
388. See section 11-C-2 supra.
389. Cf. e.g., McCoancu, EvmmzcE 51 (1954) (comparing the merits of wideopen and restricted cross-examination).
390. "Routine acceptance and use of tainted evidence secured by another
agency encourages illegal search to the same extent as would a prior agreement."
Note, 58 YA.E L.J. 144, 159 (1948).
391. Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Bartus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 168-69
(1959).
392. Of course, federal-state cooperation could operate more fully for individual
liberties if evidence illegally obtained by federal authorities were also barred from
the state courts. But admissibility states generally admit such evidence, as do even
some of the exclusionary states. See note 199 supra.
Half a loaf, however, is better than none. There are a significant number of occa-
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That, at least, is the theory. And a theory we should put into
operation. That is, unless Thomas E. Dewey were right twenty
years ago when he viewed the "silver platter" exception as proof that
"the Federal courts have been compelled to depart
from their own
303
rule in order that the guilty may not escape."
But if he were right, the "silver platter" doctrine should displace
the federal exclusionary rule-not remain an exception to it.80',
CONCLUSION

If Wolf had held that the illegal search by Colorado police did
not constitute the kind of illegal search that violates due process,
the result would have been much more understandable. And perhaps much more meaningful. For I suspect the law today would
have been that in those aggravated cases where an illegal state
search does violate due process, evidence so obtained must be excluded. That is to say, I suspect the result in Irvine would have
been otherwise. Perhaps in the course of extending the substantive
protection of due proces to all unreasonable searches, however
technical the basis, as it seems to have done, the Court concomitantly diluted the arguments for exclusion of such evidence.
The circuitous route the Court did take in Wolf led to a most
curious result. While it is true that real evidence may be much more
reliable than verbal, it is difficult to see how this explains the disparity of treatment in the confession and search and seizure areas inasmuch as even highly corroborated confessions are excluded, too.
While it is true that eliciting a confession is more often accompanied by physical violence than the gathering of real evidence, it
is difficult to see why "brutality to the person" 311 should be a pre-

requisite for exclusion in the search and seizure area when it is
not in the confession cases.
sions where officers of both "sovereignties" strongly prefer federal prosecutions,
e.g., because federal law provides stiffer penalties. See text at notes 308, 329 su pra.
A detailed discussion oS the use of federal-seized evidence in state courts is beyond the scope of this Article, but the problem is considered briefly at notes 199,
332 supra.
393. 1 NEw YoRK CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, REVISED RECOD 372 (1938).
394.
The Federal rule as it stands is either too strict or too lax. A Federal prosecutor
may take no benefit from evidence collected through the trespass of a federal
officer. The thought is that in appropriating the results, he ratifies the means.
• . . He does not have to be so scrupulous about evidence brought to him by
others. How finely the line is drawn is seen when we recall that marshals in
the service of the nation are on one side of it, and police in the service of the
states on the other. The nation may keep what the servants of the States
supply. . . . We must go further or not so far.
Cardozo, J., not going "so far" in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, -, 150 N.E. 585,
588 (1926).
395. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. at 133.
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Nor is it easy to see why the demands of federalism preclude the
exclusion of illegally seized physical evidence from the state courts
when they do not prevent the exclusion of illegally obtained confessions. The demands of federalism are no more compellingif not-less so-in search and seizure cases than in confession cases,
and the need for judicial intervention no less -if not greater. Why
did the Court fall back on the public opinion of the community in
Wolf, when it did not do so in the confession cases? Why was the
Court willing to rely fully on tort actions, criminal prosecutions
and internal police discipline in Wolf, when it refused to rest on
these largely illusory remedies in the confession cases? Is it too
much to say that in Wolf "formulas of respect for constitutional
safeguards prevailed over the facts of life which contradict
them"? 396
All in all, I venture to charge that Wolf, as written, is not a
"principled decision," i.e., "one that rests on reasons with respect
to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and
their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved." 39
If there is "a basis in neutral principle"398 for holding that the Constitution demands the exclusion of confessions obtained in violation
of due process, but permits the use of real evidence so obtained, I
have not been able to flnd it. Nor, I make bold to add, does Wolf
so much as suggest what it might be.
If Wolf means, as I think it does, that every unreasonable state
search violates due process, then it seems to strike at the very heart
of the "silver platter" exception. Wolf, in short, may be more than
an exercise in dialectics after all.
A reconsideration of the silver platter doctrine, however, may
well turn less on the meaning of Wolf than on the meaning of
McNabb. To the extent McNabb rests on a reluctance to debase the
administration of federal criminal justice, these considerations would
certainly seem to bar the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence
from the federal courts. To the extent McNabb represents an effort
to break through the problems of proof raised by the cry of
"coerced confession," the evidentiary difficulties raised by the issue
of federal-state collaboration in the search and seizure field are
no less, if not greater. Finally, to the extent McNabb is designed
to remove the considerable temptation to and opportunity for il396. To paraphrase the language of Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority
in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948).
.397. To use the terminology of Professor Herbert Wechsler in his 1959 Holmes
Lecture, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, as reported in part in
the Harvard Law Record, April 9, 1959, p. 3. The full text of the lecture will appear
in the November, 1959 issue of the Harvard Law Review.
398. ibid.
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legal interrogatory practices during illegal detention, the temptation to and opportunity for federal-state collaboration to circumvent the fourth amendment appears to be of the same magnitude
and worthy of the same judicial attention in this era of hand-inhand state and federal law enforcement. In short, McNabb attacks
the "silver platter" doctrine on two fronts; one "conceptual," the
other "practical." Whether the doctrine can emerge unscathed remains to be seen.
Unlike the situation with regard to the Wolf doctrine, the Court
has left itself much freedom of movement in the "silver platter"
area. How it will move, however, if it will move at all, is something
else again. For if "general propositions do not decide concrete
cases," 39 they decide them least of all in the search and seizure
field where the clash of values is so sharp and the notions about
these values the Justices bring to bear on a particular case so crucial. If skepticism about the efficacy of the exclusionary rule or
concern over the number of "obviously guilty" who directly benefit
thereby should prevail against the strong considerations of logic
and policy which call for the doctrine's demise it would not be the
first time that a distortion in the law resulted from "straining
toward conflicting ends, the end of truth and the end of furthering
the outside interest."400 In a word, while it will not be suprising if
the Court wipes out the "silver platter" exception, it will not be too
surprising if it does not.4"'
The Wolf doctrine is stronger stuff. Indeed, for better or worse,
it seems more firmly imbedded in the law today than when first
promulgated. For on its facts, Irvine goes much further. Yet, while
Irvine well illustrates "the tendency of a principle to expand itself
to the limits of its logic," 402 there is also precedent for the view that

a principle is never so vulnerable as when it is so expanded. Irvine
may yet prove to be a Black & White Taxicab case.40 3
399. Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76
(1905). See also Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145, 157 (1947).

400. McComuscx, EvIDENcE 162 (1954) (discussing the "eavesdropper" exception to privileged confidential communications).
401. Cf. the recent Bartkus, Knapp and Mills cases, discussed at notes 335-45
supra and accompanying text. But, as is not the case in the double jeopardy and
self-incrimination areas, a search and seizure "silver platter" problem, by definition, entails state action which is unconstitutional, or at least illegal, whether or
not there is collaboration.
402. CAnRnozo, THE NATuRE OF THE JurncLAL Poczss 51 (1925).
403. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928) probably constituted the most extreme application
of the doctrine laid down in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). The decision led to widespread criticism of Swift, see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
73 & n.6 (1938), culminating in its overruling in Erie.

